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Summary 
About seventy percent of the world’s poor live in the rural areas and are highly prone to 
poverty, price shocks, unemployment, lack of information, high risk in production, and 
imperfect labor and factor markets. Being poor and having no economic viability, poor people 
have very little or no access to resources like land and capital. In the absence of these 
resources, labor is the only tool to combat poverty and to strengthen their economic position.  
Women play a significant role in rural economy and constitute more than half of the 
rural labor force. They perform gender specific duties like preparation of food, storage of 
farm produce, taking care of infants, old or disabled family members, if any. Besides 
performing domestic duties, women also participate in farm and small scale non-farm 
activities. Despite of their valuable multidimensional responsibilities, their contribution 
towards household welfare is always underestimated. Rural development cannot be achieved 
without appreciating their dynamic role. To support this notion, there is need for gender 
analysis to estimate the role of women in accelerating the process of rural development. 
Commonly, gender refers to the position, responsibilities and activities assigned to men and 
women by the community, suggesting that the roles of men and women are different. Hence, 
in order to achieve a higher level of development, there is a need to appreciate the role of 
women in society. 
In the past few decades, agriculture was thought to be the most common way of earning 
in rural areas of developing countries. With the rapid increase in population coupled with 
inherent risks such as non-predictable weather conditions, economic as well as household 
shocks, the agriculture sector now has a lower growth potential. There is need to focus on the 
other sector of rural economy. The development of non-farm sector is often regarded to 
beneficial in raising employment opportunities, alleviating poverty, ensuring food security, 
stabling farm income, and increasing household welfare.  
This dissertation deals with the development activities of rural household of developing 
world, where poverty is wide spread and agriculture sector alone is insufficient to provide 
subsistence. In Pakistan, more than sixty percent of the population lives in the rural areas. 
Agricultural labor is the most common way of employment. The exponential increase in 
population has further stressed the depleting rural resources and created inability of the 
agricultural sector to absorb large labor force ; consequently resulting in social and economic 
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problems. Moreover, rural community is characterized by imperfect land and credit markets, 
missing insurance facilities and limiting access to inputs such as credit, fertilizer etc. 
Due to imperfect labor markets and lack of resources, household’s decision of labor 
allocation is affected. Thus, production and consumption decisions of the household are not 
separable, so household faces shadow wages which depend on the production technology and 
household’s preferences. Chapter 3 evaluates the labor supply behavior of rural households in 
Pakistan by using shadow wages which is vital for policy design to improve the welfare of the 
rural household. The functioning of labor market in Pakistan is tested by applying three tests 
of separability. All these tests strongly rejected the presence of perfect markets in Pakistan. 
 Chapter 4 estimates the impact of non-farm work on the household welfare. The rural 
non-farm sector is growing rapidly, becoming an important source of income, attracting the 
large labor force, and contributing to rural growth. With regards to factors that influence the 
participation in non-farm work, probability of participation increases with increased level of 
education, adult household size, and physical infrastructure, while lack of access to land, 
livestock, and credit decrease the likelihood of participation in non-farm work, for both male 
and female. The study shows that non-farm work increases the welfare and reduces the 
poverty level of rural household. 
One of the key challenges in the developing countries is to increase investment in order 
to enhance productivity in small-scale farming, which is the main source of income and food 
security for poor rural households. The poor households are unable to do agricultural 
investment due to liquidity constraints and insecure property rights. Chapter 5 investigates the 
role of non-farm work and land rights on the investment in soil conservation and productivity 
enhancing practices.  The study shows that non-farm participation and secure land rights tend 
to encourage more investment in long-term soil-improving measures and less to short-term 
productivity-enhancing chemical fertilizers. The findings also show that non-farm 
participation and secure tenancy arrangements have a positive effect on agricultural 
productivity. Findings suggest boosting up high return employment opportunities by reducing 
entry barriers and implying changes in land tenure system for agricultural growth. 
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Zusammenfassung  
Weltweit leben mehr als 70% der Armen in ländlichen Gegenden wobei sie Armut, 
Preisschocks, Arbeitslosigkeit, Informationsmangel, einem hohen Produktionsrisiko und 
unvollkommenen Arbeits- und Faktormärkten ausgesetzt sind. Aufgrund ihrer Armut und der 
fehlenden Wirtschaftlichkeit haben diese Menschen einen geringen oder keinen Zugang zu 
Land- oder Kapitalressourcen. Deshalb ist Arbeit die einzige Möglichkeit, ihre Armut zu 
bekämpfen und ihre ökonomische Situation zu stärken. 
Frauen spielen eine bedeutende Rolle in der ländlichen Wirtschaft und stellen mehr als 
die Hälfte der ländlichen Arbeitskräfte. Sie erfüllen geschlechtsspezifische Pflichten wie das 
Vorbereiten von Mahlzeiten, das Einlagern von Agrarerzeugnissen oder die Betreuung von 
Kindern sowie älteren oder behinderten Familienmitgliedern. Neben diesen Pflichten nehmen 
Frauen an landwirtschaftlichen und kleineren nicht-landwirtschaftlich bezogenen Aktivitäten 
teil. Trotz ihrer wertvollen multidimensionalen Verantwortung wird der weibliche Anteil an 
der Wohlfahrt eines Haushalts grundsätzlich unterschätzt. Eine ländliche Entwicklung kann 
nicht erreicht werden, wenn die dynamische Rolle von Frauen nicht anerkannt wird. Um 
diesen Gedankengang zu verstehen, bedarf es einer Geschlechteranalyse, welche die Rolle 
von Frauen als beschleunigenden Faktor in dem Prozess der ländlichen Entwicklung 
berücksichtigt. Allgemein gilt, dass es geschlechterspezifische Positionen, 
Verantwortlichkeiten und Aktivitäten gibt, die den Männern und Frauen durch die 
Gesellschaft zugeteilt werden, wobei von einer unterschiedlichen Rolle der Geschlechter 
ausgegangen wird. Daher muss die Rolle von Frauen in der Gesellschaft anerkannt werden, 
sodass ein höheres Entwicklungsniveau entsteht. 
In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurde die Landwirtschaft als übliche Einkommensquelle in 
den ländlichen Regionen von Entwicklungsländern betrachtet. Aufgrund des starken 
Bevölkerungswachstums hat dieser Sektor jedoch mittlerweile ein geringeres 
Wachstumspotential. Darüber hinaus haben Risiken in der Landwirtschaft wie Wetter, 
Saisonabhängigkeit oder haushaltsspezifische und wirtschaftliche Schocks das Potential 
zusätzlich verringert. Deshalb ist es notwendig, sich auf den Sektor der ländlichen 
Entwicklung zu fokussieren. Die Entwicklung des nicht-landwirtschaftlichen Sektors wir oft 
als nutzenbringend bezüglich der Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen, der Milderung von Armut 
sowie der Ernährungssicherheit, der Stabilität der ländlichen Einkommen und der 
Haushaltswohlfahrt. 
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Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit den Entwicklungsaktivitäten in ländlichen 
Haushalten in Entwicklungsländern, in denen Armut weit verbreitet ist und der Agrarsektor 
allein unzureichend ist, um den Lebensunterhalt zu sichern. In Pakistan leben mehr als 60% 
der Bevölkerung in ländlichen Gegenden. Die Landwirtschaft bietet die meisten 
Arbeitsplätze. Der stark ausgeprägte Bevölkerungszuwachs übt zusätzlichen Druck auf 
vorhandene Ressourcen aus und bringt soziale und ökonomische Themen an die 
Tagesordnung. Andere Faktoren betreffen unvollkommene Land- und Kreditmärkte, fehlende 
Absicherungsmöglichkeiten und eingeschränkten Zugang zu Ressourcen etc. 
Durch unvollkommene Arbeitsmärkte und den Mangel an Ressourcen wird die 
Haushaltsentscheidung bezügliche der Arbeitsverteilung beeinflusst. Daher sind Produktions- 
und Konsumentscheidungen eines Haushalts nicht voneinander zu trennen, da dieser sich mit 
Schattenlöhnen konfrontiert sieht, die wiederum von der Produktionstechnologie und den 
Haushaltspräferenzen abhängen. Das dritte Kapitel der Dissertation evaluiert das 
Arbeitsangebotsverhalten von ländlichen Haushalten in Pakistan mithilfe von Schattenlöhnen. 
Diese Bewertung ist grundlegend für die Politik, um die Wohlfahrt ländlicher Haushalte zu 
verbessern. Die Funktionsfähigkeit der Arbeitsmärkte in Pakistan wird durch die Anwendung 
von drei sogenannten "tests of separability". Alle Tests lehnen das Vorhandensein von 
perfekten Märkten in Pakistan ab. 
Im vierten Kapitel wird die Wirkung von nicht-landwirtschaftlicher Arbeit auf die 
Haushaltswohlfahrt beurteilt. Der ländliche nicht-landwirtschaftsbezogene Sektor wächst 
stetig und entwickelt sich damit zu einer wichtigen Einkommensquelle, zieht Arbeitskräfte an 
und leistet einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur ländlichen Entwicklung. Unter Berücksichtigung 
von Faktoren, welche die Teilnahme an nicht-landwirtschaftlicher Arbeit beeinflussen, steigt 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Teilnahme mit einem höheren Bildungsniveau, der 
Haushaltsgröße und physischer Infrastruktur und sinkt hingegen bei einem mangelnden 
Zugang zu Land, Vieh und Krediten. Dies gilt für Männer gleichermaßen wie für Frauen. Die 
Studie zeigt, dass nicht-landwirtschaftliche Arbeit die Wohlfahrt erhöht und das 
Armutsniveau von ländlichen Haushalten verringert. 
Eine der wichtigsten Herausforderungen in Entwicklungsländern ist der Einsatz von 
Investitionen, um die Produktivität kleinlandwirtschaftlicher Betriebe zu verbessern, welche 
die Hauptquelle für Einkommen der armen Haushalte in ländlichen Regionen darstellt und 
Nahrungsmittelsicherheit bietet. Arme Haushalte sind aufgrund von 
Liquiditätseinschränkungen und ungewisse Eigentumsrechte, nicht in der Lage agrarbezogene 
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Investitionen zu tätigen. Kapitel fünf erforscht die Rolle von nicht-landwirtschaftlicher Arbeit 
und Landrechten auf die Investitionstätigkeit in Bezug auf Bodenerhaltung und 
produktivitätssteigernde Maßnahmen. Die Studie beweist darüber hinaus, dass die nicht-
landwirtschaftliche Teilnahme und gesicherte Landnutzungsrechte langfristige, Boden 
verbessernde Maßnahmen begünstigen und den Einsatz von kurzfristig, 
produktionsverstärkenden chemischen Düngern einschränkt. Die Resultate zeigen zudem, 
dass nicht-landwirtschaftliche Teilnahme und gesicherte Pachtverträge einen positiven 
Einfluss auf die landwirtschaftliche Produktivität haben. Basierend auf unseren Ergebnissen 
wird eine Verstärkung von Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten mit einem hohen 
Einkommensniveau vorgeschlagen, indem Eintrittsbarrieren verringert und Veränderungen in 
Grundbesitzstrukturen vorangetrieben werden, die ein landwirtschaftliches Wachstum 
fördern. 
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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses on the fundamental need of gender analysis to be incorporated into rural 
household development activities. The rural areas of developing countries are of major 
concern for development. Despite of huge efforts over the last two decades to alleviate 
poverty more than 1.4 billion in the world are still subject to it and three-quarters of all these 
poor people live in rural areas (IFAD, 2011). Rural poverty results from lack of assets and 
access to information, limited economic opportunities, poor education, imperfect labor 
markets, as well as disadvantages rooted in social and political inequalities. The rural poor are 
highly sensitive to various shocks such as price fluctuations, ill health, poor harvests, social 
expenses, or conflicts and disasters, therefore a large proportion of these households move in 
and out of poverty repeatedly, sometimes within a matter of years.  
In the absence of other material and financial assets like land and capital, labor is the 
only principal and abundant asset to combat poverty and to strengthen the economic position 
of the rural poor people. Among the rural labor force, the female labor force accounts about 
51 percent of the population and is primarily responsible to meet basic family needs in low-
income food-deficit countries. Alongside of family needs they are also engaged in other 
productive tasks like participation in agricultural work, livestock caring, processing, and 
marketing of agricultural products, handicrafts and other small scale non-farm work. For 
instance in Asia, women produce 60 percent of the total food (Howard, 2003). Despite of the 
wide spectrum of their duties, their fundamental contribution is under-estimated and under-
supported by statisticians and policy makers and is often adversely affected by prevailing 
economic and development policies (Mies, 1987). Given the significance of their role in 
society, sustainable rural development cannot be achieved by ignoring or excluding the efforts 
of more than half of the rural population (FAO, 2009).  
Gender is commonly described as the position, responsibilities and activities assigned 
by the community endorsed to men and women. FAO (1997), defines the gender as perceptual 
and material relations between men and women, whose roles are based on the family 
structure, ownership and access to resources and are specific with different social, ethical and 
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ecological diversities. Difference in role of gender and social status is remarkably rigid. The 
situation not only varies among different cultures but even in the same culture within different 
social classes. Precisely, gender and its role are primarily associated with household decision 
making and setting the fate of households. Roles associated with gender describe the activities 
and responsibilities performed by both, men and women members socially assigned to them 
merely on the basis of gender and with prejudice (ICA-ILO, 2001; Mollel and Mtenga, 2001). 
So in order to achieve a higher level of development, there is need for the division of labor to 
excel in every sector of the economy.  
Since the onset of green revolution when new high yielding input responsive crop 
varieties were developed, agriculture was thought to be the main source of income and 
employment and the most common way of lifting rural masses out of poverty (Canagarajah, 
2001; World Bank, 2013). However, rapid increase in population, marginalization of lands, 
erratic weather pattern on the back of global climate changes, inaccessibility to efficient credit 
markets, production shocks, and diminishing capacity of the rural households to absorb these 
shocks has made this migration out of poverty a high risk and lower probability venture. 
The possible strategies to move out of this poverty trap are: undergoing migration to 
urban areas or even foreign countries; diversifying crops; increasing savings; depleting asset; 
changing the allocation of labor; and enduring informal borrowing. The most drastic way is 
the income diversification through development of non-farm employment. During the past 
decades, non-farm employment is often regarded to be useful in reducing unemployment by 
absorbing emergent rural labor force, in moderating the rural-urban migration, in increasing 
the household welfare and food security, in alleviating rural poverty, in enhancing the farm 
income and in promoting a more equitable distribution of income. 
Among the South Asian countries, Pakistan is a lower middle income country. 
Demographically it is characterized by poor rural and agrarian society where nearly two third 
of the population and 80 percent of the country’s poor are residing in the rural parts of the 
country. Hence, the development of the rural sector is essential for the micro and macro 
economy of Pakistan. The survival of rural economies is largely dependent on agriculture 
which contributes almost one fourth of the GDP, engaging 45 percent of the labor force. 
However at present, agricultural sector has been facing a long list of problems: the small sized 
farm holdings (Wan and Cheng, 2001; Rusu, 2002), imperfect credit markets coped with 
missing insurance facilities (Dercon, 2002), limited access to inputs (Lamb, 2003; Duflo et 
al., 2011), unavailability of credit (Odhiambo and Magandini, 2008) and increased cost of 
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production (Tan et al., 2008). The ownership of land is highly uneven due to class 
stratification. For instance, World Bank (2006) reported that almost 40 percent of land area is 
under the control of 2.5 percent people while less than half of rural households do not own 
any agricultural land. There is no change in the value (0.66) of Gini coefficient for land 
ownership for the last three decades. Moreover, the agriculture sector has no more potential to 
absorb the fast growing rural labor force.  
Hence, as a result of class stratification, increasing landlessness of small farmers, and 
population growth, non-farm sector in Pakistan is expanding. This sector in Pakistan, like in 
many other developing countries, is a heterogeneous sector covering a wide spectrum of 
activities. Generally, it includes non-farm self-employment, wage-labor, migration, non-labor 
work, renting of household and farm assets, and all other activities other than production of 
primary agricultural commodities. This sector is getting importance to rural economies for its 
productive and employment effects. Almost 45-50 percent of the rural population in Pakistan 
is directly dependent on non-farm income. Contribution of this sector is also critical for food 
security, poverty alleviation, farm sector competitiveness and productivity. It offers 
agricultural services and products to the food and fiber system. These products are critical to 
the dynamics of agriculture (GOP, 2011). 
This dissertation deals with the development activities of the households living in rural 
areas of developing countries, where poverty is pervasive and farming alone is incapable of 
providing sufficient means of survival. Labor activities are principal determinant in defining 
the welfare of rural households. Despite its fundamental role in welfare gain of rural people, 
there is inadequate evidence on labor supply decisions in developing countries. Engagement 
in high return non-farm activities enhances the economic status of household by attracting the 
large labor force. The rural non-farm sector is growing rapidly but it is difficult for the rural 
poor to enter into high returning non-farm work. Poor household generally has lack of access 
to capital, skills, information and social networks to enter into lucrative non-farm market 
(Barrett et al., 2005). On the other hand, richer households have more assets and resources 
that enable them to undertake high return non-farm work. Hence, it is significant to examine 
the determinants of participation in non-farm work and the impact of non-farm participation 
on household welfare. Non-farm income can also be used for making investment in farming in 
order to increase productivity by relaxing liquidity constraints and providing steady flow of 
income. These investments might be short-term like purchase of fertilizer and other variable 
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inputs or might be long-term like soil-improving and productivity-enhancing investments 
(Pfeiffer et al., 2009).  
The study is structured as follows. Chapter 3 evaluates the gender-based labor supply 
behavior of rural household under the assumption of non-separability between production and 
consumption decisions of households in Pakistan. A reasonable understanding of gender-
based labor supply behavior is essential for policy design to improve the welfare of the rural 
household in developing countries. Household decisions on how to allocate resources such as 
land, capital and labor are a function not only of available opportunities, but also of the need 
to minimize the possibility of shocks that can throw the household into poverty, prevent it 
from moving out of it, or reduce its ability to spend on its primary needs. Labor markets are 
often imperfect or missing, particularly in the rural areas. This market imperfection coped 
with constrained access to assets affects household’s decision of labor allocation and leads to 
different production regimes (Lovo, 2012). Under these conditions, production and 
consumption decisions of the household are not separable, so household faces shadow wages 
which depends on the production technology and household’s preferences. The findings 
reveal that labor supply of both male and female is sensitive to changes in shadow wages and 
income.  
The main objective of this study is to shed light on the determinants of household labor 
supply decisions that represent individual preferences and the intra-household bargaining 
process to cope with risks and to increase the welfare outcome. Education significantly 
increases the labor supply of both male and female in non-farm work and decrease the labor 
supply of own-farm and agri-wage work, suggesting the potential role of education in shifting 
labor from agriculture to high return non-farm sector. It shows the potential role of education 
to mobilize capital through high returning non-farm employment. Thus, education improves 
the ability of individuals to assign resources in response to changing economic conditions. 
Caste plays an important role in overthrowing the autonomy of female which is closely 
related to income inequality and distribution of land ownership. Female’s labor supply 
decreases in non-farm and agri-wage work as we move up to the caste category, indicating 
cultural and social barriers that prevent women from entering and remaining in the labor 
force. The study also shows that socially backward castes have higher constraints to enter in 
non-farm sector in the sense they face higher transaction costs. The proximity of physical 
infrastructure like factory or small scale industry in village can enable households to engage 
in high returning activities. The functioning of labor market in Pakistan was tested by 
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applying three tests of separability. All these tests strongly rejected the separability 
assumption showing the dependence of production and consumption decisions of rural 
households in Pakistan. This finding is in line with much of development literature showing 
the existence of imperfect markets in developing economies. 
Chapter 4 investigates the role of non-farm work of male and female on the welfare of 
rural household. In this study, we employ endogenous switching regression approach to 
examine the factors that influence the household’s decision to participate in non-farm work 
and the impact of participation on household welfare measures such as per capita expenditure 
and poverty levels in rural areas of Pakistan. As participation in non-farm work is not random, 
rather based on the net benefits of participation, so we rely on endogenous switching 
regression model to control for selection bias based on observables and unobservables. Given 
the significance of the non-farm work in contributing to household welfare, the focus here is 
to assess the role that gender plays in enabling or disabling these livelihood choices and to 
address gender heterogeneity.  
The participation equations reveal that education level of household head, adult 
household size, and physical infrastructure tend to positively and significantly influence the 
probability of participation of both male and female in non-farm work. On the other hand, 
lack of access to physical assets such as land and livestock, as well as lack of access to credit 
tend to decrease the likelihood of participation in non-farm work, for both male and female. 
The results also show that several household characteristics affect the welfare of participants 
and non-participants differently. In particular, adult household size tends to positively and 
significantly increase the welfare of participants, but has negative impact on the welfare of 
non-participants. Education of household head seems to be a key factor to increase welfare 
and to reduce poverty of both participant and non-participant by increasing the efficiencies of 
individual activities. The study shows that although the participation rate of female in non-
farm work is low but its contribution towards increased welfare is more as compared to male, 
depicting the importance of female participation in improving the welfare and reducing the 
poverty status of farm household. Overall the results from this study generally confirm the 
potential positive role of the non-farm work in improving household welfare and alleviating 
poverty in rural areas of developing countries. From a policy perspective, this study also 
highlights strategies that can be employed to reduce entry barriers to the non-farm sector, 
particularly for females, who face substantial barriers. 
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Chapter 5 evaluates the impact of non-farm work and tenancy arrangements on the 
intensity of investment in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures, as well as on 
farm productivity. One of the most enduring challenges in the developing countries has been 
the question of how to increase investment in order to enhance productivity in small-scale 
farming, which is the main source of income and food security for poor rural households.  
There is a need to focus on the intensification of agriculture practices by sustainable 
management of land and other natural resources. Investment measures are the key 
components of sustainable management of resources which ultimately enhance productivity 
of the farm sector. The poor households are not able to undertake soil-improving and 
productivity-enhancing investments because of the two major limiting factors. The first one is 
the irregular income and high covariate risk in agriculture sector. The second one is the lack 
of secure property rights of land. This situation has pushed the resource poor and land 
constraint households away from agriculture and urged to find employment opportunities in 
non-farm sector. Non-farm income may enhance investments in agriculture sector by 
providing capital in the context of imperfect credit and insurance markets. Hence, the role of 
non-farm sector has become increasingly significant in recent decades. 
Similarly, the secured property rights provide incentives for farmers to stimulate long-
term land-improving and productivity-enhancing investments in many ways. First, the 
‘assurance effect’ which is related to the security involved in undertaking long-term land 
improvement and conservation measures, without any fear of expropriation. The second 
effect, which is known as the ‘transaction effect’, operates through the trade effect when land 
is easily convertible to liquid assets as a result of tenure security. Third, secure tenancy 
improves farmer’s access to credit to finance agricultural investments by using land title as 
collateral. 
The problem of endogeneity of non-farm work participation and tenancy arrangements 
is addressed by employing multivariate tobit model. This study reveals that land tenancy 
arrangements influence investment intensity in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing 
measures. In particular, owner-cultivators invest more in soil-improving measures, but less in 
chemical fertilizer. On the other hand, fixed-rent tenants invest less in soil-improving 
measures, but more in chemical fertilizer. This highlights the fact that farmers on short-term 
fixed-rent contracts normally aim for short-term benefits and therefore tend to invest more in 
static inputs such as chemical fertilizer. However, owner-cultivators, with secured property 
rights, mostly target longer term benefits from their agricultural investments. 
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Further, the study also shows that participation in non-farm work increases the intensity 
of investment in soil-improving measures such as organic manure and green manure, but 
decreases the use of chemical fertilizer. Thus, household participation in non-farm work 
induces a shift toward investment in soil-improving measures with long-term benefits, and 
away from static inputs such as chemical fertilizer with short-term benefits. We also find 
evidence that participation in non-farm work exerts positive and significant impact on farm 
productivity, suggesting that access to non-farm work opportunities can contribute to higher 
farm household income and poverty reduction in rural areas. 
The study also used propensity score matching approach to examine the direct effects of 
investment in organic manure, green manure, and chemical fertilizer on farm productivity. It 
indicates that investment in organic manure, green manure, and mineral fertilizer exert a 
positive impact on farm productivity, indicating that it may partly account for the productivity 
impacts of tenure security. This study suggests boosting up high return employment 
opportunities and implying changes in land tenure system for agricultural growth. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Background 
The first part of this chapter includes introduction and geographic information of Pakistan, 
focusing on economic indicators like poverty status, population growth and labor force 
participation. The chapter also describes the role of agriculture sector, access to land and land 
reforms, and growing need of non-farm sector in the development of rural economy. At the 
end of this chapter problem setting, motivation, objectives, and significance of the study are 
presented. 
2.1 Pakistan – Geographic Profile 
Pakistan is an Islamic Republic, sovereign and a multiethnic country, situated in South Asia in 
the western part of the Indian subcontinent, with India (2912 km) on the east, Durand line 
with Afghanistan (2430 km) on the northwest, Iran (909 km) on the southwest, China (523 
km) on the northeast, and the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman (1046 km) on the south. 
Pakistan is the world’s 36th largest country with an area of 796,095 km2 (ICIMOD, 1998). 
The name Pakistan is derived from the Urdu words Pak (meaning pure) and stan (meaning 
country). Islamabad is the capital city with an approximate population 832,000 and other large 
cities include Karachi (13,125,000), Lahore (7,132,000), Faisalabad (2,849,000) and 
Rawalpindi (2,026,000) (Pakistan encyclopedia, 2013). 
The lowest point in Pakistan is sea level at the Arabian Sea (0 ft) and ranges to the 
northern and western highlands of Pakistan, including the gigantic Karakoram and Pamir 
mountain ranges. These mountain ranges take account of some of the world's highest 
pinnacle: K2 (28250 ft) and Nanga Parbat (26660 ft). The Plateau of Baluchistan lies to the 
west, and the Thar Desert and an expanse of alluvial plains, the Punjab and Sind, lie to the 
east of the country.  
Five rivers flow in the country. The Indus River rises in southwestern Tibet with a 
catchment area of about 1 million square kilometers. Other major rivers of Pakistan include 
Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej. These rivers also flow into Indus River. The Indus River 
basin is a fertile plain created by the silt deposited from the Indus River.  
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Figure: 2.1: Map of Pakistan. 
 
    Source: en.wikipedia.org 
 
Pakistan lies in the temperate zone and has a record of one of the highest temperatures 
in the world, 53.5 °C (128.3 °F) as on 26 May, 2010. The climate is subject to change from 
tropical to temperate on daily and seasonal basis as Pakistan is located on a wide land area 
starting from latitudes 25° and 35° N. Arid conditions prevail in the coastal south. Monsoon 
season follows a dry season. Rainfall ranges from 10 inches to 150 inches per annum. Punjab 
is the most rainfall receiving province (ICIMOD, 1998).  
There are four seasons in Pakistan: a cool but dry winter from December to February, a 
hot and dry spring from March to May, the rainy season or the monsoon from June to 
September and the retreating monsoon period of October and November. The onset and 
duration of these seasons varies significantly according to the location. The climate in the 
capital city of Islamabad varies from an average daily low of 5 °C (41.0 °F) in January to an 
average daily high of 40 °C (104 °F) in June. Half of the annual rainfall occurs in July and 
August, averaging about 300 millimeters (11.81 in) in each of those two months. The 
remainder of the year has significantly less rain, amounting to about 100 millimeters (3.94 in) 
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per month. Hailstorms are common in early spring. These climatic conditions are very 
suitable for the cultivation of wide variety of crops, beans, nuts, fruits, and vegetables 
(Pakistan encyclopedia, 2013). 
2.2 Poverty in Pakistan 
Poverty refers to lack of food, shelter and basic necessities like medical care, education, 
electricity and clean drinking water (World Bank, 2001). Like in several developing countries, 
poverty is also very common and widespread in Pakistan. The basic reasons behind this 
increasing poverty include corruption, inflation, high population growth rate, high 
unemployment level and to some extent, natural disasters like floods and earthquakes. United 
Nations (2013) reported that according to Human Development Index (HDI), about 53.4 
percent of the population in Pakistan lives in a state of deprivation of basic needs. 
Most of the poor people in Pakistan are concentrated in the rural areas where main 
source of livelihood is agriculture sector. This sector is poorly managed due to unequal 
distribution of land and financial constraints, causing poverty. During 1960s, poverty in rural 
areas was estimated about 42.28 percent whereas in the next decade the rural poverty had a 
decreasing trend. The factors responsible for this decrease in poverty were the increased 
private investment in agriculture sector and urbanization as a result of migration from rural 
areas to cities in quest of better living. Coped with agriculture sector development and 
remittances, this decreasing trend of poverty continued till 1980s (ADB, 2002). In the late 
1980s, again the poverty level started to increase. During 1990s and in 1999, the poverty rate 
decreased to 36.3 percent in rural areas as compared to 22.6 percent in urban areas (Zaman et 
al., 2011). 
Government of Pakistan is making valuable efforts to eradicate poverty and has 
allocated 4.5 percent of GDP for this purpose. Government has identified seventeen sectors 
being the poorest and efforts are being made to strengthen them all. Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviating Fund (PPAF) has disbursed about 7.5 billion PKR to different poverty alleviation 
projects like microcredit, supply of clean drinking water, education and health during July – 
December 2012. Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) has spent about 165 billion PKR 
for the prosperity and wellbeing of the poor in terms of employment, health and education 
(GOP, 2013). 
Apart from these numerous programs and poverty alleviation strategies, NGOs, Public 
and Private Organizations are helping to combat and finally eradicate poverty but these efforts 
18 
 
prove to be much smaller against the gigantic and ever increasing population. It proves that 
poverty cannot be alleviated merely by giving donations, providing food to the foodless and 
giving clothing to the needy.  In fact, there is a need of investment in human and physical 
capital. The true remedy of poverty is not to help the poor in kind or cash, instead making 
poor able to combat and overcome poverty. Helping poor people in skill development and 
ability to cope with risks can help them to earn their own income and to increase the standard 
of living.  
2.3 Population Growth and Labor Force in Pakistan  
Pakistan's estimated population in 2012 was 184.35 million, which makes Pakistan the 
world's sixth most-populous country. The sex ratio at birth is 1.05 male(s)/female, less than 
15 years is 1.06 male(s)/female, 15–64 years is 1.09 male(s)/female, 65 years and over is 0.92 
male(s)/female and the total population ratio is 1.07 male(s)/female. The population growth 
rate now stands at 2 percent. This increasing population is a great hurdle for economic growth 
and poverty alleviation strategies. The undeveloped economy lacks the potential to absorb this 
colossal labor force in productive activities and results in increased unemployment. Moreover, 
this labor force being unskilled receives low wages and cannot increase their standard of 
living. Keeping in view less employment opportunities and low wage rates, rural people tend 
to migrate to big cities. Increasing population promotes urbanization in developing countries 
and both are the joint tools to get high economic growth and to combat with poverty.  
In Pakistan, almost 69.87 millions are living in urban area and 114.4 millions in rural 
area. During 1950–2011, Pakistan's urban population expanded over seven times, and the total 
population increased by over four times. Migration is the major cause of urbanization that 
ensures more employment opportunities, better education and health facilities, as well as 
better mobilization and empowerment of women. There is a significant trend of overseas 
employment in Pakistan, for instance the number of emigrants increased from 0.45 million in 
2011 to 0.63 million in 2012 (GOP, 2013).  
Pakistan has one of the largest labor sources available in the world. According to CIA 
World Fact book (2013), the total number of Pakistan's labor force is 57.2 million, making it 
the ninth largest country in terms of available human workforce. About 43 percent of this 
labor is involved in agriculture, 20.3 percent in industry and the remaining 36.6 percent in 
other services. Female participation rate in agricultural wage work is high in Punjab and 
Sindh provinces of Pakistan; 58 percent in Punjab and 54 percent in Sindh. However, the 
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participation rate of female in non-farm work is extremely low due to limited independence, 
immobility, and burden of domestic duties. For instance, only 4 percent of females between 
the ages of 18-60 had worked in non-farm sector in the past year (IFPRI/IDS, 2012). 
2.4 Sources of Rural Income 
The country has a developing mixed economy based largely on agriculture, light industries, 
and services. Remittances from Pakistanis working abroad are a major source of foreign 
exchange. Rural families earn their livelihood from variety of sources which varies across 
provinces. Overall, almost 31 percent of income comes from agriculture sector, non-
agricultural employment contributes 24 percent and businesses and remittances account for 8 
percent of total rural household income. Other sources include pensions and rent from 
property (IFPRI/IDS, 2012). Provincial wise sources of rural income are shown in Table 2.1 
and Figure 2.2.  
Table 2.1: Sources of income in rural Pakistan 
Provinces 
Own Farm & 
Livestock 
Argi. 
Employment  
Non-Agri. 
Employment 
Remittances, Rent 
and Pension 
Punjab 34 34 21 11 
Sindh 21 30 29 20 
KPK 25 7 46 22 
Source: (IFPRI/IDS, 2012) 
Figure: 2.2: Sources of income in rural Pakistan 
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2.5 Agriculture Sector in Pakistan 
Agriculture being a major source of income and employment is central to economic growth 
and development in Pakistan. It currently contributes 21.4 percent to the GDP with 3.3 
percent growth rate, generates employment for 45 percent of country’s labor force, and 62 
percent of rural population depends on this sector for its livelihood. It is an important 
component in the economy of Pakistan in securing food security, reducing poverty, improving 
employment for poor rural people, enhancing overall economic growth, and stimulate 
domestic demand for industrial goods and services (GOP, 2013). Agriculture contributes to 
the economy by three ways: first, it provides food to consumers and raw material to industry; 
second, it is a source of national income and export earnings; and third, it provides market for 
industrial goods. Thus agriculture exerts a multiplier effect on the socio-economic conditions 
of the people and development of industrial sector. 
Generally, the agriculture sector includes five sub-sectors: major crops, minor crops, 
livestock, fisheries, and forestry. Major crops grown in Pakistan are cotton, wheat, rice, 
sugarcane, maize etc. which contribute 25.2 percent of the value added in overall agriculture 
and 5.4 percent to the GDP. Minor crops consist of oilseeds, vegetables, pulses, chilies, 
tobacco and other small crops which account for 12.3 percent of the value added to 
agriculture. On average, Pakistan annually produces over 24 million tones of wheat, more 
than 62 million tones of sugarcane, and 5.5 million tones of rice (GOP, 2013). According to 
Food and Agriculture Organization (2011), Pakistan is the second largest producer of buffalo 
milk, fourth largest producer of cotton, fifth largest producer of mango, dates, and sugarcane, 
sixth largest producer of apricot, and chickpea, seventh largest producer of wheat and tenth 
largest producer of rice. Livestock is an important sub-sector of agriculture which includes 
cattle, buffalos, sheep, goats, camels, donkeys, horses and poultry. Small holders in rural 
areas depend on it for their daily nutrition and cash income. Livestock contributes 55.4 
percent to the agricultural value added and around 12 percent to the national GDP. Fisheries 
share in GDP is very less but it adds substantially to the national income through export 
earnings (GOP, 2013). 
Although, the agricultural sector plays a vital role for defining the livelihood of rural 
people but this sector, however, has been facing challenges like: rapid population growth, 
unequal distribution of landholdings, inadequate farm infrastructure, lack of access to credit, 
imperfect markets, traditional methods of production, lack of investment etc. All of these have 
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contributed to low productivity and incapability for new employment opportunities in the 
agriculture sector. 
2.6 Land Tenure and Land Reforms in Pakistan 
Land has a strategic position in rural areas because of its multidimensional roles: key factor in 
production, collateral in credit markets, security against natural disaster or shocks, and symbol 
of social, economic and political status. Although, land is the major asset of farm families in 
rural areas of Pakistan but its distribution is highly skewed, as 5 percent of large landholders 
possess 64 percent of total farm land and 65 percent small farmers hold 15 percent of land. 
Rural poverty and food insecurity is strongly correlated with landlessness (USAID, 2010). 
Provincial distribution of land shows that 70 percent farmers in Punjab cultivate less than 5 
acres of land while large farmers are extremely low. Same trend is observed in other 
Provinces as shown in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3: 
Table 2.2: Proportion of farmers by size of farm and Provinces 
Province Marginal Farmers Small Farmers Medium Farmers Large Farmers 
Punjab 70 20 7 3 
Sindh 87 12 2 0 
KPK 90 7 2 1 
Source: (IFPRI/IDS, 2012) 
Figure: 2.3: Proportion of farmers by size of farm and Provinces  
Source: (IFPRI/IDS, 2012) 
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In Pakistan there is feudal system which is inherited from British Raja. The large 
landlords have political powers and enjoy all economic advantages. They hold thousands of 
acres and do little agricultural work themselves. The monopoly of their power and status has a 
leading hindrance in the way to achieve social and economic wellbeing of rural poor families. 
There is need of land reforms not only to increase agriculture growth but also to raise the 
social and economic status of peasants in Pakistan’s rural society.  
After independence in 1947, Pakistan has subjected to three land-reform efforts (1959, 
1972, and 1977) under different governments but they failed to achieve their objectives of 
implementing tenancy, land ceiling and land distribution measures. 1959’s land reforms fixed 
the ceiling of 500 acres for irrigated and 1000 acres for un-irrigated land for private 
ownership. Only 0.65 million acres was distributed amongst 59,906 tenants and small owners. 
The number of beneficiaries was very low as government occupied only 35 percent of the 
holdings that exceeded the ceiling. Hence, this reform was not a big achievement. For 
instance in 1947, less than 1 percent of farm owners control more than 25 percent of 
agricultural land and after the 1959 reforms, 42 percent of agricultural land was occupied by 
less than 8.5 percent of farm owners. Average landholding was still 7,208 acres in Pakistan 
and 11,810 acres in Punjab due to the state’s inefficiency. 
Second attempt of land reforms was done in 1972 in which the ownership ceiling was 
reduced to 150 and 300 acres for irrigated and un-irrigated land respectively. Nearly 1.3 
million acres of land was resumed and 0.9 million of that was distributed amongst 76,000 
beneficiaries. Again landlords were succeeded to manage land within the extended joint 
family system as the ceilings were again in terms of individuals rather than families. Under 
the 1977 reform, another 1.8 million acres of land was resumed, out of which almost 0.9 
million acres were distributed amongst 13,143 small farmers and tenants.  
Unfortunately, these all reforms did not radically change the nature of land tenure in 
practice and land ownership is still highly concentrated in Pakistan. As a consequence, lease 
markets are very active where large land owners employ hired labor or lease their land to 
tenants in order to release themselves and their families from manual labor. Small land 
owners rely primarily on family labor including women labor, but they may abstain from 
manual labor if their status maintenance requires it (Rehman, 1987). 
Land in Pakistan is classified as state land, private land or community land. Generally 
three types of tenancy arrangement exist there; ownership, lease and sharecropping. The most 
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common type of tenancy is ownership where private individuals have rights to use land. Lease 
refers to written or oral agreement where rates are fixed and it may continue from one year to 
many years. This arrangement is common for the area of more than 30 hectares of land. 
Sharecropping arrangement is common among small and medium sized parcels of land, 
usually less than 30 hectares, where the landlord usually receive 50 percent of produce 
(USAID, 2010). Nearly, 66 percent of cultivated land was under sharecropping arrangement 
in 2010 and productivity of sharecropped land was 20 percent lower than that of owner-
operated land. Tenants and sharecroppers have little incentive to invest in sustainable 
production practices and insecurity of property rights has led to increased degradation of 
agricultural land (World Bank, 2007; Barnhart, 2010).  
2.7 Non-farm Sector in Pakistan 
As a result of increasing landlessness of small farmers, low farm productivity and population 
growth in rural Pakistan, rural labor force is shifting from agriculture to non-farm sector. The 
non-farm sector has great importance to rural economies as it helps in generating employment 
opportunities, ensuring income diversification, enabling food security, reducing poverty, 
improving income distribution, reducing risks and vulnerabilities, as well as relaxing liquidity 
constraints to enhance farm investment and productivity. For instance, Arif et al. (2000) noted 
that even a low return non-farm work contributed to stable household income and 
consequently increased in the welfare of rural families.  
Rural economy of Pakistan derives important share of income from non-farm activities 
which employ large labor force. The share of non-farm labor in the country was about 40 
percent and about 45-50 percent of the rural population is directly dependent on non-farm 
income (GOP, 2011). Non-farm sector in Pakistan includes diverse range of economic 
activities in rural areas such as non-farm self-employment, wage-labor, migration, non-labor 
work, renting of household and farm assets, and all other activities other than agriculture. 
Generally, non-farm rural household falls into three categories: agricultural wage labor, non-
agricultural wage labor, non-agricultural enterprises (or businesses). According to IFPRI/IDS 
(2012), about 40 percent of total non-agricultural household are agricultural wage labors, 34 
percent belongs to non-agricultural enterprises and 26 percent derive their income from non-
agricultural wages. 
The scale of non-farm sector in rural Pakistan varies enormously, ranging from small-
scale home based cottage industries to large scale agro-processing industries. Its performance 
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is heavily dependent upon the availability of raw material from agriculture, supply of 
household labor force and access to financial services. Non-farm sector has a significant 
importance for the marginalized poor segment of rural populace, especially women who 
usually participate in home-based informal activities because of domestic and childcare 
responsibilities, social barriers, and differential access to education and physical resources.  
Although non-farm sector has a significant contribution in the rural economy of 
Pakistan (Adams and He, 1995), but the full expansion of this sector is overlooked because of 
the existing political and feudal system. High return large-scale enterprises such as rice, sugar, 
and flour mills are generally occupied by landlords or big businessmen, while poor people are 
engaged in low return small-scale activities such as crafts, local vendors, shops, small hotels, 
and cottage industries. This situation calls for three important strategies for the generation and 
promotion of non-farm activities in rural Pakistan; the first is the access to resources, specially 
finance, the second is to improve the quality of product and the third one is the provision of 
institutional approach to build human capital, to develop rural infrastructure and to enforce 
law of minimum wage rate. There is also a need to understand factors that determine the 
performance and growth of non-farm sector and to formulate the policies and investment 
measures that would stimulate the growth of the sector. 
2.8 Problem Setting and Motivation 
The rural areas of developing countries are of major concern for development where at least 
70 percent of the world’s poor community is residing. Agriculture is the main source of 
livelihood of rural households. But at present this sector has limited potential to create new 
job opportunities due to unequal distribution of landholdings, disguised unemployment, low 
farm productivity, high covariate risks, and imperfect labor and input markets.  Moreover, 
rapidly growing population is depleting natural resources like land, water, energy and facing 
extreme poverty. Labor is the only principal and abundant asset of rural economy. There is 
need of proper utilization of available resources, especially labor to increase the welfare of 
rural families. Hence, the biggest challenge of rural community is how to increase farm output 
from the shrinking agricultural sector, while sustaining the productivity potential of the 
available natural resources, as well as creating gender based job opportunities in high return 
non-farm sector. 
Several studies have investigated the involvement and role of rural women in crop 
activities (Quadri and Jahan, 1982; Mumtaz, 1993; Saghir et al., 2005; Jamali, 2009), meeting 
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food requirement of family (ESCAP, 1997), participation in decision making in agriculture 
(Atta, 2000; Rasheed, 2004), inequality in resource access (Chaudhry et al., 2009). Few 
studied the importance of gender participation in non-farm sector of rural areas of Pakistan. 
The rural non-farm sector in Pakistan, like in many other developing countries, is a 
heterogeneous sector covering an extensive range of earning activities. It ranges from small 
scale home-based enterprises to large scale manufacturing industries. This situation calls for 
investigating the potential of whole range of these non-farm activities. There is a substantial 
body of literature on poverty reduction in Pakistan but they ignore the significance and 
contribution of non-farm sector for reducing poverty. Very few studies have investigated the 
linkages between rural non-farm sector and poverty but their studies were based on relatively 
small sample size. For example, Adams and He (1995) examined sources of non-farm income 
inequality, and Nasir (2001) made links between poverty and formal and informal sector 
employment in rural and urban areas of the country. Nevertheless, the factors that are 
effecting the participation of rural household in earning activities and its impact on household 
welfare and poverty are not examined extensively in literature. In view of the growing 
importance of gender role in non-farm activities in the rural economy, this examination is 
critical particularly in drawing policy recommendation for poverty alleviation in rural areas. 
The present study fills this gap and examines the issues surrounding non-farm gender 
employment and rural poverty in Pakistan.  
2.9 Objectives of the Study 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to study the gender based labor supply, income 
diversification and household welfare in Pakistan, the specific objectives of the study are: 
1. To examine the labor supply responses of male and female of rural households in 
Pakistan under the assumption of non-separability. 
2. To analyze the impact of participation of male and female in non-farm work on 
household welfare in Pakistan. 
3. To examine the impact of non-farm work and tenancy arrangements on investment in 
soil conservation and productivity-enhancing measures and productivity in Pakistan. 
4. Based on the findings, to suggest policy recommendations for improvement of 
household welfare in Pakistan. 
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2.10  Significance of the Study 
Rural communities in the developing countries are facing a key challenge of combating 
poverty and are continuously trying to increase the social and economic status of their 
families. The biggest asset that rural communities hold is their abundant labor force. The 
agriculture sector is overcrowded and is incapable of absorbing surplus labor. Given the 
abundant labor and low agricultural productivity, household welfare can be achieved through 
the involvement and appreciating the contribution of female labor force and finding new 
earning opportunities other than agriculture. 
The women play an important role in the rural economy but their participation is always 
ignored and thought to have no economical significance which has caused negative effect on 
the rural development. Their role in daily household work is considered as nonproductive. 
Women contribute more than half of the rural population. Although being in a majority, they 
are underestimated and their services have no value. This study reveals the importance of 
women’s contribution towards a better living and a well developed rural economy.   
This study also highlights the importance of non-farm sector for the increasing welfare 
and reducing poverty level of land constraint rural households. Non-farm income is also 
useful for enhancing investment in agriculture sector by providing capital in the context of 
imperfect credit and insurance markets. This study also pinpoints the 
inequality/discrimination regarding the access of resources and ownership of land.  Thus, this 
examination is significantly important in drawing policy recommendation for poverty 
alleviation in rural areas of Pakistan. 
2.11  Structure of the Thesis 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the general introduction of the 
study which is about setting the need of this research and summarizes the findings of chapter 
3, 4, and 5. Chapter 3 examines the labor supply of male and female on own-farm, agri-wage 
and non-farm activities under the assumption of non-separability. This chapter focuses on the 
sensitiveness of labor supply to changes in different socio-economic conditions. Chapter 4 
analyzed the impact of non-farm work of male and female on the household welfare and 
poverty reduction. Chapter 5 estimated the impact of non-farm work and tenancy arrangement 
on the decision of soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures and farm productivity. 
Chapter 6 concludes and makes some recommendations for policy formulations.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Gender based labor activity of farm households:                                                              
A case of market imperfections in rural Pakistan. 
 
This paper will be submitted to the Journal of Agricultural Economics 
 
 
Abstract 
This article evaluates the labor supply of male and female on own-farm, agri-wage and non-
farm activities, using cross-sectional data of 341 rural households of the Punjab province of 
Pakistan. The estimation in this study proceeds in two steps. In the first step, shadow wage is 
estimated through production function analysis. The estimated shadow wages and income are 
then used to calculate the labor supply in the second stage. Our analysis reveals that 
education, caste, village infrastructure appeared to be important determinants for labor supply 
of both male and female. Hypothesis of separability in agricultural household models was 
tested by applying three tests. All tests strongly rejected the separability hypothesis, indicating 
the dependence of production and consumption decisions of rural households in Pakistan. 
Keywords: labor supply, non-separability, shadow wages, Pakistan 
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3.1  Introduction 
Labor activities are the significant determinant in rural household’s welfare in developing 
countries. To cope with the higher levels of poverty in these countries, different welfare 
projects have been introduced to increase the overall productivity level and demand for labor 
resulting in higher returns. On contrary, in addition to demand for labor, rural household 
welfare is also determined by the labor supply behavior. Hence, the effectiveness of the 
welfare projects also depends on the gender based labor supply behavior and the knowledge 
of which is an important tool in policy designing.  
Generally, gender is most commonly described as the position, responsibilities and 
activities assigned by the community endorsed to men and women. Roles associated with 
gender describe the activities and responsibilities performed by both women and men 
members socially assigned to them just on the basis of gender and with prejudice. Differences 
in role of gender and social status are remarkably rigid. However, this situation varies among 
different cultures and even in different social classes in the same culture. Commonly, it is 
associated with overall decision making about the fate of households (ICA-ILO, 2001; Mollel 
and Mtenga, 2001).  
Women constitute more than half of the rural labor force and are the backbone of their 
communities in low-income food-deficit countries. They perform wide spectrum of tasks 
ranging from household domestic duties to commercial income generating activities. But 
women efforts for such activities are not measured in economic term. Given the significance 
of the role of women, rural development cannot be achieved by ignoring the efforts of such a 
large segment of society (FAO, 2009). It is quite common to underestimate their contribution 
by statisticians and policy makers and their work might go under the label “housewives” 
(Mies, 1987). 
In Pakistan, there is male dominant society, both in villages and cities. Males head 
about 92 percent of the households (Elahi, 2006). Seventy percent of the Pakistan’s 
population live in rural areas and 51 percent of them are the women, fulltime dwelling in 
villages and socially bound to carry out household activities like food processing, food 
storage, taking care of children and sick family members, raring of livestock, engaging artisan 
and handicrafts, and helping male members in agricultural work. According to the 
Government of Pakistan, the participation of rural women in agricultural work is about 79 
percent as compared to men’s participation, which is 63 percent showing that women’s 
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participation is higher than that of men. Despite this fact, women are suffering from their 
social position and wage rate discrimination. This condition is even worse and women are 
more discriminated in the villages nearby cities (Nazir, 2009).  
There is a major split in the activities of rural farm household: production of farm 
output for income earning on one end and production of food for household consumption on 
the other end and both the processed go side by side. In the past studies, it was considered that 
there is independence between farm household production and consumption decisions 
(Barnum and Squire, 1979; Rozenzweig, 1980; Singh et al., 1986; Tockle and Huffman, 1991; 
Abdulai and Delgado, 1999).  This assumption does not fit in developing countries because of 
the market imperfections, so the emphasis of development economics has shifted to the 
separability assumption in the last decade (Stark, 1991; Benjamin, 1992; Jacoby, 1993; 
Skouﬁas, 1994; Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; Taylor and Martin, 2001). A country, like Pakistan 
is no exclusion and the labor and factor markets are imperfect especially in the rural areas 
(Heltberg, 1998; Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999) and hence, there is no evidence of 
separability and rural households are the producers as well as consumers of farm produce 
simultaneously. 
Several studies have investigated the involvement and role of rural women in crop 
activities (Qadri and Jahan, 1982; Mumtaz, 1993; Saghir et al., 2005; Jamali, 2009), meeting 
food requirement of family (ESCAP, 1997), participation in decision making in agriculture 
(Atta, 2000; Rasheed, 2004), inequality in resource access (Sen, 2001; Chaudhry et al., 2009), 
linkages between agrarian change and gender relations (Mackenzie, 1990; Carney, 1992; 
Francis, 1998; Kabeer and Tran, 2000) and; effect of human capital on productivity and labor 
allocation of rural household and tested existence of imperfect labor and factor markets as a 
by-product (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999). To the best of our knowledge no study has 
examined the labor supply responses of male and female of farm-households in Pakistan 
under the assumption of non-separability. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap and to 
make contribution to scarce empirical literature by investigating the effects of education, 
family caste, and infrastructure on the allocation of labor between own-farm, non-farm and 
agri-wage activities of farm households based on gender by using the shadow wages. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, the theoretical framework 
is presented. In section three, description of the survey area and data set are provided. In 
section four, estimation strategy and empirical results are reported. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are given in section five. 
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3.2  Background and Conceptual Framework  
 3.2.1 Household Model of Labor Allocation 
To investigate the labor supply behavior of farm household based on gender, we present basic 
household model of labor allocation below. We draw upon the economic theory of farm 
household based on the work of Singh et al. (1986); Bardhan and udry (1999), empirical 
studies of household resource allocation  based on the work of Abdulai and Delgado (1999);  
Heltberg et al. (2000), income diversification in developing countries based on the work of 
Abdulai and CroleRees (2001), and the use of shadow wages and labor supply of agricultural 
household based on the work of Jacoby(1993); Skoufias (1994); Abdulai and Regmi (2000); 
Linde-Rahr ( 2001); and Le (2009).   
Household model of labor allocation assumes here that rural household consists of two 
income earners- the head of household and his or her spouse, and allocation of family labor is 
across: agriculture, non-farm, home production and leisure. The household’s leisure is the 
difference between the total stock of potential labor supply and the sum of hours worked in 
agriculture, domestic and non-farm activities. Consumption is the sum of income derived 
from agriculture, non-farm activities and other sources like livestock, transfers etc. Given this, 
the household utility function is given as: 
);,( ZNCUU iMax   
FemaleiMalei ,2,,1   (1) 
where U is the household utility function which is assumed to be strictly concave and 
possesses continuous second partial derivatives (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999). 
iN  is the 
leisure hours for male and female labor, C is the set of consumption of goods and services, 
and Z is the individual and household characteristics. 
Household faces constraints like time, budget, non-negative, and production function 
constraints. 
Household’s time constraint is given as: 
iiDiNFiAi NLLLL          (2) 
where 
iL  is the sum of  household labor allocated to agricultural ( iAL ), non-farm ( iNFL ), home 
production )( iDL  and leisure ( iN )  
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Household also faces non-negative, production function and budget constraints: 
0,0,0  iDiNFiA LLL             (3) 
),,,,,,,( VSAZXHLQQ iiA         (4) 
CPXPYYYY CXiOiDiNFiA         (5) 
Putting value of Q from equation 4, the equation 5 can be written as: 
iOiDDiNFiHXiiAC YLWWLHWXPVSAZXHLPQCP  ),,,,,,,(    (6) 
where iOiDiNFiA YYYY ///  represents income from agriculture, non-farm, home production, and 
other sources respectively for male and female members of household, xP  represents vector 
of prices of variable inputs, cP  represents vector of prices of purchased goods, P represents 
vector of Farm output prices, iH  represents amount of hired male and female labor, 
HW represents wage paid to hired labor, W  represents non-farm wage, DW  represents wages 
of home production,   represents production shocks (climatic risks, economic fluctuations), 
A  represents fixed assets of the household (land etc.), S  represents vector of social/cultural 
constraints, V represents village level characteristics such as distance, infrastructure etc., 
X represents vector of purchased inputs and Q  represents quantity of agricultural production. 
The Lagrangian of the household’s maximization problem is: 









CPYLWWLHW
XPVSAZXHLPQ
NLLLLZNCU
CiiDDiNFiH
XiiA
iiDiNFiAi
0
),,,,,,,(
)();,(

   (7) 
where   is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the inequality constraints on each type 
of labor participation (i.e. male and female labor participation), is the Lagrangian multiplier 
associated with income inequality constraint. The Lagrangian function (  ) is maximized with 
respect to ,iAL ,iNFL iDL ,iH X ,  ,   for maximizing the utility (U) across gender of 
household members as shown below: 
)1.7(0/ 



iA
iA
L
Q
pL 
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0/  WLiNF    (7.2) 
0/ 



iD
iD
L
Q
pL   (7.3) 
0/ 


 H
i
i W
H
Q
pH   (7.4) 
0/ 


 Xp
X
Q
pX   (7.5) 
0/  iiDiNFiA NLLLL    (7.6) 
 
0),,,,,,,(/ 0  CPYLWWLHWXPVSAZXHLPQ CiiDDiNFiHXiiA    (7.7) 
It is important to mention that the model above assumes that the markets are complete. 
Under this assumption, the production and consumption decisions of the household are 
separable. Under separability assumption, the value of marginal product of non-farm labor 
participation by gender is equated to an exogenously determined market wage (Singh et al., 
1986). In many low-income countries where market for key factors and products typically is 
weak or absent in rural areas, usually separability does not exist and mostly farm households 
are both producers and consumers of agricultural goods.  
If commodity and resource markets are incomplete and on farm and off-farm labor are 
imperfect substitute, thus shadow prices exist. De Janvry et al. (1991) showed that under non-
separability, labor is allocated such that the marginal product of labor is equal to an 
endogenously determined shadow wage ).( w Shadow prices will be the function of 
preferences and technology of household members if the household is both a producer and 
consumer of commodity. Thus, we introduce market failure in the model as a market labor 
constraint: MLiNF  , where M is the maximum number of hours a farmer can work in the labor 
market. This type of failure is important particularly for the existing situations of Pakistan. 
Given this development, maximization of Langrangian with respect to iN , iH , iAL , iNFL , 
iDL , yields the following first order conditions for the optimal choices of the household; 



i
i w
CU
NU
/
/
          (8) 
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The equilibrium condition (8) for household utility maximization implies that household 
will equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure of family labor 
of type i  and the "shadow wage rate" 

iw of labor type i . Condition (9) states that hired labor 
will be utilized up to the point where the marginal product of hired labor of each gender is 
equal to the wage paid to hired labor. Also shadow wage is same as market wage (10), if labor 
market is complete and non-farm labor constraint is not binding. Shadow wage will be less 
than the non-farm wage (11), if labor market is incomplete and non-farm labor constraint is 
binding. 
By using the shadow wage, the non-linear budget constraint can be replaced by an 
artificial linear constraint. The household maximization problem of equation (1) under the 
linear budget constraint can then be re-written as: 
);,( ZNCUU iMax    FemaleiMalei ,2,,1      (12) 
Subject to  
  iiiC YNwCP          (13) 
Where shadow income )( *Y is written as: 
ioiiiHXiiAi YZLwHWXPVSAZXHLPQY 
 )(),,,,,,,( 
   (14) 
Structural demand function for leisure and corresponding structural labor supply 
function are given as: 
);,( ZYwNN iii
 
          (15) 
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);,( ZYwTT iii
 
         (16) 
where iT  is the total hours of work of family members of gender i  in agricultural, non-farm 
and other activities. 
0******  iNFiNFiAiDiii LifLLLNLT       (17) 
0*****  iNFiAiDiii LifLLNLT   
    (18)
 
3.3  Data Description 
Data for this study was collected between September 2010 and January 2011 through a cross- 
sectional survey of rural households in the Punjab province of Pakistan. Punjab province is 
the country's most populous region, constitutes 56 percent of Pakistan's total population. Due 
to its largest rural society, this province was selected for data collection. There is no large-
scale redistribution of agricultural land and asymmetry exists in land ownership. As a result 
most rural areas are dominated by a small set of land-owning families which has always 
contributed the most to the national economy of Pakistan. Agriculture share of Pakistan's 
GDP has historically ranged from 51.8 to 54.7 percent. It is especially dominant in the service 
and agriculture sectors of the Pakistan economy. Its contribution ranges from 52.1 to 64.5 
percent in the service sector and 56.1 to 61.5 percent in the agriculture sector. It is also major 
manpower contributor because it has the largest pool of professionals and highly skilled 
manpower (Pakistan encyclopedia, 2009). It has three broad agro-climatic zones named as 
lower, central and upper. Two districts from each zone were selected for survey. A stratified 
random sample of a total of 341 households was selected in each of six districts to ensure 
representation of all categories of households, which potentially influence the extent and 
nature of livelihood diversification. 
Using a structured questionnaire, the households in the sample area were interviewed 
eliciting information on farm and non-farm activities as well as personal, demographic and 
locational characteristics. Information on agricultural activities includes farm size, crop 
output, price of output, expenditure on variable inputs, family and hired labor, capital assets, 
own consumption, sale of produce. Information on livestock activities includes the number of 
animals and poultry birds. Detailed time allocated to farm, non-farm, livestock and domestic 
work of family and hired labor differentiated by gender was fully obtained.  
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Table 3.1 includes the definitions and sample statistics of variables used in the analysis 
for male and female respondents. Total value of output is computed as the sum of value of all 
crops grown, income from the sale of animal byproducts and twenty percent of the value of 
the household’s herd- an approach similar to work of Huffman (1976); Jacoby (1993); and 
Abdulai and Regmi (2000). The value of each crop is estimated by using village level median 
prices of the prices that farmers indicate their crops would currently fetch on the market. This 
avoids the problem of using the same set of prices for all farm.
1
The land variable is the total 
cropped area in acres during survey year, whether owned, rented or sharecropped. Detailed 
information on the variable physical inputs such as fertilizer, seed, and pesticide was also 
obtained. The use of values in place of quantities in the production function can lead to biased 
estimates if input price variation is substantial. Yet, taking this route seems preferable to 
ignoring these inputs altogether and suffering an omitted variables problem. Number of farm 
equipments, dummy variable for whether or not livestock is reared and locational dummies 
for the six districts of Punjab Pakistan, are also included in the production function.  
The study is concerning to the household-headship and level of education of household 
head since the head of the household is considered to be the person mainly responsible for the 
decision-making of the household. The level of education may indicate productivity potential 
for both farm and non-farm sector (Behrman and Wolf, 1984). Age is used as a measure of 
experience that increases the marginal value of time in each activity. 
The farm labor is divided into four categories as seen in Table 3.2: family male labor; 
family female labor; hired male labor; hired female labor. The use of family labor is high 
(62%) as compared to hired labor (38%) in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 As argued by Bardhan (1979), if farmers face the same prices and the true production possibility 
frontier is concave, rather than linear, crop composition cannot be allowed to vary across farms, since 
farmers are assumed to have the same technology. However, if crop composition is variable in the 
sample, movements along a given production possibility frontier will be construed as shifts in the 
value of output. 
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Table 3.1: Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables used in production 
a  wages are noted in Rupees (2010). 
 
Variable Definition of variables Mean S.d 
 
Dependent variables  
OutPutValue Total output value in Rupees 1654011 6598264 
 
Explanatory variables 
TCultiLand Total cultivated land in acres   19.93 41.35 
FertiCost Expenditures on fertilizer(rs) 6584.33  8288.42           8288.42 
SeedCost  Expenditures on seed(rs) 7202.84     9626.00           
PestCost Expenditures on pesticide(rs) 3901.95  4325.17 
Equipments   Number of farm equipments     4.34 4.56 
HrsFmale     Total hours of family male labor worked on farm            97.25 135.94 
HrsFfemale    Total hours of family female labor worked on farm  43.36   95.79       
HrsHmale  Total hours of hired male labor worked on farm 139.20     184.20 
HrsHfemale      Total hours of hired female labor worked on farm 82.06   104.77        
HrsChildlab    Total hours of farm child labor (family and hired) 9.54     24.78                       
Head  1if Head of HH is male,0 otherwise 0.74         0.44                       
HeadEdu  Years of education of HH head   2.12        1.18        
AgeHead  Age of education of HH head (years)  48.47        11.54            
Livstk  1 if HH has livestock, 0 otherwise  0.83      0.38           0.38      0.38           
Location1  1 if HH resides in Lahore district, 0 otherwise  0.15      0.36           0.36       
Location2  1 if HH resides in Sahiwal district, 0 otherwise  0.20      0.40         0.40 
Location3  1 if HH resides in M.Garh district, 0 otherwise  0.30      0.46        0.46 
Location4  1 if HH resides in Layyah district, 0 otherwise  0.02      0.13          0.13 
Location5  1 if HH resides in Sialkot district, 0 otherwise  0.25      0.43         0.43 
Location6  1 if HH resides in Khushab district,0 otherwise  0.08     0.27 
 
Instruments 
M0CasWa   Average village daily wage rate of male   272.23      74.21                                                                     Average village daily wage r te of male       272.23   74.21                            
F0CasWa   Average village daily wage rate of female   156.95      76.64           Average village daily wage rate of female       156.95   76.64       
Dis0vill Distance of village from city in km        18.05 12.69                        
Road   1 if village has road, 0 otherwise      0.67       0.47   1 if village has ro d, 0 otherwise         0.67     0.47   
Water0supp 1 if village has water supply, 0 otherwise      0.85    0.35        
Electricity 1 if village has electricity, 0 otherwise        0.99     0.09    
HHSizOvr14    No. of adult household members        4.99 2.76       
AdultFarm No. of adults working on farm       1.83     1.62             
Ch0L05     No. Of children under age of 5 years                 1.01   1.41             
Child14   No.Of children between age 6-14 years     6.25 6.46 
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3.4 Empirical Approach 
The estimation in the present study proceeds in two steps. The first step is to estimate the 
marginal productivity of family male and female labor through production function analysis. 
The estimated marginal productivity of family male and female labor (shadow wage) and 
shadow income are then used in the second stage to estimate the male and female labor supply 
functions.
2
 
3.4.1 Estimation of Shadow Wages and Shadow Income 
 3.4.1.1 Production Function Analysis 
The estimation of technological relationship between output and input that lies at the very 
heart of economic analysis is usually carried out by production function with family male and 
female labor hours and hired male and female labor hours specified as heterogeneous inputs. 
However, a typical example of production function in literature is Cobb-Douglas and 
Translog production functions. Despite the well known limitation, the Cobb-Douglas 
production form is used in this study because more flexible functional forms such as the 
translog production function was initially estimated which yielded results that were 
inconclusive. Specifically, most of the coefficients of the inputs were not statistically 
significant, while some of the coefficients turned out to be negative, contrary to prior 
expectation. 
The Cobb-Douglas production form has the advantage of being easily interpreted in 
economic term and has achieved widespread empirical support from data of various 
industries, including agriculture and for various countries (See also Heady and Dillon, 1961). 
Thus a typical Cobb-Douglas production function is specified as: 
iik
k
ij
j
ji DkXY    lnln     (19) 
Where iY  represents the total value of agricultural output of farm household i . ijX  is the 
quantity of input j  used by farmer i , 
kD  is the location dummies that represents some 
locational-specific characteristics such as topography and temperature, which effect output 
but not observable to an econometrician.  and  are input intensity parameters that represent 
                                                          
2
 The approach of Jacoby (1993); Abduali and Regmi (2000) are followed in this study. 
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the elasticities of output with respect to the individual inputs. i is the error term summarizing 
the effects of omitted variables. 
The variable inputs in the vector ijX  includes cropped area, value of fertilizer, value of 
seed, value of pesticide, number of farm equipments, hours of family male labor, hours of 
family female labor, hours of hired male labor, hours of hired female labor, hours of total 
child labor (family and hired), dummy variable representing the presence of livestock for farm 
household, gender of household head which assumes that household head ,whether male or 
female, is the primary decision maker on the family farm, age and education level of 
household head as a proxies of management inputs. In the regression all the explanatory 
variables are in logarithmic except dummies for household headship, livestock and vector of 
age and education level of household head. The variables measured in monetary terms such as 
value of output, fertilizer, seed and pesticide were divided by village-specific price indexes 
used as measures of the price of the composite agricultural commodity consumed and 
produced. 
To keep the estimation manageable in the presence of zero values in most of the 
variable inputs, the logarithmic transformation was carried out by adding one to the inputs 
))1ln(ln.,.(  ijij XXei . 
  3.4.1.2 Shadow Wage Estimation 
We follow the approach of Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994), laterally applied as standard 
approach in the literature to estimate the shadow wage and the labor supply function under 
market failures (Lambert and Magnac 1994; Sonoda and Maruyama 1999; Abdulai and 
Regmin 2000; Seshan 2006). These authors found that the shadow wage is identical to the 
marginal product of labor (MPL) on the farm regardless of market failures. Based on this 
concept, we calculated the shadow wage rate of labor (MPL) from the instrumental variable 
(IV) estimates of Cobb-Douglas production function in Table 3.2, using the expressions: 
m
m
m
F
Y
W ˆ
ˆ
* 
    
f
f
f
F
Y
W ˆ
ˆ
*     (20)
 
Where Yˆ  is the predicted value of output based on the estimated coefficients j . The fitted 
output Yˆ is used instead of real output Y since farmers make decisions when they do not know 
the random shocks and real output. mF  and fF  are the total hours of adult male and female 
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labor respectively. We obtained negative marginal product for some observations and have 
subsequently set these values equal to 1.
3 
 
  3.4.1.3 Shadow Income Estimation 
The estimates of the shadow income *iY of the household is derived from the expression 
SeedPestiFertLivWHWHWFWFWYYY Lfhmhffmmioi 
*** ˆ    (20) 
where ∏ is the net return from sales of livestock products and non-farm income; ioY  is the 
unearned income such as rent of land, farm equipments  and transfers received by households; 
**, fm WW are shadow wages of male and female, fm FandF  are hours of adult male and female, 
hW , LW  are the average village wage rate of labor and animal services respectively; 
SeedPestiFert ,,  are expenditures on fertilizer, pesticide and seed respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Jacoby (1993) or Skoufias (1994) also found negative marginal product of labor. They then either 
dropped these observations or set the value to 1 to avoid negative shadow wages. 
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Table 3.2: Cobb-Douglas production function (dependent variable: log value of Output) 
 OLS  IV 
b
 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients Coefficients 
LogTCultiLand   0.46(2.05) 1.13(5.60)  
LogFertiCost 
a
 0.05(0.06)    1.86(3.34)                                     
LogSeedCost 
a
  0.46(0.59)    0.49(1.92)                                             
LogPestCost 
a 
  -0.08(0.37)    1.03(2.20)         
LogEquipments     0.56(1.79)    0.18(0.60)        
LogHrsFmale 
a
       0.07(0.72)    0.47(2.00)    
LogHrsFfemale 
a
 -0.09(0.90) 0.28(1.73)  
LogHrsHmale a        0.26(1.90)    0.68(1.88)    
LogHrsHfemale 
a
      -0.13(1.08)    0.19(0.52)    
LogHrsChild 
a
       0.12(0.99) 0.14(0.35)    
Head      1.18(2.42)   2.31(5.33)                                                           
HeadEdu          0.00(0.01)    0.02(0.10)    
AgeHead                                            -0.02(1.27)    -0.02(1.06)                               
livstk      4.30(9.09)   4.40( 8.87)           
location1                                -0.79(1.12)   -0.53(0.69)                                 
location2                           -2.27(3.41)   -2.64(3.91)                                  
location3                           -0.91(1.44)   -1.02(1.54)                                   
location4                               -1.29(0.95)   -1.82(1.32)                               
location5     0.40(0.63)   0.13(0.19) 
constant       3.13(3.20)   3.06(2.70)                                                                 
Adj R-squared    0.7105 0.6928                                                                 
Male labor marginal product   2.73 0.89 
Female labor marginal product  6.05 1.20                                                        
Number of observations   341 341 
Note: a Variables considered endogenous in the instrumental variable estimation. 
b Wu-Hausman statistics for the joint exogeneity test is  1.88 against a critical value of F(8, 312)=2.29 which is significant at 
10 percent. 
Value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
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3.4.2 Estimation of Own-farm, Non-farm and Agri-wage Labor Supply Functions 
The estimated shadow wages and income in the first stage of analysis are used to calculate the 
labor supply of farm household in three major activities: own farm, non-farm and agri-wage. 
Thus our analysis is focused on the impacts of wages, income and other exogenous variables 
on the hours worked in three activities by male and female members. Since all households 
reported positive hours for male and female labor, we employed OLS technique for the 
estimation of labor supply function in the study. 
For each household, the male and female labor supply variables are computed as the 
average annual hours spent by working on their own-farm, non-farm, and on the farm of 
others. Time spent on social ceremonies, religious activities, and other pure consumption 
activities, such as eating or sleeping are considered as leisure. The average daily worked 
hours are 8.1 for males and 14.1 for females, indicating that females spend more time in 
working than males. Particularly, males are more engaged in farm and non-farm activities and 
females are more involved in domestic and livestock activities. All the females reported 
positive hours for domestic work and almost 33.14% male spent no time on domestic work. 
The empirical specification for the labor supplies of male )( *imP  and female )(
*
ifP in three 
activities ),,( wageagrifarmnonfarmowni   is: 
)22(lnlnlnln ***0
*
mmmzmyfmfmmmim ZYWWP    
)23(lnlnlnln ***0
*
fffzfyffmfmfif ZYWWP  
 
where ’s are parameters to be estimated, *** ,, YWW fm are described above, iZ  is the vector of 
individual and/or household specific characteristics such as age, education level, household 
composition, etc. affecting taste towards work and i  is the error term summarizing the 
effects of unobserved factors. The coefficients fm  , provide estimates of own-wage 
elasticities for male and females, respectively. Since these are reflections of the usual 
opposing substitution and income effects, no prediction can be made about their sign. This is 
also the case for the coefficients fmmf  , that provide estimates of cross wage elasticities. The 
Coefficients fymy  ,  provide estimates of the income elasticities of male and female labor, 
respectively. If leisure is a normal good, higher levels of income would result in fewer hours 
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of work. Previous studies generally support this hypothesis although estimates have been 
inelastic (Jacoby, 1993; Skouﬁas, 1994). 
3.4.3 Testing for Separability 
Correct modeling of household production decisions require knowledge of whether a specific 
household is likely to behave according to separability or non-separability decision rules. For 
this reason, numerous tests of separability have been applied in empirical studies. In this 
section, the hypothesis of separability in agricultural household models was tested by 
applying three tests in order to gain further intuition into the efficient functioning of labor 
markets in rural Pakistan. The first test is based on the Benjamin (1992) test which focuses on 
the relationship between production decision and preferences of household, the second test is 
based on Jacoby (1993) test which testes the equality of market wage and shadow wage and 
the third is Le (2010) generalized test which combined both the Benjamin and the Jacoby tests 
into one relationship. 
  3.4.3.1 The Jacoby’s Test for a Perfect Market Assumption 
The hypothesis of equality between marginal products of labor and the market wages is tested 
in this section. Under the utility maximization assumption, a test for the equality of marginal 
products and the observed wages could shed some light on the presence of transaction costs or 
frictions in the rural labor market. 
We therefore tested the hypothesis of equality between wages and estimated marginal 
productivity of labor by regressing the shadow wages on the observed market wages: 
ihi WW  

        (24) 
Where *
iW is the estimated shadow wages of labor type ),( fmi  , hW is the market wages of 
male and female, 
i  is the random term probably including measurement error. 
Assuming there are no serious biases involved in the derivation of the marginal 
productivities of family labor from a Cobb-Douglas production function, the null hypothesis 
of the absence of any frictions in off-farm employment implies that 10   and . This 
means that the allocation of time between farm and market is made purely on efficiency 
grounds by individuals in the sub-sample. The theory also implies that i  is independent of 
the taste for work.  
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  3.4.3.2  The Benjamin’s Test for Differing Efficiencies 
Benjamin (1992) proposed a test that uses the relationship between production decisions and 
household preferences. This test focuses on the differing efficiencies issue of family and hired 
labor. The study approximates the shadow wages with the following linear regression:
  
)25()1(*  
L
H
LogZLogWLogL  
Where L is the total hired and family labor, W* is the shadow wage, Z is household 
preferences,
L
H
is the fraction of hired labor. The objective of perfect substitutability of family 
and hired labor is to test 0)1(  . 
  3.4.3.3 The Le’s Generalized Test 
Both the Benjamin and Jacoby’s tests use only one relationship; either between production 
decisions and preferences; or between shadow wages and market wages. It means both tests 
implied half of the information to test the separability and results of both tests are 
contradictory. This shortcoming was covered by Le’s generalized test. He simultaneously 
studied both relationships in one relation to increase the power of test and to avoid possibility 
of contradictory results. In the present study we also applied the approach of Le’s generalized 
test to test the separability in agricultural household model in the context of Pakistan. 
The following regression is estimated for generalized test 
)26(/   LogZLogWLLogPQ  
The test for the separability model is whether 01   and .  
3.5 Results and Interpretations 
 3.5.1 The Production Function Estimates 
The first column of the Table 3.2 represents OLS estimates of the coefficients of the 
production technology of the sample households. The results indicate that variable inputs have 
positive coefficients, while cropped area, equipments and livestock appears to be significantly 
important inputs in production function. Of the labor inputs, adult male labor contributes most 
to the output and contribution of teenagers and children appear to be relatively small. 
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But in the estimation of production function estimate, labor hours, fertilizer, seed and 
pesticide used are likely to be endogenous variables so the estimates from OLS could be 
biased. We address the endogeneity bias in this study by adopting an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach to estimate the Cobb–Douglas production function. The variables used as 
identifying instruments in the estimation are: male and female daily field wage; distance of 
village from city; dummies for the presence of road, water supply and electricity; adult 
household size; number of adults working on farm; and number of children less than 5 years 
and between 6-14 years as instruments. The value of the Wu–Hausman statistic as presented 
in Table 3.3 suggests that the instruments can be considered exogenous in the estimation. 
The results of IV approach, in the second column of the Table 3.2, indicate that most of 
the inputs have signiﬁcant positive effects on agricultural output. Livestock and land appears 
to be important inputs in the production process. We also found that fertilizer, seed and 
pesticide inputs lead to higher farm output in the study. 
All the labor inputs have significant positive impact on the output except the hired 
female labor and child labor which do not significantly different from zero. The family male 
labor has a greater impact on output than family female labor, probably due to the fact that the 
activities such as ploughing, irrigation etc., which are undertaken by men, contribute more at 
the margin to output than activities such as weeding, picking and transplanting in which 
females are largely engaged. This finding is in line with the result of Jacoby (1992) and 
Abdulai and Regmi (2000), but is in contrast to the results reported by Skoufias (1994); Udry 
et al. (1995); and Thapa (2003). 
The gender of household head has a positive and significant impact on agricultural 
output, indicating discrimination in the access to resources on gender basis. This support the 
findings of Thapa (2008) who indicated  that male headed households have relatively better 
access to resources, particularly in access to new varieties of seeds, inorganic fertilizers, 
agricultural extension services, and farm credit. The coefficient of age is negative though not 
significant indicating that young farmers use new technologies to increase production as 
compared to old farmers. Education of household head has positive effect on agricultural 
output, confirming the widely accepted role of human capital towards improving farmer’s 
efficiency (Abdulai and Huffman, 2000; Abdulai and Regmin 2000; Barrett et al., 2008). 
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3.5.2 The Labor Supply Functions Estimates 
The variables in *** ,, YWW fm  are correlated with i  so labor supply functions are estimated by 
using instrumental variable approach to obtain consistent estimates. The complete set of 
instruments used are: individual characteristics such as age and age squared, level of 
education; non-labor income; saving; own land; zonal dummies; and all the instruments that 
are given in Table 3.2. Thus, in the ﬁrst-stage, the shadow wage rates and shadow income are 
regressed on instrumental variables. In the second stage, the predicted values from these 
regressions are used to estimate the labor supply function employing OLS. The value of the 
Wu–Hausman statistic given in Table 3.4 suggests that the instruments can be considered 
exogenous in the estimation. 
Estimation of the labor supply functions requires deleting some variables that are used 
in the first stage regression to allow for the identification of models and variables left out, 
therefore serve as identifying instruments. Male and female daily field wages; distance of 
village from city; dummies for the presence of road, water supply and electricity; number of 
adults working on farm and non-labor income served as identifying instruments. The Wald 
test statistics
2
10  for the joint significance of these variables for male and female shadow 
wage equations are 27.20 and 35.20 respectively which are significant at 1 % level as against 
a critical value of 21.23
2
)01.0,10(  . The corresponding figure for the shadow income equation 
is 235.40, also against a critical value of 21.232 )01.0,10(  . The joint significance of these 
variables in the first stage regressions suggests that the instruments do enter in the first stage 
estimation and are therefore appropriate instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
In order to account for any potential heteroskedasticity induced by the two-stage 
procedure of using estimated shadow wages and income as well as for heteroskedasticity 
possibly present across households, the Breusch–Pagan test was employed. The computed 
Breusch–Pagan test values 216  85.63, 262.10, 291.42  for males and 562.12, 424.11, 179.85 
for females in own farm, nonfarm and agri-wage work respectively, are above the critical 
value of 32.00 at the 1% level, suggesting the presence of heteroskedasticity. In order to 
account for the heteroskedasticity, the t-statistics reported are based on the standard errors 
calculated from White's (White, 1980) formula that accounts for nonparametric forms of 
heteroskedasticity. 
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To test the exogeneity of the set of instruments, the value of Wu–Hausman statistics 
given in the Table 3.3 suggests that the instruments can be considered exogenous in the labor 
supply functions. The joint hypothesis that all non-intercept coefficients in the labor supply 
models are zero, are tested with the Wald statistics. The sample values of the Wald statistics 
are  10.89, 5.69, 4.78 for male and 4.26, 4.19, 2.84 for female labor supply functions in three 
sectors, with a critical value F(16,324)=2.75, thus rejecting the null hypothesis which is 
significant at 1 % level. 
Table 3.3 also displays parameter estimates of the male and female labor supply 
functions. Starting with the estimates for males, the uncompensated own-wage effect is 
negative in the case of own-farm and agri-wage work, suggesting a backward sloping labor 
supply. It means that the income effect dominates the substitution effect. Similarly, 
Rosenzweig (1980) noticed negative own wage effect of male household labor supply. In the 
case of non-farm work, own wage effect is positive, suggesting upward sloping labor supply. 
The negative own-wage elasticity for female confirmed the findings of Skoufias (1994) and 
are in contrast to Killinsgworth and Heckman (1986); Jacoby (1993); and Abdulai and Regmi 
(2000). 
The cross male wage effect on the non-farm and agri-wage labor supply of females is 
negative and significant in the case of non-farm, indicating that female labor supply is quite 
sensitive to any change in the male wage. This is presumably due in part to the reallocation of 
time by females from income generating to non income generating personal matters such as 
funerals and weddings. It suggests that male and female leisure are gross substitutes in terms 
of utility and indicates that studies that restrict such cross-wage effects to be zero may result 
in specification errors. The cross female wage effect on the labor supply of male is positive, 
but not significant, indicating that males are not much sensitive to reduce their labor supply 
even when females earn more from income generating activities. 
The coefficient of shadow income is significant and negative for both males and 
females in all three sectors, indicating that both male and female leisure are normal goods. 
This finding is in line with the results obtained by Jacoby (1993) for Peru; Skoufias (1994) for 
India; and Abduali and Regime (2000) for Nepal. 
Household composition and characteristics seem to matter as well on the labor supply of 
both male and female. The presence of working age men and women in the household which 
is an indicator of non-nuclearity of household, tends to increase the labor supply of both male 
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and female in own-farm and non-farm. These results are in contrast to the study of Barrett et 
al. (2008) and are in line with the study of Abdauli and Regime (2000) in the case of male 
labor supply. The presence of young children (<5 years) in the household impedes the labor 
supply of female in own-farm and non-farm sector, particularly significant effect in the case 
of non-farm work. So caring for young children appears to be compatible with farm and non-
farm work in rural areas of Pakistan. This result is in line with the findings of Rosenzweig 
(1980); Evenson et al. (1980); Sahn and Alderman (1988); Skoufias (1994); and Abduali and 
Delgado (1999). With regard to the age of household-head which also represents experience, 
we found that labor supply in the agriculture sector increases with experience and decreases in 
non-farm sector, although the effect is not statistically significantly different from zero for 
both groups of households.  
Turning to the variables of interest in this article viz the education level of household 
members; family caste; village infrastructure, we found that investment in human capital 
significantly decreases the labor supply of household on own-farm and agri-wage activities. 
This reflects the lack of response of agricultural wages to human capital in South Asia as 
noted by Kurosaki and Khan (2006); Ito and Kurosaki (2009) and disgrace of working as an 
agricultural laborer in rural areas (Ito and Kurosaki, 2009). Once villagers are educated, they 
are reluctant to perform manual agricultural work for themselves and especially for others. 
The positive coefficient of education in non-farm work indicates that individual who has more 
schooling, spend a great proportion of his working hours in non-farm work. Thus, education 
was found to be a better positioned to mobilize capital through high returning non-farm work. 
High return work often requires a specific level of schooling and therefore individuals who 
have attained less than that are excluded from particular better-paid activities (Abdulai and 
Delagado, 1999; Davis, 2003). Most activities in non-farm work like service sector or running 
a small business require a certain level of education or skill and serve as important criteria 
regarding the allocation of scarce non-farm employment (Bucherrieder, 2005). In other words 
illiteracy serves as an entry barrier into high returning activities. Thus, education improves 
individual’s ability to allocate resources in response to changing economic conditions. It is a 
powerful source that leads labor out of agriculture and shifts it into high returning non-farm 
sector (Timmer, 1988). 
Looking at the role of family castes (with the middle castes as the reference group), we 
found that male labor supply from upper castes decreases in own-farm and agri-wage 
activities and increases in non-farm sector. Caste is traditionally hereditary social grouping 
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which has great influence in Pakistan. This class stratification is closely related to income 
inequalities and distribution of land ownership. Indeed, the caste system is clearly 
constraining efforts of members of lower castes to improve living conditions. Males from 
upper castes are more resourceful person so they employ hired labor or lease their land to 
tenants in order to release themselves from manual agricultural work. We found that female 
labor supply decreases in non-farm and agri-wage work as we move up to the caste category. 
There are cultural and social barriers that prevent women from entering and remaining in the 
labor force. They are not allowed to go outside for work and confined to only household 
duties which are considered honorable for them. These findings show that caste plays a 
pivotal role in minimizing the liberty of female. Labor supply increases for agri-wage work 
for lower castes males and females. This is probably due to the fact that lower castes do face 
difficulty in non-farm employment in the sense they face high transaction costs associated 
with entry into labor market. These results are consistent with the findings of Ito and Kurosaki 
(2009); and Ito (2009) for India. 
Presence of small scale industry (factory or mill) as indicator of village infrastructure is 
associated with higher amount of non-farm labor, indicating that males and females are 
significantly less geographically mobile. Good state of infrastructure reduces transaction cost 
and increases efficiency with which rural labor and financial markets channel inputs into high 
yielding activities by declining cost of information and transport. 
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Table 3.3: Instrumental variable estimates of male and labor supply functions using shadow 
wages and income (dependent variable: log average annual hours of male and female in own-
farm, non-farm and agri-wage work) 
a Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of  the set of instruments against a critical value of  F(3,286)=32.00    at  α= 0.01. 
bBreusch–Pagan test for homoskedasticity(critical value=32.00 at 1%).  
Variables Own-Farm Non-Farm Agri-Wage 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Log male swage                 -1.184(3.24)       0.097(0.27) 0.583(0.59)     -1.568(1.93)               -1.404(1.93)      -0.345(1.02) 
Log fem swage           0.059(0.19)   -1.106(3.57) 0.397(0.43)  -0.769(1.00) 0.911(1.41) 0.404(1.51) 
Log s income                        -0.916(3.77)      -2.072(5.62) -1.244(1.63)     -0.979(1.52) -1.788(2.81) -0.708(2.50) 
No. ofadults>14                 0.106(1.67)       0.014(1.70) 0.500 (2.53)      0.314(1.86) -0.009(0.05) -0.086(1.12) 
No. of child<5                      0.057(0.61)       -0.013(0.10) 0.418(1.61)      -0.368(1.86) 0.581(2.07) 0.012(0.10) 
No of Child 5-14                 -0.020(0.94)        0.037(1.77) -0.006(0.12)      0.009(0.17) -0.045(0.75) 0.010(0.45) 
Age of Head                         0.007(0.63)         0.012(0.86) -0.028(0.82)     -0.000(0.00) 0.019(0.57) 0.033(1.59) 
Location1 -0.657(1.35)         0.589(0.59) 5.009(2.72)      6.071(3.44) 3.572(2.47) 0.094(0.15) 
Location2 -0.799(1.67)        -1.202(2.24) 1.802(1.37)      2.236(2.44)                               1.018(0.93) -0.129(0.21) 
Location3 -1.251(2.99)         -1.114(2.25) 1.114(1.04)       2.286(3.27)      -1.632(1.87) -0.437(0.80) 
Location4 0.524(0.71)           1.051(1.41) -0.089(0.05)     1.880 (1.32) -3.131(2.16)  0.049(0.07) 
Location5 -0.156(0.34)          0.496(0.98) 0.228(0.22)       1.063(1.74) 0.232(0.25) 0.961(1.63) 
Education -0.127(1.69)         -0.058(1.86) 1.098(3.18)       0.099(0.69) -0.229(1.82) -0.041(2.62) 
Upper caste   -0.640(2.52)         0.648(1.79) 1.255(1.69)      -1.85(1.95) -0.709(1.89) -0.209(1.87) 
Lower caste   -0.718(1.94)         0.337(0.91) 0.425(0.44)       -1.569(1.50) 2.939(2.35) 1.809(2.32) 
Factory/mil                      -0.405(1.67)        -0.095(0.25) 1.763(2.19)        1.386(1.90) -0.268(0.48) -0.028(0.07) 
cons 13.268(4.80) 25.038(5.97) 13.647(1.58) -10.190(1.43) 22.175(3.14) 11.034(3.09) 
Adj R-squared 0.2637 0.1161                      0.1776    0.1005           0.1543    0.0770  
Wu-Hausman
 a
                 13.13             5.62                                       1.86        4.01 1.42                   0.45  
Breusch-Pagan 
b
              85.63                    562.13                                    262.10        424.11                             291.42              179.85                         
Wald-Statistics
c
 10.89 4.26 5.69  4.19  4.78  2.84 
c Wald statistics for the joint significance of the non-intercept exogenous variables against a critical value of F(16,324)=2.75at 1% 
significance level.  
Value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
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3.5.3 The Separability Test’s Estimates 
 3.5.3.1  The Benjamin’s Test Estimates 
The results of estimation of Benjamin test by OLS and instrumental variable estimation are 
presented in Table 3.4. Column 1 shows the results of OLS estimation. Coefficients on the 
number of adult male and fraction of hired labor are significant while the coefficient on the 
number of adult females is not. Column 2 reports the results of instrumental variable 
estimation. In this specification, the coefficients on all three labor variables are significant, 
strongly rejecting the separation hypothesis. Compared with OLS, the results show that the 
coefficients on the number of adult male, adult female and fraction of hired labor increase in 
absolute values.  
Table 3.4: The Benjamin test (dependent variable:  log farm labor) 
Value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 OLS IV  
Explanatory Variables Coefficients Coefficients 
Log Wage -0.372(28.24)   -0.184(3.79) 
Log Land     0.123(3.31)    -0.004(0.06)                                                                                                                                                            
Log Fertilizer Cost     0.083(0.62)    -0.273(1.11)                                                                                                                                                       
Log Sowing Cost     0.164(1.25)   0.768(3.21)                                                                                                                                                    
Log Pesticide Cost    -0.092(2.04)    -0.052(0.63)    
Log Equipments -0.089(1.75)    -0.011(0.09)                                                                                                                                             
Adult Male 0.045(2.16)    -0.072(1.78)                                                                                                                                                   
Adult Female 0.011(0.42)    0.076(1.67) 
Log Fraction of Hired Labor -0.082(2.84)    -0.099(1.82)                                                                                                                                                 
Livestock 0.703(8.14)   -0.151(1.05)    
Age of HH head    -0.003(0.97)    0.001(0.22)                              
Education of HH head     0.008(0.36)    -0.017(0.40)                                         
Location1 0.066(0.57)    0.258(1.22)                                        
Location2   -0.223(2.02)   -0.141(0.66)                                       
Location3 -0.006(0.06)    -0.039(0.20)                                                                                                                                      
Location4 -0.276(1.22)    -0.278(0.63)                                                                                                                                 
Location5 0.086(0.82)    -0.032(0.16)                                                                                                                                       
Constant 1.721(10.21)    1.302(4.17)       
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  3.5.3.2  The Jacoby’s Test Estimates 
The result of Jacoby’s test is presented in Table 3.5. In order to account for the potential 
presence of measurement error in the reported individual wage rates, instrumental variable 
estimation is also reported in Table 3.5. The value of F-Statistics for both the OLS and IV 
strategies rejected the assumption of perfect market in this sample of Pakistani farmers. It 
showed that market imperfections are responsible for the inequality between marginal product 
and market wage. This finding supported the conclusion of Jacoby (1993); Skoufias (1994); 
Abdulai and Regmi (2000); and Le (2009).  
Table 3.5: Tests of the equality of estimated marginal products and market wages received by 
market participants 
a
 (dependent variable: shadow wage)
        
          
   
 ˆ  ˆ  
2R  F-test 
b
 
Males (n=337)     
OLS  -2.32(-17.07) 0.15(3.44) 0.0341 11.84 
IV -1.17(-2.68) -0.41(-1.96) 0.0114 3.85 
Females (n=341)     
OLS -1.58(-14.99) 0.29(4.39) 0.0544 19.28 
IV -1.85(-11.92) 0.60(3.83) 0.0420 14.68 
a Value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 b Value of F-statistics under null hypothesis Ho : 0ˆ   and 1ˆ  .The 5% critical value is 3. 
 
3.5.3.3  The Le’s Generalized Test Estimates 
The results of Le (2010) test are presented in Table 3.6. Column 1 reports the OLS estimates. 
The coefficient of wage is significantly different from 1 but coefficients of preference shifters 
are not significant. The results of instrumental variable are in the 2nd column, with the same 
instruments that are used in Jacoby’s test. The coefficient of wage is significantly different 
from 1 and coefficients of preference shifters are significant. All tests strongly rejected the 
separability hypothesis, indicating the dependence of production and consumption decisions 
of rural households in Pakistan. 
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Table 3.6: The Le’s generalized test (dependent variable:  log (value of output/farm labor)) 
            
 OLS IV  
Explanatory Variables Coefficients Coefficients 
Log Wage 0.461(5.93)  0.276(1.68)                                                                                                                             
Log Land     0.266(1.21)    0.412(1.79)                                                                                                                                                        
Log Fertilizer Cost     -0.165(0.21)    0.327(0.40)                                                                                                                                                     
Log Sowing Cost     0.596(0.77)   - 0.189(0.23)                                                                                                                                                    
Log Pesticide Cost    0.087(0.33)    0.026(0.09)                                                                                                                                                          
Log Equipments -0.716(2.37)    0.690(1.67)                                                                                                                                             
Adult Male 0.065(0.53)    0.233(1.70)                                                                                                                                                   
Adult Female  -0.132(0.89)    -0.201(1.31)                                                                                                                                                   
Log Fraction of Hired Labor -0.218(1.28)    0.223(1.70)                                                                                                                                             
Livestock 3.378(6.62)   4.482(9.23  )                                          
Age of HH head    -0.011(0.68)    -0.015(0.93)                                   
Education of HH head 0.064(0.45)    0.099(0.68)                             
Location1 -0.487(0.71)    -0.831(1.15)                                      
Location2 -1.878(2.87)   -2.033(2.84)                                      
Location3 -0.872(1.41)    -0.888(1.31)                                                                                                                                   
Location4 -0.953(0.71)    -1.139(0.76)                                                                                                                              
Location5 0.307(0.49)    0.417(0.62)                                                                                                                                       
Constant 1.52(1.52)    2.036(1.93)    
Value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
Shadow wages and shadow income are important variables for estimating the labor supply of 
rural household of developing countries, particularly where wage data is not available and 
markets are imperfect or weak. This article estimated own-farm, non-farm and agri-wage 
labor supply of rural households under the assumption of non-separability between the 
production and consumption decisions of households. Estimate proceeded in two steps. At 
first step the marginal productivity of family male and female labor is estimated through 
production function analysis. The estimated shadow wage and shadow income are then used 
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in the second stage to estimate the male and female labor supply functions. We analyzed how 
the household adjusts its decision on labor supply in response to change in economic 
conditions. A better understanding of how male and female members of household allocate 
their time between own-farm, non-farm, agri-wage sector in response to changes in economic 
conditions may be crucial for designing policy for the welfare of individuals. Results indicate 
that education can be a powerful source for rural Pakistani households that lead labor out of 
agriculture and shift into high returning non-farm sector. Caste plays an important role in 
overthrowing the autonomy of female. Socially backward castes have higher constraints to 
enter in non-farm sector in the sense they face higher transaction costs. The proximity of 
physical infrastructure, like factory or small scale industry in village can enables households 
to engage in high returning activities. 
We applied three tests for separation hypothesis to the sample of Pakistani rural 
households, one test is based on the Benjamin (1992) test which focused on the relationship 
between production decision and preferences of household, the second test is based on Jacoby 
(1993) test which tested the equality of market wage and shadow wage and the third one is Le 
(2010) generalized test which combined both the Benjamin test and the Jacoby test into one 
relationship. Our analysis provides strong evidence against the perfect labor market 
hypothesis in Pakistan. This stands in contrast to Benjamin (1992) but agree with other 
empirical work (Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; Le, 2010). 
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Chapter 4 
 
Non-farm employment and household welfare:                                                       
A gender based analysis of rural households in Pakistan 
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Abstract 
This article examines the impact of non-farm work on household welfare, differentiated by 
female, for rural households in the Punjab province of Pakistan. We employ an endogenous 
switching regression approach that accounts for selection bias due to observable and 
unobservable factors to examine the factors that influence the household’s decision to 
participate in non-farm work and the impact of participation on household welfare. Given that 
we find no substantial selection bias on unobservable factors, we also use PSM approach to 
check the robustness of our results from the ESR estimates. Separate estimates are also 
provided for male and female to address gender heterogeneity. The empirical results reveal 
that participation in non-farm work significantly increases the per head expenditures and 
reduces the household poverty level. This confirms the potential role of non-farm work in 
improving rural household welfare and poverty alleviation in rural areas of developing 
countries. 
Keywords: non-farm work, household welfare, impact assessment, endogenous switching
       regression, propensity score matching, Pakistan 
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4.1  Introduction 
In developing countries, most of the poor live in rural areas and majority of it engage in 
agricultural related activities. The agricultural sector plays a primal role in providing 
employment opportunities. This sector, however, has been contending with a number of 
factors, for example, the small size of landholdings, insufficient capital and investment 
incentives, the inadequate farm infrastructure, limited markets, and stagnant prices of 
agricultural products, which have limited its further potential for generating new jobs in rural 
areas. So there is need to focus on other sector of rural economy, not just on agriculture. The 
development of various non-farm activities has been generally recognized to have a potential 
in raising employment opportunities and stimulating the growth of rural economies. The 
important share of income is derived from non-farm activities. Haggblade et al. (2010), for 
instance, report that non-farm income contributed 35-50 percent of rural household income 
across the developing world.  
Given the significance of the non-farm in contributing to household welfare, many 
studies have explained the determinants of participation in non-farm work (e.g., Abdulai and 
Delgado, 1998; Ellis, 2000; Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Barrett et al., 2001). These studies 
generally highlight the entry barriers to participation in non-farm work and policy measures to 
promote non-farm activities in the rural area.  However, very few have analyzed the impact of 
participation in non-farm work on household welfare (e.g., Lanjouw, 2001; Chang and 
Mishra, 2008; Owusu et al, 2011). The studies that have examined the welfare impacts either 
analyzed correlations rather than causal effects (e.g., Lanjouw, 2001) or did not account for 
selectivity bias that may occur as a result of unobservable factors (Owusu et al., 2011). From 
an econometric standpoint, analyzing the welfare impact of non-farm work may be affected 
by unobserved factors such as the innate technical abilities, the types of social networks 
households belong to, as well as transaction costs that can be incurred as a result of poor 
access to markets because of infrastructure constraints. Failure to distinguish between the 
causal effect of participation and the effect of unobserved heterogeneity could lead to biased 
estimates and misleading policy implications.  
The present study examines the impact of participation in non-farm work on 
household welfare. It specifically employs endogenous switching regression approach to 
account for selectivity bias, and to capture the impact of participation on the welfare of 
participants and non-participants in non-farm work. Thus, the approach allows us to analyze 
the determinants of participation in non-farm work, as well as the impact of the participation 
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decision on household welfare.  The study utilizes cross-sectional rural household level data 
collected in 2010 from a randomly selected sample of 341 households in Punjab province of 
Pakistan. Separate estimates are provided for males and females in order to capture the 
differential impacts of non-farm work on gender. The knowledge and information generated 
from the study could be essential in promoting growth in the non-farm sector.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, a description of the 
data used in the analysis is provided. In section three, overview of the significance of non-
farm sector in Pakistan is described. The conceptual framework and estimation strategy are 
presented in section four.  The empirical results are reported in section five, while the final 
section presents conclusions and implications.  
4.2 Significance of Non-farm Sector in Pakistan 
Among the South Asian countries, Pakistan is a lower middle income country. Nearly two 
thirds of the population and 80 percent of the country’s poor people are concentrated in the 
rural parts of the country. Major economic activities in these areas are related directly or 
indirectly to the agriculture sector, but at present this sector has limited margins for landless 
poor due to many limiting factors. The major limiting factor in rural areas of Pakistan is the 
skewed distribution of land ownership. As Anwar et al., (2004) reported that in rural areas of 
Pakistan, 67 percent households were landless and just 0.1 percent households possessed 1 
hectare and above landholdings. Moreover, the fast growing rural labor force cannot be much 
absorbed in the almost employment overcrowded agriculture sector.  
As the result of class stratification, increasing landlessness of small farmers, and 
population growth, non-farm sector in Pakistan is expanding. This sector in Pakistan, like in 
many other developing countries, is a heterogeneous sector covering a wide spectrum of 
activities. Generally, it includes all activities in the rural economy that are not pursued on 
farms. It is of great importance to rural economies for its productive and employment effects. 
Almost 45-50 percent of the rural population in Pakistan is directly dependent on non-farm 
income. Contribution of this sector is also critical to food security, poverty alleviation, farm 
sector competitiveness and productivity. It offers agricultural services and products to the 
food and fiber system. These products are critical to the dynamics of agriculture (GOP, 2011).   
Despite the critical role of the rural non-farm sector in food security, poverty 
alleviation, farm sector competitiveness and productivity, this sector has received inadequate 
attention in the debate in Pakistan (Malik, 2008). There is need to focus on the non-farm 
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sector while designing poverty alleviation strategies for rural areas of Pakistan where vicious 
land-labor ratio limit income earnings opportunities in agriculture.  
4.3  Data Description 
Data for this study was collected between September 2010 and January 2011 through a cross 
sectional survey of rural households in Punjab province which is the country's most populous 
region, constitutes 56 percent of Pakistan's total population. Due to its largest rural society, 
that province was selected for data collection. There was no large-scale redistribution of 
agricultural land and asymmetry exists in land ownership. As a result most rural areas are 
dominated by a small set of land-owning families. It has always contributed the most to the 
national economy of Pakistan.  Its share of Pakistan's GDP was 54.7 percent in 2000 and 
increased to 59 percent in 2010. It is especially dominant in the service and agriculture sectors 
of the Pakistan economy. Its contribution is ranging from 52.1 to 64.5 percent in the service 
sector and 56.1 to 61.5 percent in the agriculture sector. It is also major manpower contributor 
because it has largest pool of professionals and highly skilled manpower (Pakistan 
encyclopedia, 2012). It has three broad agro-climatic zones named as lower, central and 
upper. Two districts from each zone were selected for survey. A stratified random sample of a 
total of 341 households was selected in each of six districts to ensure representation of all 
categories of households, which potentially influence the extent and nature of livelihood 
diversification. 
Using a structured questionnaire, these households were interviewed eliciting 
information on farm and non-farm activities as well as personal, demographic and locational 
characteristics. Information on agriculture activities included farm size, crop output, price of 
output, expenditure on variable inputs, family and hired labor, capital assets, own 
consumption, sale of produce, access to credit. Information on livestock activities included 
number of animals and poultry birds. Detailed information on the consumption expenditure 
was fully recorded.  
The dependent variable used in the study is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one, if the household participated in non-farm work, and the value zero, if no participation 
was recorded. The outcome variables used in this study are per head expenditure and 
headcount index as an indicator of household poverty status. The consumption expenditure 
components include expenditures on food, tobacco, clothing, energy, livestock, health, 
education, social activities (marriages, deaths, etc.), recreation and other household 
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expenditures over the last year. Headcount index was calculated on the basis of per capita 
expenditures. Purchasing power parity (PPP) poverty line used in this study is 1.25$ per day 
per person suggested by World Bank (2008) for Pakistan. Poverty outcome was measured as a 
binary variable. Since gender plays an important role in the poverty dynamics in Pakistan, the 
gender stratification was used in the estimation. 
The independent variables used in the estimations were based on past research on 
determinants of participation in non-farm employment (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Barrett et 
al., 2001; Owusu et al., 2011). These variables include household characteristics such as 
gender of household head, age to capture experience, and education of the household head to 
present productivity potential, presence of children, household size, household assets (land, 
livestock) to indicate wealth, access to credit to capture liquidity constraints, village 
infrastructure development project (road, factory/mill), distance of household from retail shop 
to indicate employment opportunities, and location characteristics to capture community ﬁxed 
effects. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the descriptive statistics of variable used in estimations and 
difference in the characteristics of participants and non-participants with their t-values for 
males and females, respectively. The observed mean difference of 0.50 in the effects of 
treatment for males (0.59) and females (0.09) is statistically significant at 1% level indicating 
the presence of gender heterogeneous treatment effects. The difference in the rate of 
participation between males and females reflects the fact that males in the area are more 
engaged in non-farm activities, while females are predominantly engaged in household 
activities. There are cultural and social barriers that prevent women from entering and 
remaining in the labor force. They are not allowed to go outside for work and confined to only 
household duties are considered honorable for them.  Also presented in the Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
are differences in means of the variables used in the estimations for both male and female 
participants, alongside their significance levels. The significance levels suggest that there are 
some differences between participants and non-participants with respect to household and 
farm-level characteristics. 
  With regards to the outcome variables, there appear to be statistically significant 
differences in per head expenditures and poverty level of household between participants and 
non-participants. Poverty appeared to be lower and per head expenditures was higher among 
non-farm participants than non-participants for both male and female. When estimating 
poverty using monetary measures, one may have a choice between using income or 
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consumption as the indicator of wellbeing. Most analysts argue that, provided the information 
on consumption obtained from a household survey is detailed enough, consumption will be a 
better indicator of poverty measurement than income (Coudouel et al., 2002). Head count 
index is used as indicator of poverty. It is the share of the population living in household 
whose consumption is below the poverty line.  
We found a significant difference in term of education level of household head. Higher 
level of education of household head among participants in non-farm work indicates that, 
education was found to be a better positioned to mobilize capital through high returning non-
farm work. In other words illiteracy serves as an entry barrier into high returning and less 
risky activities. There is also significant difference between the female participants and non-
participants with respect to access to credit. 41 % of participants and 24 % of non-participants 
have access to credit, while the corresponding figures for males were 26 % and 24 % 
respectively; revealing the fact that limited access to credit for households is an entry barrier 
to their non-farm work participation. 
Household composition and characteristics seem to matter for participants and non-
participants. Participants have more working age members as compared to non-participants 
for both male and female. The presence of young children (<5 years) in the household impede 
the probability of participation of female. So caring for young children appears to be 
compatible with non-farm work in rural areas of Pakistan. In particular, there appear to be 
differences in the ownership of land and livestock. Non-participants have higher acreage of 
land and more number of livestock than participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in estimation for males  
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the  *10%, **5%  and ***1% levels.  
For poverty calculations Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) US$ 1.25 per person per day is used as poverty line. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description 
Participants Non-participants Diff.in 
Mean   N=202 (59.24%) N=139 (40.76%)           
Mean S.d Mean S.d 
PerHExp Per head expenditures (Rupees) 99738.11 289855.2 72494.24 78173.28 27243.86* 
Headcount Head count index 0.35 0 .48 0 .40 0 .49 - 0.04* 
AgeHead Age of the HH head in years 49.63 0.82 46.77 0.95 2.86** 
Age2Head Square of head age 2490.28 1215.56 2286.22 1098.84 204.07* 
HeadEdu Years of education of HH head 2.39 1.24 1.73 0.97 0.66*** 
HHSizOvr14 No.of HH members < 14 years 5.49 2.72 4.25 2.67 1.23*** 
Ch0L05 No. of children >5 year of age 1.04 1.45 0.95 1.35 0.09 
Child14 No. of children b/w age 6-14 years 6.02 6.78 6.58 5.96 -0.57 
Livstk 1 if HH has livestock,0 otherwise 0.78 0.41 0.88 0.32 -0.98** 
TLand Total cultivated land in acres 18.81 42.58 21.54 39.57 -2.74 
Credit 1 if HH takes credit, 0 otherwise 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.42 0.03* 
DProg 1 if village dev. prog, 0 otherwise 0.22 0.42 -0.47 0.72 0.69 
M0CasW Village cash wages of male (Rs) 266.36 70.75 280.76 78.44 -14.39* 
Location1 1 if Lahore district, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36  
Location2 1 if Sahiwal district ,0 otherwise 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.35  
Location3 1 if M.Garh district ,0 otherwise 0.32 0.46 0.26 0.44  
Location4 1 if layyah district, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00  
Location5 1 if Sialkot district,0 otherwise 0.20 0.41 0.32 0.46  
Location6 1 if Khushab district,0 otherwise 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.32  
DRShop Distance of HH to retail shop (km) 0.72 0.45 0.82 0.39 -0.09** 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of variables used in estimation for females 
 
Variable Description 
Participants Non-participants 
Diff. in 
Means  N=32 (9.38%) N=309 (90.61%)           
Mean S.d Mean S.d 
PerHExp  Per head expenditures (Rupees) 85552.33 203701.3 64742.62     54142.19 20809.71** 
Headcount  Head count index 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.50 -0.03* 
AgeHead Age of the HH head in years 53         8.64               47.99             11.71                    5.00** 
Age2Head Square of head age  2455.13 966.93 2402.13 1192.49 52.99* 
HeadEdu  Years of education of HH head   2.41 1.41 2.09     1.15 -0.32* 
HHSizOvr14  No.of HH members < 14 years 6.75     2.16 4.81        2.76 1.94*** 
Ch0L05  No. of children > 5 year of age  0.75 0.92 1.03 1.45  -0.28* 
Child14 No. of children b/w age 6-14 years 5.13 5.96 6.37 6.51  -1.24 
Livstk 1 if HH has livestock,0 otherwise 0.68 0.47 0.84 0.36 -0.15** 
TLand Total cultivated land in acres 10.62 11.92 20.89 43.16 -10.27* 
Credit 1 if HH takes credit, 0 otherwise 0.41 0.49 0.24 0.43 0.17** 
DProg 1 if village dev. prog, 0 otherwise  0.44 0.51 0.38 0.49           0.06 
F0CasW Village cash wages of female (Rs) 138.59 74.17 158.85 76.75 20.26 
Location1 1 if Lahore district, 0 otherwise 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36  
Location2 1 if Sahiwal district, 0 otherwise 0.15 0.37 0.20 0.40  
Location3 1 if M.Garh district, 0 otherwise 0.41 0.49 0.29 0.45  
Location4 1 if layyah district, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13  
Location5 1 if Sialkot district, 0 otherwise 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44  
Location6 1 if Khushab district, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.29   
DRShop Distance of HH to retail shop (km) 0.75 0.44   0.76 0.43 -0.01 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. 
For poverty calculations Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) US$ 1.25 per person per day is used as poverty line. 
 
Although the comparison in Table 4.1 and 4.2 do reveal some significant differences 
between participants and non-participants, however mean differences do not account for the 
effect of other characteristics of rural households and cannot be taken as evidence for the 
specific effects of participation. Multivariate approaches that account for selection bias arising 
from the fact that participants and non-participants may be systematically different, are 
essential in providing sound estimates of the impact of participation on per head expenditure 
and poverty level of household. 
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4.4  Conceptual Framework and Estimation Strategy 
In this section, we introduce the conceptual framework and estimation method. To derive the 
relationship between participation in non-farm work and household welfare, we start with a 
standard time allocation model. Consider a farmer who maximizes utility defined over 
consumption of goods C  and leisure N , and a vector of preference shifters Z (e.g., number of 
adults and number of children), );,( ZNCU , subject to a budget constraint  wmpYC  , 
where p is the price of farm output (Y). The budget constraint suggests that the farmer earns 
income from working on his farm ( FL ) to receive farm output (Y) and working in the non-
farm labor market ( NFL ) to earn the market wage (w). The sum of the labor supply 
( NFF LLL  ) and leisure (N) is the total time (T) available, NLT  , where T could be 24 
hours a day. The technology of farm production is represented by a twice differentiable, 
concave production function, );,,( ZXFLY F , where F is a vector of fixed factors such as 
land, X represents variable inputs such as hired labor and fertilizer. The household 
maximization problem outlined above can be summarized as follows 
);  ,);,,(( max ZLTwmZXFLpYU F       (l)  
The first order condition for optimal time allocation for farm, non-farm and leisure 
activities is given as: 
0///  LUCUWLU ii         (2)  
Equation (2) can be rearranged to obtain the returns to labor from farm work and non-
farm work: )/(/()/( QULUwi  . As shown in Huffman (1991), a positive number of 
non-farm hours will be observed for an individual i, if the potential market wage ( m
iw ) is 
greater than the reservation wage ( r
iw ).
4
 The labor supply functions can then be derived as 
);,( ZPwLL iiii   for cases where farm households allocate their time to the three activities.  
Following the empirical literature on non-farm work decisions of farm households, it 
is assumed that the participation decision of the individual is influence by a comparison 
                                                          
4 The reservation wage for non-farm work is the marginal value of the individual’s time when 
all of it is allocated to farm and leisure. 
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between the reservation wage )( riW and the potential market wage )(
m
iW   in the non-farm 
sector. Participation in non-farm activities )1( iL  occur if  
r
i
m
i WW   and positive number of 
non-farm hours will not be observed )0( iL if 
r
i
m
i WW  . However, these differential wages 
are not observable, but we do observe the decision of participation. Given that we do observe 
participation or non-participation, Huffman and Lange (1989) note that an index function can 
be specified with an unobserved variable )( *iL , such that  
iii XL  
*
 
01 *  ii LifL           (10) 
00 *  ii LifL  
where )( iX   is a vector of individual and household characteristics and )( i  is an error term. 
In order to estimate the relationship between participation in non-farm work and 
household per head expenditures and poverty level, we start with a linear function 
 iiii
LZY  
          (11) 
where )( iY  is per head expenditure and poverty level of household, )( iL is dummy variable 
representing participation in non-farm sector, )( iZ   is individual, household and locational 
characteristics, )( i is random error term. 
 4.4.1  Empirical Impact Evaluation Challenges 
In non-randomized trial, estimation of the impact of non-farm work on the welfare of 
household is very substantial because there is need of information on the counterfactual 
situation had they not had participated in non-farm work. In randomized experimental studies, 
information on counterfactual situation is provided by randomly assigning households to 
treatment and control status, where the welfare outcome observed on the non-participants are 
statistically representative of what would have occurred without participation for participants. 
Moreover, in non-randomized trials, households are not randomly distributed to the two 
groups (participants and non-participants), rather participation in non-farm activities may be 
dependent on the benefits from participation. Therefore, participants and non-participants may 
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be systematically different. Thus, selection bias occurs if unobserved factors influence both 
the error term )( i  of the participation equation (10) and the error term )( i   of the outcome 
equation (11), thus resulting the correlation of the error terms. The implication of this is that 
the use of standard regression techniques (ordinary least square (OLS) to estimate the 
parameters of the equation would result in biased and inconsistent estimates.  
Some authors have employed the Heckman selection method or instrumental variable 
approach (IV) but these two methods are quite restrictive and assume that outcome function 
would differ only by unobservable factors (constant term) between the participating and non-
participating households in the non-farm work. According to Heckman et al., (1997), it is 
likely that the differences between two individuals with or without exposure to program or 
technology may be more systematic even after conditioning on unobservable or observable 
factors. So in this study, we employ endogenous switching regression approach to examine 
the factors that influence the household’s decision to participate in non-farm work and the 
impact of participation on household welfare measures such as per capita expenditure and 
poverty levels. As we found no endogenous, therefore we also employed the propensity 
matching approach to further examine the impact of participation on household welfare, and 
to also check the robustness of our findings from the endogenous switching regression model. 
 
 4.4.2  Endogenous Switching Regression Model 
We specify the binary decision choice of household to participate in non-farm work 
conditioned on observed covariates as: 
iii XL  
*
 
01 *  ii LifL          (12) 
00 *  ii LifL  
To account for selection biases we adopt an endogenous switching regression model of 
welfare outcomes, (i.e. per head expenditure and poverty level) where households face two 
regimes (1) to participate, and (2) not to participate defined as follows: 
iiii LZY 11111            (13a)                
iiii LZY 22222       (13b)  
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where iY  is per head expenditure and poverty level of participant and non-participant 
household (regimes 1 and 2), iZ represent a vector of exogenous variables representing 
individual, household and village level information which thought to influence outcome 
function. 
21 ,  are parameters to be estimated and 21 ,  are error terms. 
Finally, the error terms are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution, with zero 
mean and non-singular covariance matrix expressed as: 
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where );,cov(;);,cov();,cov();var();var();var( 221121121
2
2
2
21
2
1 ii     
2  represents variance of the error term in the selection equation and 21 , 
2
2  represent 
variance of the error term in the outcome equations.  
 According to Maddala (1983), when there are unobservable factors associated with 
selection bias, the important implication of the error structure is that because the error 
term )( i of the selection equation (12) is correlated with the error terms ),( 21  of the welfare 
outcome functions (13a) and (13b), the expected values of ii 21 ,  conditional on the sample 
selection are non-zero: 
11111
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where  and   are the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of the 
standard normal distribution, respectively. The ratio of  and  evaluated at iX  ,represented 
by 
1 and 2 in equations (15a) and (15b) is referred to as the inverse mills ratio (IMR) which 
denotes selection bias terms. 
Previous studies have used a two-stage method to estimate the endogenous switching 
model. (e.g Lee, 1978; Feder et al., 1990;  Fuglie and Bosch, 1995; Freemanet al., 1998). In 
the ﬁrst stage, a probit model of the criterion equation is estimated and the inverse Mills ratios 
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1  and 2  are derived according to deﬁnitions in equations (15a) and (15b). In the second 
stage, these predicted variables are added to the appropriate equation in (13a) and (13b) 
respectively to yield following sets of equations: 
1111111    iii LZY      (16a)          
2222222    iii LZY      (16b) 
The coefficients of the variables 
1  and 2  provide estimates of the covariance terms 1 and 
2 , respectively. Since the variables 1  and 2  have been estimated, however, the residuals 
1  and 2  cannot be used to calculate the standard errors of the two-stage estimates. While 
Lee (1978) suggested a procedure to derive consistent standard errors most especially for the 
two stage approach, Maddala (1983) argue that such procedure require potentially 
cumbersome and complicated process which most studies using the earlier two stage approach 
failed to implement. Thus, in the present study, a single stage approach where Full-
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method proposed by Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) 
using the movestay command in the statistical software STATA is employed for the empirical 
analysis. The FIML simultaneously fit the selection (i.e., equation 12) and outcomes (i.e., 
equation 13a and 13b) equations in order to yield consistent standard errors, thus, making 
1  
and 
2 in equations 16a and 16b, respectively homoskedastic. 
The FIML’s log likelihood Function for switching regression model employed in this 
study proposed by Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) is described below: 
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The signs of the correlation coefﬁcients 1 and 2 have economic interpretations 
(Fuglie and Bosch 1995). If 1 and 2  have alternate signs, then individuals participate in 
non-farm work on the basis of their comparative advantage: those who participated have 
above average returns from participation and those who choose not to participate have above-
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average returns from non-participation. On the other hand, if the coefficients have the same 
sign, it indicates hierarchical sorting: participants have above-average returns whether they 
participate or not, but they are better off participating, whereas non-participants have below-
average returns in either case, but they are better off not participating. 
The ATT of non-farm participation can be calculated as 
1212121 )()()1(    iiii ZLYYEATT     (18) 
In equation 18, 1111 )1(   iii ZLYE  represents the expected outcome for 
households who participated, had they chose to participate in non-farm; 
1222 )1(   iii ZLYE represents the expected outcome for households who participated, 
had it been they chose not to participate in non-farm.  
 4.4.3 Propensity Score Matching 
To examine the causal effect of non-farm participation on household per head expenditure and 
poverty level, propensity score matching technique was also used. The basic idea behind the 
propensity score is that we may reduce the bias if we compare outcomes of treated and control 
groups which are as similar as possible. It constructs a statistical comparison group by 
matching every individual observation of participants with an observation with similar 
characteristics from the group of non-participants. Thus, create the conditions of an 
experiment in which participants and non-participants are randomly assigned, allowing for the 
identification of a causal link between the non-farm participants and outcome variables.  
The propensity score is the conditional probability of assigning a treatment, given pre-
treatment characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), written as: 
)()1Pr()( iiiii XLEXLXP         (19) 
Where  1,0L  is the indicator of exposure to treatment (non-farm participation) and X is the 
vector of pre-treatment characteristics.       
The parameter of interest is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which 
can be estimated as: 
 
     1)(,0)(,1 01  iiiiiii LXPLYEXPLYEE         (20) 
  )(,101 iiii XPLYYEEATT 
78 
 
Where 1
iY  and 
0
iY  are the potential outcome in two counterfactual situations. The propensity 
score is predicted with probit model. The predicted propensity score is then used to estimate 
treatment effect. 
Conceptually the ATT requires a mean for the unobservable counterfactual,  10 ii LYE   
so for the observable quantities in equation (20) to identify the ATT relies on three key 
conditions introduced into the literature by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). First is the 
“unconfoundedness” ),( 10 iiii XLYY   where   denotes independence. According to this, 
potential outcomes are independent of participation, conditional on the observable covariates, 
iX . Given observable covariates, participating group is treated as random and any systematic 
differences in actual outcomes between participants and non-participants individuals with the 
same value of the covariates is attributed to the participation in non-farm work.  
Second is the “common support” where all participated households have a counterpart 
in the non-participating group for each iX  for which we seek to make a comparison. This 
condition would appear to create a dimensionality problem when many covariates are 
matched on; for example, if iX  contains k covariates which are all dichotomous the number 
of possible matches will be k2 . However, the propensity score reduces the dimensionality of 
the matching problem because it is possible to match on )( iXP  which is scalar, rather than on 
the vector of observable variables iX . This use of )( iXP  is valid so long as the “balancing” 
property )))(,0())(,1(( PXPLXprobPXPLXprob iiiiii   holds (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). In other words, conditional on the propensity score, the means of the covariates 
should be identical across the treatment and control groups if the balancing property holds. 
Since the propensity score is a continuous variable it is unlikely that there are two 
observations with exactly the same value of )( iXP , so further refinement is needed to 
estimate equation (20). Various matching estimators have been suggested in the literature. 
Although all matching estimators normally yield same results but the choice of a matching 
approach could become important in small sample (Heckman et al., 1997). The most 
commonly used are nearest neighbor matching (NNM), kernel based matching (KBM), 
stratified matching, radius matching and Mahalanobis matching methods. The NNM, Radius 
and KBM methods are employed in this study.  
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The most straightforward matching estimator is nearest neighbor (NN) matching which 
matches each participant with its closest neighbor with similar observed characteristics. It can 
be done either with replacement or without replacement. Matching with replacement results in 
bias reduction since each treatment group can be matched to the nearest comparison group as 
a result of a reduction in the propensity score distance (Smith and Todd, 2005).  
Kernel matching (KM) is non-parametric matching estimators that use weighted 
averages of all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. 
Kernel matching tends to use more non-participants for each participant, thereby reducing the 
variance but possibly increasing the bias. To avoid the risk of bad matches by choosing the 
closest neighbors that are far away, calipers are implemented. This involves imposing a 
tolerance on the maximum distance in the propensity score allowed. When applying KM one 
has to choose the kernel function and the bandwidth parameter. The kernel function appears to 
be relatively unimportant in practice (DiNardo and Tobias, 2001). As noted by Pagan and 
Ullah (1999) that more important is the choice of the bandwidth parameter with the following 
trade-off arising: High bandwidth-values yield a smoother estimated density function, 
therefore leading to a better fit and a decreasing variance between the estimated and the true 
underlying density function. On the other hand, underlying features may be smoothed away 
by a large bandwidth leading to a biased estimate. The bandwidth choice is therefore a 
compromise between a small variance and an unbiased estimate of the true density function. 
In radius matching, each treated unit is matched only with the control unit whose 
propensity score falls in a predefined neighborhood of the propensity score of the treated unit. 
The benefit of this approach is that it uses only the number of comparison unit available 
within a predefined radius; thereby allowing for use of extra units when good matches are 
available and fewer when they are not. One possible drawback is the difficulty of knowing a 
priori what radius is reasonable (Dehija and Wahba, 2002). 
The matching quality depends on the ability of the matching procedure to balance the 
relevant covariates. The standardized bias approach proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985) is used to quantify the bias between treated and control groups. Sianesi (2004) has also 
proposed a comparison of the pseudo- 2R  and p-values of the likelihood ratio test of the joint 
significance of all the regressors obtained from the probit analysis before and after matching 
the samples. To ensure that there are no systematic differences in the distribution of the 
covariates between both groups, the pseudo- 2R  should be fairly low after matching and the 
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joint significance of covariates should be rejected. Sensitivity analysis was also undertaken to 
check if the influence of an unmeasured variable on the selection process is so strong to 
undermine the matching procedure. Since it is not possible to estimate the selection bias in 
practice with non-randomized data, we employed the bounding approach suggested by 
Rosenbaum (2002) to examine the influence of unmeasured variable on the selection process. 
The aim of this approach is to determine how strongly an unmeasured variable must influence 
the selection process to undermine the implication of the matching process. 
4.5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
In order to analyze the driving forces behind rural household’s decision to participate in non-
farm work, we employed endogenous switching regression that can control for both 
observable and unobservable selection bias. FIML estimates of the endogenous switching 
regression model for male and female participants are reported in Tables 4.3-4.6. The third 
column of Tables 4.3-4.6 presents the estimated coefficients of the selection equation (12) on 
non-farm work participating or not whereas the fourth and fifth column present per head 
expenditures and poverty level of household.  The empirical results for the probability of non-
farm participation are generally in agreement with prediction from the analytical model. Age 
variable is positive and statistically significant in both specifications for male and females, 
which represents general experience that increases the marginal value of time in each activity. 
The results suggest that an increase in age of household head increases the probability of both 
male and female participation in non-farm work. In both specifications, number of years of 
schooling of household head significantly increases the participation decision since most of 
the activities in non-farm work require a certain level of education. Thus education of 
household members, represented by the household head’s level of education, is a powerful 
source that leads labor out of agriculture and shifts it into high returning non-farm sector 
(Timmer, 1988). Therefore, households without well educated heads are consequently 
excluded from non-farm activities. 
Household composition and characteristics seem to matter as well on the probability of 
participation for both male and female. The coefficient of the adult household size is positive 
and significant, suggesting that the presence of working age men and women in the household 
which is an indicator of non-nuclearity of household, tends to increase the probability of 
participation of both male and female in non-farm work. These results are in contrast to the 
study of Barrett et al. (2008) and in line with the study of Abdauli and Regime (2000) in the 
case of male labor supply. The presence of children in the household had no significant effect 
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on the probability of participation of both male and female in non-farm work, confirmed to 
the findings of other studies that showed that non-farm work and child care are not necessarily 
competing activities in rural areas of developing countries (Rosenzweig, 1980; Sahn and 
Alderman, 1988; Skoufias, 1994; Abdulai and Delgado, 1999). 
Males and females belonging to households endowed with valuable physical capital like 
farm land or livestock are less likely to participate in non-farm activities. As noted by Weiss 
(1997) that increase in farm size reduces the probability of participation in off-farm labor 
market. Perhaps they often capitalize their valuable assets in order to smooth consumption in 
times of income shortfalls (Fafchamps et al., 1998; Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Corral and 
Reardon, 2001; Lanjouw et al., 2001; Dercon, 2002; Barrett et al., 2005; Verpoorten, 2009). 
Consequently, valuable agricultural assets can be regarded as some kind of entry barriers, 
since well endowed households are able to run their farm properly and are not dependent on 
non-farm activities to generate more income or to spread risk. In the absence of valuable 
endowments, however, households seem to be forced into non-farm employment since 
farming would not be successful due to low quality of assets. Since endowment with valuable 
assets also represents the household’s wealth, these findings also support the theory of 
decreasing risk aversion. Households endowed with valuable physical capital are less risk-
averse and therefore less likely to participate in non-farm employment. The presence of a 
development project in study area enhances the probability of participation for both male and 
female in non-farm earning activities. In both specifications, access to credit decreases the 
likelihood of non-farm participation for both male and female but this variable is not 
significantly different from zero. 
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Table 4.3: Full information maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching 
regression 
Dependent variable: non-farm participation of male and per head expenditure 
Variables Description 
FIML Endogenous Switching Regression 
Participation 
(1/0) 
Participation=1 
(participants) 
Participation=0 
(non-participants) 
AgeHead Age of HH head (years) 0.044(0.02)* 1486.615(1032.52) 10850.41(5859.70)* 
Age2Head Square of head age -0.001(0.00) - 9.553(9.68) -113.069(62.17)*      
HeadEdu Years of education of HH head   0.089(0.02)*** 2006.029(1212.06)* 15799.03(5925.29)*** 
HHSiz14  No.of HH members < 14 years 0.101(0.03)*** 477.980(1639.10) -2552.426(10025.73) 
Ch0L05 No. of child > 5 years  -0.018(0.06) - 11172.18(3115.13)*** -13555.96(19111.12) 
Child14 No. of child b/w 6-14 years -0.016(0.03) - 2648.617(692.17)*** -8396.397(3770.76)** 
Livstk 1 if HH has livestock,0 otherwise -0.496(0.24)** 29170.37(11271.17)*** 111341.70(56806.98)** 
CultLand Total cultivated land in acres -0.007(0.01)  629.072(351.20)* 5390.478(3056.95)*  
Credit 1 if HH takes credit, 0 otherwise -0.126(0.18) -12316.09(9926.92)* 23771.70(61787.72) 
DProg 1 if village dev. prog, 0 otherwise 0.008(0.00)*  11913.81(11815.76) 249.831(665.87) 
M0CasW Village cash wages of male (Rs) -0.001(0.00)  116.95(93.42)      -170.992(259.22)      
Location1 1 if Lahore district, 0 otherwise 0.166(0.29) - 12266.68(17977.18) 61118.18(64830.65) 
Location2 1 if Sahiwal district , 0 otherwise 0.503(0.31) - 15005.54(12192.1) 76184.78(71324.03) 
Location3 1 if M.Garh district , 0 otherwise 0.190(0.30) - 11033.16(14055.02) 16619.42(57644.97) 
Location4 1 if Layyah district, 0 otherwise 6.446(0.74)*** - 2614.478(31276.57) 25803(35664.1) 
Location5 1 if Sialkot district, 0 otherwise 0.132(0.33)   6467.268(20673.71) 29066.35(57972.38) 
DRShop Distance of HH to retail shop (km) -0.324(0.15)**   
Constant  -1.056(0.81) -9608.821(40579.14) -899.378(148525.60) 
ei    70679.45(1.95) *** 262235(13.64)***                              
j    -0.336(0.30) 0.758(0.53) 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5%  and ***1% levels. 
ei denotes the square root of the variance of the error terms in the outcome equations, j
denotes correlation       
coefficient b/w the error term of selection equation and error term of outcome equation. 
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Table 4.4: Full information maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching 
regression. 
Dependent variable: non-farm participation of female and per head expenditure 
Variables Description 
FIML Endogenous Switching Regression 
Participation 
(1/0) 
Participation=1 
(participants) 
Participation=0 
(non-participants) 
AgeHead Age of HH head (years)  0.057(0.03)** 710.811(657.06) 8864.94(4527.70)** 
Age2Head Square of head age -0.052(0.03)** -325.627(708.21) -10041.23(5216.64)* 
HeadEdu Years of edu. of HH head  0.063(0.02)*** 3233.42(879.11)*** 2962.276(2825.53) 
HHSizOv14  No.of HH members <14 years 0.115(0.03)*** 1123.871(1966.81) -8814.77(6239.28) 
Ch0L05  No. of child > 5 year of age  -0. 051(0.06) -6185.097(3179.638)* -29598.36(13595.25)** 
Child14 No. of child b/w age 6-14 years -0.001(0.01) -2050.238(692.40)*** -3227.91(1804.83)* 
Livstk 1 if HH has livestock,0 otherwise -0.423(0.23)* 26923.76(10608.73)*** -10451.13(26556.61) 
CultLand Total cultivated land in acres -0.004(0.00) 216.820(189.01) 3417.42(2015.69)* 
Credit 1 if HH takes credit, 0 otherwise -0.024(0.18) -15084.88(9266.77) 45493.47(43596.3) 
Dprog 1 if village dev. prog, 0 otherwise 0.013(0.01)** 21355.13(13433.69) 532.333(463.14) 
F0CasW Village cash wages of female (Rs) -0.001(0.00) 188.854(111.14)* -88.223(152.82) 
Location1 1 if Lahore district, 0 otherwise 1.458(0.41)*** 16096. 98(14509.69) 14043.9(34611.43) 
Location2 1 if Sahiwal district, 0 otherwise 1.830(0.40)*** 18832.9 (14331.83) -20906.85(36205.26) 
Location3 1 if M.Garh district, 0 otherwise 1.558(0.40)*** 22716.35(13875.92) -14001.92(34369.65) 
Location4 1 if Layyah district, 0 otherwise 2.093(0.78)*** 8100.969(30827.24) 112396.8(61361.67)* 
Location5 1 if Sialkot district, 0 otherwise 0.014(0.46) 47265.47(27991.48)* 3048.95(23646.26) 
DRShop Distance of HH to retail shop (km) -0.586(0.21)***   
Constant  -2.832(0.85)*** -38401.17(44267.32) -70368.19(99072.37) 
ei    58999.02(7766.79)*** 201434.5(70.54)*** 
j    -0.009(0.43) 0.001(0.13) 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5%  and ***1% levels. 
ei denotes the square root of the variance of the error terms in the outcome equations, j
denotes correlation coefficient 
b/w the error term of selection equation and error term of outcome equation. 
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Table 4.5: Full information maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching 
regression. 
Dependent variable: non-farm participation of male and headcount 
Variables Description 
FIML Endogenous Switching Regression 
Participation 
(1/0) 
Participation=1 
(participants) 
Participation=0 
(non-participants) 
AgeHead Age of HH head (years)  0.045(0.02)* -0.005(0.01) -0.044(0.01)*** 
Age2Head Square of head age -0.000(0.00) -7.77e-06(0.00) 0.001(0.00)*** 
HeadEdu Years of edu. of HH head  0.082(0.02)*** -0.030(0.01)*** -0.022(0.01)**  
 HHSizOv14   No.of HH members < 14 years 0.1077(0.03)***  -0.035(0.02)*  0.026(0.02)     
Ch0L05  No. of chil under > year of age  -0.014(0.07) 0.068(0.03)*** 0.080(0.03)*** 
Child14 No. of child between age 6-14 years  -0.011(0.01) 0.009(0.01)*     0.017(0.01)* 
Livstk 1 if HH has livestock,0 otherwise -0. 598(0.23)***  -0.186(0.09)***  -0.161(0.13) 
CultLand Total cultivated land in acres -0.003(0.00) -0.002(0.00)** -0.002(0.00)*  
Credit 1 if HH takes credit, 0 otherwise -0.126(0.18) 0.052(0.07) 0.061(0.09) 
DProg 1 if village dev. prog, 0otherwise 0.013(0.01)* -0.121(0.07)* 0.003(0.00)** 
M0CasW Village cash wages of male(Rs) -0.000(0.00)     0.001(0.00)      0.001(0.00)      
Location1 1 if Lahore district, 0 otherwise 0.180(0.32) 0.288(0.12)***  0.251(0.12)** 
Location2 1 if Sahiwal district ,0 otherwise 0.564(0.31)* 0.207(0.13) 0.443(0.13)*** 
Location3 1 if M.Garh district ,0 otherwise 0.212(0.31) 0.214(0.11)**  0.303(0.09)***  
Location4 1 if Layyah district, 0 otherwise 6.521(0.98)*** 0.133(0.25)    0.986(0.72) 
Location5 1 if Sialkot district,0 otherwise 0 .093(0.35) 0.021(0.13)      0.020(0.32)*** 
DRShop Distance of HH to retail shop (km) -0 .370(0.21)*   
Constant  -1.204(0.79)  0.758(0.43)*    1.102(0.32)*** 
ei    0.418(0.03)*** 0.378(0.02)*** 
j    -0.229(0.50) 0.081(0.48) 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5%  and ***1% levels. 
ei denotes the square root of the variance of the error terms in the outcome equations, j
denotes correlation coefficient 
b/w the error term of selection equation and error term of outcome equation. 
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Table 4.6: Full information maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching 
regression. 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5%  and ***1% levels. 
ei denotes the square root of the variance of the error terms in the outcome equations, j denotes correlation coefficient 
b/w the error term of selection equation and error term of outcome equation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: non-farm participation of female and headcount 
Variables Description 
FIML Endogenous Switching Regression 
Participation 
(1/0) 
Participation=1 
(participants) 
Participation=0 
(non-participants) 
AgeHead Age of HH head (years)  0.054(0.03)** -0.008(0.01) -0.031(0.01)*** 
Age2Head Square of head age -0.050(0.02)** 0.003(0.01) 0.026(0.01)*** 
HeadEdu Years of edu. of HH head  0.063(0.02)*** -0.032(0.01)*** -0.018(0.01)** 
HHSizOve14  No.of HH members < 14 years 0.114(0.03)*** -0.042(0.02)** 0.021(0.01)** 
Ch0L05  No. of child > 5 year of age  -0.055(0.06) 0.072(0.03)** 0.085(0.02)*** 
Child14 No. of child b/w 6-14 years -0.000(0.01) 0.006(0.01) 0.007(0.01)* 
Livstk 1 if HH has livestock,0 otherwise -0.431(0.23)* -0.286(0.10)*** -0.143(0.09) 
CultLand Total cultivated land in acres -0.004(0.00) -0.002(0.00)* -0.002(0.00)***  
Credit 1 if HH takes credit, 0 otherwise -0.017(0.18) 0.096(0.08) 0.014(0.08) 
DProg 1 if village dev. prog, 0 otherwise 0.012(0.01)* -0.114(0.09) 0.003(0.00)*** 
F0CasW Village cash wages of female (Rs) -0.001(0.00)  0.000(0.00)     0.000(0.00)    
Location1 1 if Lahore district, 0 otherwise 1.441(0.41)*** 0.104(0.34) 0.331(0.12)** 
Location2 1 if Sahiwal district, 0 otherwise 1.800(0.40)*** 0.076(0.37) 0.588(0.13)*** 
Location3 1 if M.Garh district, 0 otherwise 1.541(0.40)*** 0.034(0.35) 0.341(0.10)*** 
Location4 1 if Layyah district, 0 otherwise 2.057(0.76)*** -0.081(0.46) 0.210(0.13) 
Location5 1 if Sialkot district, 0 otherwise -0.015(0.47) 0.050(0.32) 0.148(0.09)* 
DRShop Distance of HH to retail shop (km) -0.608(0.22)***   
Constant  -2.720(0.89)*** 1.270(0.65)* 1.091(0.26)*** 
ei    0.431(0.03)*** 0.385(0.02)*** 
j    -0.287(0.39) 0.199(0.22) 
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The results of the second part of FIML endogenous switching regression model are 
presented in last two columns of Tables 4.3-4.6. Identification of the model requires that there 
should be at least one variable in the participation equation that does not appear in the per 
head expenditures and poverty equations.  In both specifications, distance of household from 
retail market variable is used as identifying instrument. 
The non-significance of covariance terms 1  in the case of per head expenditures and 
poverty, in the lower panel of Tables 4.3-4.6, shows the absence of endogenous switching in 
both cases. Also results show that the covariance terms ),( 21   have alternate signs with 
01   and 02  , which indicates that non-farm participation is based on its comparative 
advantage. The non-significance of 2  indicates that in the absence of non-farm work 
participation, there would be no significant difference in average behavior of male and female 
in the two groups, caused by unobserved effects. 
The results in Tables 4.3-4.6 indicate that education of household head exerts a positive 
effect on per head expenditure for both non-farm participants and non-participants 
households, but its effect is not significant in the case of female. On the other hand, the 
negative and significant coefficient of the variable for schooling suggests that education 
seems to be a key factor to reduce poverty of both participant and non-participant households. 
These results indicate that education enhances the welfare of household by increasing the 
efficiencies of individual activities. As noted by El-Osta (2011) that schooling has significant 
impact on higher rural household earnings. 
Family composition appears to be an important factor in explaining per head 
expenditure and poverty level differences among participants and non-participants for both 
male and female. Adult household size tends to have a positive effect on per head 
expenditures for both male and female participants, and negative effect on per head 
expenditure for non-participants households, although it does not significantly influence for 
both cases. In the case of poverty level, adult household size tends to decrease the poverty 
level of male and female participants and increases the poverty level for non-participants male 
and female. Presence of children (> 5 years & between 6-14 years) tends to decrease the per 
head expenditure, while it enhance the poverty level of non-farm work participants and non-
participants for both male and female. 
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Households, endowed with sufficient natural capital (e.g. land) and physical capital (e.g. 
livestock) are found to influence outcome, although at varying levels. The ownership of 
livestock has positive impact on per head expenditure of household, albeit its effect is 
inconclusive for non-participant females. In the case of poverty, livestock has positive and 
significant effect on poverty reduction for male and female participants but no significant 
impact for both male and female non-participants. Similarly farm size increases the per head 
expenditure for both participants and non-participants. The coefficient of farm size is negative 
and statistically significant for both participants and non-participants in the case of poverty. 
Table 4.7: Impact of non-farm participation on per head expenditures and poverty level of 
household---- ESR results 
 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. 
 
 
Table 4.7 presents the results of the impact of non-farm participation of male and 
female on per head expenditure and poverty by using endogenous switching regression 
method. We find that participation in non-farm work significantly increases consumption 
expenditures and reduces the poverty status of rural households. Non-farm participation 
increases per head expenditures by about 35357.43 and 43150.26 point compared to non-
participants for male and female respectively.  The ATT estimates of 0.26 and 0.30 for 
poverty reduction suggests that household participation in non-farm work decreases 
probability of  poverty by 0.26 and 0.30 point for male and female respectively, suggesting 
that non-farm work has significant impact on poverty reduction among rural households in 
Pakistan. Overall, the estimates show that although the participation rate of females was lower 
but their participation contributes more to improve welfare and reduce poverty as compared to 
their male counterparts. Thus, non-farm work appears to be more crucial in the case of female 
in improving the welfare and reducing the poverty status of farm household. 
 Outcome Variables 
Outcome mean 
ATT t-Statistics 
Participants non-participants 
M
al
e 
Per head expenditure 90560.12 55202.69 35357.43 1.92* 
Head count 1.235 1.504 -0.26 4.37*** 
F
em
al
e 
Per head expenditure 123000.81 79850.55 43150.26 6.42*** 
Head count 1.206 1.501 -0.30 3.56*** 
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As we find no endogenous switch so in order to check robustness of our ESR findings 
and for comparability purposes, we used propensity score matching (PSM) to determine the 
impact of non-farm on household welfare. A probit model has been employed to predict the 
probability of participation in non-farm work. The estimated propensity scores for male and 
female participation are given in Table 4.A.1 and 4.A.2 in the appendix. As the propensity 
score only serves as a device to balance the observed distribution of covariates across the 
participant and non-participant groups (Lee, 2008) so, the detailed interpretation of the 
propensity score estimates is not undertaken here. However, the results indicate that most of 
the variables included in the estimations have the expected signs.  
The effect of non-farm work on per head expenditure and poverty status of the 
households is estimated with the nearest neighbor matching (NNM), radius matching, and 
kernel-based matching (KBM) methods. The empirical results of average treatment effect 
(ATT) are given in Tables 4.8, while the indicators of matching quality are provided in Table 
4.9 for both male and female. Before turning to the causal effects of non-farm participation of 
household, we briefly discuss the quality of the matching process. After estimating the 
propensity scores for the participants and non-participants group we check the common 
support condition.
5 
 
A visual inspection of the density distributions of the estimated propensity scores for the 
two groups (Figure 4.1 in appendix) indicates that the common support condition is imposed 
and the balancing property was satisfied in all the estimates regression models. The bottom 
half of the graph shows the propensity scores distribution for the non-participants and the 
upper half refers to that of participants. The densities of the scores are on the y-axis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 In this study, the common support region is implemented, following the example of Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003), discarding observation from the participants group, whose propensity score is higher 
than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of non-participants 
89 
 
Table 4.8: Average treatment effects and sensitivity analysis for male and female----PSM 
results 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level. 
 
 
The matching for all three approaches in Table 4.8 generally indicate that non-farm 
work of male and female exerts a positive and significant impact on per head expenditure and 
a negative and significant impact on poverty status of household. Specifically, the NNM, 
Radius and KBM casual effect of participation on per head expenditures range between 
27765.51 and 29678.95 for male; 25452.68 and 36996.14 for female. The magnitude of 
coefficient suggests that the average treatment effect of participation in non-farm work 
increases the individual’s welfare by 27765.51 - 29678.95 for male and 25452.68 - 36996.14 
for female. Non-farm participation of male and female also had significant impact on 
reducing poverty. The estimated impact of participation on poverty reduction as measured by 
head count index is estimated to range between -0.14 and -0.21 for male;  -0.17 and -0.27 for 
female, suggesting that poverty is lower for participant by 0.14-0.21 for male and 0.17-0.27 
for female.  
Matching Outcome variable 
No. of 
neighbors/           
Kernel 
type 
Caliper ATT 
Critical 
level of 
hidden 
bias 
No. of 
treated 
No. of 
controlled 
M
al
e 
NNM 
 
Per head expenditures 4 0.0011 29678.95**(2.15) 1.4-1.5 196 139 
Headcount 1 0.04 -0.14*(1.79) 1.4-1.5 196 139 
Radius Per head expenditures - 0.0011 29678.95**(2.15) 1.4-1.5 196 139 
Headcount - 0.0015 -0.16*(1.84) 1.3-1.4 196 139 
Kernel Per head expenditures tricube 0.0011 27765.51**(2.00) 1.4-1.5 196 139 
Headcount tricube 0.0011 -0.21**(2.06) 1.5-1.6 196 139 
F
em
al
e 
NNM Per head expenditures 1 - 25452.68**(2.15) 1.4-1.5 32 308 
Headcount 3 - -0.27**(2.57) 2-2.1 32 308 
Radius Per head expenditures - 0.0003 36996.14*(1.82) 1.3-1.4 32 308 
Headcount - 0.19 -0.17*(1.96) 1.2-1.3 32 308 
Kernel Per head expenditures normal 0.0001 32738.56*(1.69) 1.5-1.6 32 308 
Headcount biweight 0.01 -0.23**(2.03) 1.4-1.5 32 308 
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A comparison of the ATT estimates from the endogenous switching regression and the 
PSM approach reveals that the estimates from the PSM are slightly lower, suggesting that the 
PSM may be underestimating the ATT. It is widely accepted that in the presence of hidden 
bias, PSM normally underestimates the average treatment effects, since matching only 
controls for observable characteristics. 
Also presented in Table 4.8, the critical levels of gamma (  ), at which the causal 
inference of significant participation effect may be questioned. Given that sensitivity analysis 
for insignificant effects is not meaningful, Rosenbaum bounds were calculated only for 
treatment effects that are significantly different from zero (Hujer et al., 2004). For example, 
the value of 1.50 for male participation implies that if households that have the same X-vector 
differ in their odds of participation by a factor of 50%, the significance of the participation on 
per head expenditure may be questionable. The lowest critical value of   is 1.20, whereas the 
largest critical value is 2.10. We can therefore conclude that even large amounts of 
unobserved heterogeneity would not alter the inference about the estimated effects, suggesting 
that the findings are generally insensitive to hidden bias. 
Table 4.9: Indicators of matching quality before and after matching----PSM results 
Matching Outcome 
variable 
Pseudo-R2 p-Value* Median absolute  
bias 
% bias 
reduction 
(unmatched) (matched) (unmatched) (matched) (unmatched) (matched) 
M
al
e 
NNM 
Per head 
expenditures 
0.112 0.054 0.000 0.888 14.3 6.1 57.34 
 Headcount 0.112 0.010 0.000 0.997 14.3 3.3 76.92 
Radius 
Per head 
expenditures 
0.112 0.054 0.000 0.888 14.3 6.1 57.34 
 Headcount 0.112 0.029 0.000 0.982 14.3 5.1 64.34 
KBM 
Per head 
expenditures 
0.112 0.049 0.000 0.929 14.3 6.3 55.94 
 Headcount 0.112 0.049 0.000 0.929 14.3 6.3 55.94 
F
em
al
e 
NNM 
Per head 
expenditures 
0.299 0.197 0.000 0.189 26.9 12.2 54.6 
 Headcount 0.299 0.081 0.000 0.995 26.9 7.7 71.43 
Radius 
Per head 
expenditures 
0.299 0.176 0.000 0.186 26.9 16.9 37.17 
 Headcount 0.299 0.082 0.000 0.995 26.9 6.4 76.34 
KBM 
Per head 
expenditures 
0.299 0.157 0.000 0.26 26.9 13.3 50.56 
 
Headcount 0.299 0.143 0.000 0.947 26.9 15.5 59.09 
Note:* p-Value of likelihood ratio test )( 2pr . 
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The fourth and fifth columns in Table 4.9 present the pseudo-R
2
 from the propensity 
score estimation and from the re-estimation of the propensity score after matching on the 
matched samples for both male and female. The likelihood-ratio test of the joint signiﬁcance 
of all the regressors in the probit model of propensity score estimation before and after 
matching and their corresponding p-values are presented in the sixth and seventh columns of 
the Table 4.9 for both male and female. The corresponding p-values of the likelihood-ratio 
test show that the joint signiﬁcance of regressors on treatment status could always be rejected 
after matching. It was, however, never rejected before matching. The relatively low pseudo-
R
2
 after matching and the p-values of the likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of the 
regressors imply that there is no systematic difference in the distribution of covariates 
between participants and non-participants after matching. 
However, as indicated earlier, the main purpose of the propensity score estimation is not 
to obtain a precise prediction of selection into treatment but rather to balance the distributions 
of relevant variables in both groups. The balancing powers of the estimations are ascertained 
by considering the reduction in the median absolute standardized bias between the matched 
and the unmatched models. These median absolute standardized bias before and after 
matching are shown in the eighth and ninth columns of Table 4.9 for male and female, and the 
tenth column reports the total bias reduction obtained by the matching procedure. The 
estimates show substantial bias reductions for both male and female. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985) suggested that a remaining standardized bias of 20% would be advisable. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
This study evaluates the impact of non-farm work on consumption expenditure and poverty 
status in rural Pakistan. The study utilizes cross-sectional rural household level data collected 
in 2010 from a randomly selected sample of 341 households in Punjab province of Pakistan. 
The causal impact of non-farm work participation is estimated by utilizing switching 
regression and propensity score matching methods to assess robustness of the results. This 
helps in estimating the true welfare effect of non-farm work by controlling selection problem 
that normally occurs when observable and unobservable factors influence both on 
participation in non-farm work and outcomes such as per head expenditures and poverty 
status of household. The study provides separate estimates for males and females to address 
gender heterogeneity. The estimates show that although the participation rate of females was 
lower but their participation contributes more to improve welfare and reduce poverty as 
compared to their male counterparts. 
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Both the switching regression and propensity score matching results suggest that 
participants of non-farm work have significantly higher consumption expenditure and lower 
poverty than non-participants even after controlling for all confounding factors.  The results 
from this study generally confirm the potential direct role of non-farm sector in improving 
rural household welfare and alleviating poverty in rural areas of developing countries. 
The policy makers should be worried about substantial evidence of the inability of the 
poor to overcome existing economic and social entry barriers of non-farm activities. 
Particularly, women face more entry barriers to participation in non-farm work, so policy 
measures should target them to lower these barriers. Increased and stable household income 
through non-farm participation in turn smoothes consumption and reduces poverty. 
Government poverty reduction strategies should address the poor people, especially females 
to encourage them to engage in non-farm work in order to reduce poverty. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.A.1: Probit estimates of propensity score for male’s non-farm employment 
participation. 
Variable Coefficient Standard error Z-value 
Head -0.566 0.203 -2.79** 
AgeHead 0.006 0.007 0.92 
HHSizOvr14  0.127 0.033 3.81*** 
Ch0L05 -0.004 0.062 -0.06 
Child14 -0.006 0.013 -0.45 
AvEdMale  0.128 0.053 2.43** 
livstk -0.477 0.224 -2.13** 
TCultiLand -0.001 0.002 -0.27 
Dis0vill       -0.000 0.008 -0.03 
Credit -0.29 0.177 -0.16 
UppCaste -0.222 0.179 -1.24 
LowCaste 0.015 0.251 0.06 
Fac0Mil -0.127 0.167 -0.76 
Location1 0.167 0.332 0.50 
Location2 0.738 0.323 2.29** 
Location3 0.436 0.369 1.18 
Location4 -0.550 1.009 -0.54 
Location5 0.212 0.356 0.64 
Constant -0.272 0.559 -0.49 
Pseudo-R2 0.1118   
Log likelihood -201.91614   
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. 
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Table 4.A.2: Probit estimates of propensity score for female’s non-farm employment 
participation.        
Variable Coefficient Standard error Z-value 
Head -0.350 0.304 -1.15 
AgeHead 0.024 0.011 2.09** 
HHSizOvr14  0.222 0.054 4.14*** 
Ch0L05 -0.217 0.113 -1.91* 
Child14 -0.003 0.022 -0.14 
AvEdFemale  0.042 0.028 1.45 
livstk -0.268 0.318 -0.84 
TCultiLand -0.011 0.008 -1.34 
Dis0vill  -0.070 0.023 -3.08*** 
Credit 0.309 0.257 1.20 
UppCaste 0.323 0.317 1.02 
LowCaste 0.638 0.407 1.57 
Fac0Mil 0.328 0.253 1.30 
Location1 0.821 0.766 1.07 
Location2 0.835 0.750 1.11 
Location3 0.265 0.685 0.39 
Location4 -0.550 1.009 -0.54 
Location5 0.105 0.691 0.15 
Constant -3.005 1.036 -2.90*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.2979   
Log likelihood -74.471862   
 Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. 
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Figure 4.1: Propensity score distribution and common support for propensity score estimation 
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Chapter 5 
 
Non-farm work, land tenancy contracts and investment                                               
in soil conservation measures in rural Pakistan 
 
This paper is submitted to the Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of participation in non-farm work and land tenancy 
arrangements on the intensity of investment in soil-improving measures and farm 
productivity. A multivariate tobit model that accounts for potential endogeneity between the 
intensity of investment and the non-farm work and tenancy arrangement variables is estimated 
for 341 rural households in Punjab province of Pakistan. Instrumental variable approach is 
also used to analyze the impact of tenancy arrangement and non-farm work on farm 
productivity. The empirical results show that participation in non-farm work and tenure 
security tend to increase the intensity of investment in long-term soil-improving measures, but 
decrease chemical fertilizer use intensity. We also find that increases in non-farm work and 
tenure security exert significant and positive effects on agricultural productivity. Investment 
in soil conservation measures is also found to significantly increase agricultural productivity. 
Keywords: farm productivity, land tenancy arrangements, non-farm work, soil conservation.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Sustainable management of natural resources such as land and water remains a key 
component of production strategies that aim at encouraging soil conservation and reducing 
soil losses. As rightly noted by Pretty et al. (2011), soil conservation on its own does not 
necessarily increase, but conservation methods that capture water and add new system 
components can result in improved productivity of food crops. Thus, sustainable management 
of natural resources is a possible route to improved agricultural productivity and increased 
farm income. Considerable effort has therefore been directed toward identifying and 
promoting sustainable management farm practices in low-income countries. Although soil 
type, rainfall and slope of the land largely influence rates of soil loss, farmers’ management 
decisions can exacerbate or mitigate their effects (Lee and Stewart, 1983).  
There is now strong evidence that institutions such as land tenancy arrangements tend to 
influence farmers’ decisions to adopt or invest in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing 
practices (Feder and Onchon, 1987; Deininger and Jin, 2006; Banerjee and Ghatak, 2004; 
Abdulai et al., 2011). However, studies by Pender and Fafchamps (2006) and Arcand et al. 
(2007) show that the impact of tenancy arrangement on investment in soil-improving and 
productivity-enhancing measures is quite weak. The recent literature on tenure security and 
investment in soil-improving practices suggests three major effects that explain the positive 
and significant impact of tenure security on investment in soil conservation measures such as 
organic manure and green manures (Brasselle et al., 2002). First, the ‘assurance effect’ which 
is related to the security involved in undertaking long-term land improvement and 
conservation measures, without any fear of expropriation. The second effect, which is known 
as ‘transaction effect’, operates through the trade effect when land is easily convertible to 
liquid assets as a result of tenure security. Third, secure tenancy improves farmer’s access to 
credit to finance agricultural investments, by using land title as collateral. As shown by Feder 
and Feeny (1991), in the presence of credit constraints, ownership security results in greater 
investment by providing access to credit. On the other hand, insecure tenancy arrangement, 
which is the characteristic of many farmers in less developed countries in most regions of the 
world, create disincentives for the users to invest resources in land-improving inputs, resulting 
in productivity declines. Some reports suggest that the absence of secured land tenancy 
arrangements have contributed to increased degradation of agricultural land (World Bank, 
2007; Barnhart, 2010).  
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Meanwhile a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that participation in non-
farm work may be equally important in promoting investments in sustainable management 
practices and productivity-enhancing inputs (e.g. Barrett et al., 2001; Haggblade et al., 2002; 
Phimister and Roberts (2006); Pfeiffer et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2011).
6
  The underlying 
intuition of this relationship between non-farm work and investment in soil-improving and 
productivity-enhancing measures is that in the presence of credit market imperfection, 
earnings from non-farm work of households that face financial constraints can be used to 
relax the budget constraint and therefore raise investment in farming activities by providing 
the required capital (Pfeiffer et al., 2009). The available evidence on the impact of non-farm 
work on investment in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing inputs, as well as farm 
productivity also appears to be mixed. For instance, Barrett et al., (2001); Chang et al., (2011) 
found that participation in non-farm work exerts a positive effect on purchase of farm inputs 
by relaxing the liquidity constraints faced by farmers. In contrasts, McNally (2002) and 
Goodwin and Mishra (2004) found that increased participation of household members in non-
farm work leads to decrease in the use of family labor and subsequent reduction in farm 
efficiency.  
Most of the studies mentioned above have either examined the role of non-farm work on 
agricultural investments, or the impact of tenancy arrangement on investment in conservation 
measures. However, very few have analyzed the link between tenancy arrangements and farm 
investment through enhanced income possibilities from non-farm work (Feng et al., 2010). 
The recent study by Feng et al. (2010) examined the impact of land rental market and 
participation in off-farm employment on land investment, input use, and rice productivity in 
Northeast Jiangxi Province in China, and found that tenure status of plots did not affect the 
level of land investments. They also found that off-farm employment does not significantly 
affect crop yields. They conclude that the negative lost-labor effect of off-farm employment 
dominates the positive income effect. A shortcoming of the study is the consideration of the 
household’s decision to participate in non-farm work as exogenous, without accounting for 
potential endogeneity of the variable. This study seeks to contribute to the literature by 
considering participation in non-farm work and land tenure arrangement as endogenous to 
investment decisions. 
                                                          
6 Haggblade et al. (2010), for instance, report that non-farm income contributed 35-50 percent of rural 
household income across the developing world. 
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The main objective of this study is to examine how participation in non-farm work and 
tenancy arrangements affect investment in soil conservation and productivity-enhancing 
measures in Pakistan. The empirical analysis focuses on the impact of explanatory variables 
that represent participation in non-farm work, tenancy arrangements, and farm characteristics 
on agricultural input investment and farm productivity. The study utilizes cross-sectional rural 
household level data collected in 2010 from a randomly selected sample of 341 households in 
Punjab province of Pakistan.   
Land ownership in Pakistan remains highly concentrated in rural areas due to class 
stratification, where 67 percent of households are landless and just 0.1 percent households 
possessed 1 hectare and above landholdings (Anwar et al., 2004). Land lease markets are 
therefore very active in the country, with large land owners employing hired labor or leasing 
their land to tenants in order to release themselves and their families from manual labor 
(Rehman, 1987). The main types of tenancy arrangements are ownership, fixed-rent and 
sharecropping contracts. The most common type of tenancy is ownership where private 
individuals have rights to use, rent or sell land. The fixed-rent arrangement involves land 
owners renting out parcels to tenants, while sharecropping contracts involve arrangements 
between the landlords and the operators, such that part of the output is given to the landlord as 
compensation for using the land. As a result of unequal access to land and population growth, 
non-farm sector has expanded significantly over the last decades.  Almost 45-50 percent of 
the rural population in Pakistan is directly dependent on non-farm income for their livelihood 
(GOP, 2011). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, the conceptual 
framework on which the analysis is based is presented. Section 3 outlines the empirical 
specification. The data used in the analysis is described in section 4. In section 5, the 
empirical results are discussed. The final section presents the conclusion. 
5.2 Conceptual Framework 
In many developing countries, where the risks of farming are high and rural credit markets are 
poorly developed, the non-farm sector provides a vital source of income diversification and 
access to cash. Thus, earnings from non-farm work can help households to overcome credit 
and insurance market constraints by providing liquidity that can be used for investment in soil 
conservation measures and productivity-enhancing inputs (Upton and Haworth, 1987). 
Similarly, ownership security provides incentive for farmers to engage in investment in soil-
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quality, yield-enhancing and resource management practices. However, these investments 
depend upon the nature of users rights, that is, whether the farmers have permanent rights to 
use land (e.g., owners) or have temporary rights (e.g., fixed-renters or sharecroppers). Hence, 
farmers consider these tenancy arrangements when making agricultural investment decisions. 
As indicated by Abdulai et al. (2011), farmers with short-term fixed-rent contracts have little 
incentives to invest in longer term soil-improving measures, but are more interested in short-
term benefits from their agricultural investments. Tenants therefore tend to invest in the soil-
quality up to the point where marginal profits are equal to zero and do not consider the 
depreciation cost of the soil. 
To illustrate the relationship between non-farm work participation, tenancy 
arrangements and investment in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing activities, we start 
by specifying a simplified allocation model. To fix things, consider a household that 
maximizes utility over consumption of goods C and leisure, N, i.e., ),( NCUU  . Utility is 
maximized subject to time, budget, production, liquidity, and non-negativity constraints. We 
restrict attention to utility functions that are twice differentiable and strictly concave. The time 
constraint is NLLT  21 , where T is total time endowment, 1L and 2L  are respectively 
time allocated to farm work and non-farm work, and N is leisure as defined above. The farm 
technology is specified as );,,( ZXALQQ f , where  Q  represents quantity of agricultural 
production, X captures inputs such as investment in organic manure, farm manure and 
chemical fertilizer, A is fixed capital like land etc., and Z is the individual, household and 
location characteristics. In the case of liquidity constraints, expenditures on purchased inputs 
( XPx ) cannot exceed household income from farm ( fY ), non-farm ( nfY ), and un-earned ( uY ) 
sources, given as: 
unffx YYYXP  . The full household budget constraint can be specified 
as 
unfnfAffXQC YLwKLwXPQPCP  ),(  ,      (1) 
where CP  is the price for the consumption good purchased in the market, XP  is the vector of 
costs associated with the nonconventional inputs, QP , represent vectors of prices of farm 
output, 
AK  is cost of land; fw nfw are the farm and non-farm wages.  
The first order conditions associated with maximizing utility subject to these 
constraints, yield the following optimal choices of the household 
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where is the multiplier for the labor market constraint, which is equal to the marginal utility 
of leisure,   is the multiplier for liquidity constraint and is equal to the marginal utility of 
liquidity, and   is the marginal utility of full income.  
Equation (2) shows that when the liquidity constraint is binding, rather than being equal 
to zero at the optimum, the marginal profit from purchased inputs is equal to the shadow value 
of liquidity )/(  . Intuitively, increasing demand for the purchased input carries with it an 
additional cost above and beyond the input price, in terms of the exhaustion of scarce 
liquidity. Therefore, liquidity-constrained households cannot purchase productivity-enhancing 
inputs and pursue longer term investment in agriculture. Equation (3) indicates that 
households will equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure of 
family labor and the shadow wage rate. When the liquidity constraint is binding, the shadow 
wage will be less than the market wage by a factor of the shadow price of the 
constraint )/(  , with additional labor being allocated to non-farm activities in order to relax 
the liquidity constraint. If the liquidity constraint is not binding ( =0), the shadow wage 
would be equal to the market wage, and inputs are used up to the point where their marginal 
effect on profit vanishes, which is the case of a separable agricultural household model. 
The first order condition for optimal time allocation for farm work, non-farm work and 
leisure is given as  
0///  LUCUWLU ii .        (4) 
Equation (4) can be rearranged to obtain the returns to labor from farm work and non-
farm work: )/(/()/( QULUwi  . As shown in Huffman (1991), a positive number of 
non-farm hours will be observed for an individual i, if the potential market wage ( miw ) is 
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greater than the reservation wage ( r
iw ).
7
 The labor supply functions can then be derived as 
);,( ZPwLL iiii  for cases where farm households allocate their time to the three activities.  
The above derivation of non-farm work can be employed to relate non-farm work to 
farm input use through duality theory. As shown in Bazaraa (1993) and Phimister and Roberts 
(2006), by Lagrangean duality theory, at the optimal solution the farm household production 
problem can be specified as the outcome of a profit-maximization problem given as  
 ),(max),,,,,,( ,,  AXffQXALnffXQ KXPLwQPZwwPP    (5) 
subject to the technology constraint, );,,( ZXALQQ f ; where )(K represents the cost of 
land, reflecting the three different land tenancy arrangements, namely, ownership, fixed-rent 
contract and sharecropping contract. With these three types of arrangements, the cost of land 
can be specified as 
QPKK QAA   )1(),(        (6) 
where  the parameter  represents an output-sharing rule, with equal to zero for fixed-rent 
tenants and one for sharecroppers. Given this specification, the cost of land for sharecroppers 
will be QPQ . In the case of no sharecropping (owner and fixed-rent tenant), 0 , the cost 
of the land is given by the constant AK .       
From equation (5), we can specify the maximized profits as a function of prices, 
household characteristics, and tenancy arrangements as 
           (7) 
Beginning with any well-specified normalized profit function, direct application of 
Hotelling’s lemma to equation (7), then yields the reduced-form specifications for input 
demand (land, labor and non-conventional inputs) and farm output functions 
           (8) 
           (9) 
                                                          
7 The reservation wage for non-farm work is the marginal value of the individual’s time when all of it 
is allocated to farm and leisure. 
 
),,,,,,( , ZwwPP nffXQ  
),,,,,,( , ZPwwPLL xnffQ 
),,,,,,( , ZPwwPAA xnffQ 
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           (10) 
           (11) 
The specifications (8)-(10) show that input and output prices, tenancy arrangements, 
and non-farm work tend to influence farm profits, demand for inputs, while equation (11) 
shows how these factors affect farm output. It is significant to mention that in the absence of 
moral hazard problems, the optimal input use and farm output would not be dependent on the 
tenancy arrangement. As argued by Jacoby and Mansuri (2008), where landowners fully 
commit to reward tenants, fixed-rent contracts provide user rights for the duration of the 
contract, making it possible for tenants to claim monetary compensation for maintaining or 
improving soil quality. In such cases, tenants are fully incentivized and moral hazard and 
hold-up problems disappear. Without full commitment, tenants invest only up to the point 
where the marginal profits in the current period are equal to zero.
8
 
On the basis of above theoretical concepts, we formulate two hypotheses about the 
relationship between tenancy arrangement, non-farm work and agricultural investment. The 
first hypothesis is that participation in non-farm work exerts a positive effect on investment in 
longer term soil-improving measures. The second hypothesis is that secure tenancy 
arrangements lead to higher investment in soil-improving measures.
9
 
5.3 Empirical Specification 
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to analyze the impact of non-farm work and 
tenancy arrangements on investment in three soil-improving (conservation measures) and 
productivity-enhancing activities. A direct way to examine the effects of farm household 
participation in non-farm work and tenure security on input use would involve estimating a 
structural farm household model, which can directly capture the optimal production decisions 
and how they interact with non-farm labor supply (Phimister and Roberts, 2006). However, as 
shown in Lopez (1984), this requires detailed information on both production and 
consumption decisions, as well as complex econometric modeling techniques. We therefore 
employ a reduced-form approach that is less data-intensive, but still includes the production 
                                                          
8
 No commitment usually refers to cases where landowners withhold the benefits of an increase in soil 
capital. 
9 Tenure security refers to the assurance that an individual can use or hold land for an agreed period of 
time and cannot be deprived of rights and benefits of using that land. 
 
),,,,,,( , ZPwwPXX xnffQ 
),,,,,,( , ZPwwPQQ xnffQ 
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relationships indicated in the discussions outlined previously. Specifically, we employ the 
specifications in (8)-(11) for the empirical analysis.  
The investment measures we address in the analysis include organic manure (m) and 
green manure from leguminous crops (g), which are soil conservation measures, as well as 
chemical fertilizer (f), which is a productivity-enhancing measure, since its productivity 
effects are limited to the season of application (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2008). In the absence of 
information on non-farm wages, we can approximate the investment function by using the 
input demand function in equation (10), and substituting non-farm labor supply for non-farm 
wages in the following reduced-form specification 
ininiAninin ZTLY     ,,, fgmn       (12)  
where inY represents investment by household i in soil conservation and productivity-
enhancing measure n,  and iL  captures the household’s participation in non-farm work. The 
vector  inT  represents tenancy arrangements and includes the variables   and  , indicating 
whether the farm is owner-cultivated, or on sharecropping or fixed-rent contract. The vector 
inZ  is as defined earlier, capturing household and farm-level characteristics. Because of the 
censored nature of the investment in the soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures, 
we employ a tobit specification in the analysis. Suppressing subscripts, this can be expressed 
as 
iiiAii ZTLY  
*         (13) 
0**  iii YifYY          (14) 
00 *  ii YifY   
where *iY  is a latent variable capturing the expected profits for household i from investing in 
an activity, while iY  is observable variable and indicates the level of investment in soil-
improving and productivity-enhancing measures, and i  is the error tem, which is assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed,  is a constant,   and  are parameters to be 
estimated. Given that the errors of the individual specification may have nonzero correlation, 
a multivariate tobit estimation can be employed in the analysis. In particular, because of the 
substitutability or complementarity between these investment options, and the fact that the 
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farm lands in the sample are similar across equations, it is most likely that the error terms of 
these equations will be correlated. 
 The specification above in equation (12) assumes that the non-farm work and tenancy 
arrangement variable are exogenous. However, many studies on non-farm work and 
investment in farm inputs could be jointly determined (Pfeiffer et al., 2009; Kilic et al., 2009). 
Similarly, studies on the relationship between tenancy arrangements and investment in soil 
conservation measures suggest that the two variables may be jointly determined (Braselles, 
2002). Given that the dependent variable is censored, the usual two-stage approach will not be 
able to address the endogeneity problem. We therefore employ the approach suggested by 
Smith and Blundell (1989), by modeling both non-farm work and tenancy arrangement 
explicitly and then allowing for interactions between these decisions and the investment 
variables specified in equation (12). The approach involves specifying the first-stage 
equations for non-farm work and tenancy arrangements as functions of exogenous variables 
as follows: 
iiii XYL            (15) 
iiii XYT            (16) 
where   ,   ,   are parameters to be estimated and i  and i  are error terms. Both the 
observed values and the residuals from the regressions are then used in the investment 
specification as follows  
iAiiiiAii UZTLY   54321
*
      (17) 
where iL and iT  are vectors of the observed variables for non-farm work and tenancy 
arrangement, respectively; iU  and i  are the residual terms of non-farm work and tenancy 
arrangement from equations (12) and (13), and  iA  is the error term. As noted by Smith and 
Blundell (1989), the tobit estimates of 
1  and 2 in equation (17) are consistent. An 
interesting feature of the approach is the fact that the usual tobit t-statistics on 
4  and 5  are 
valid tests of the null hypotheses that the variables are exogenous. 
A linear probability model that yield consistent estimates of the parameters is used in 
the first-stage estimation. Proper identification of the investment specification requires that 
some of the variables included in the first-stage estimation of non-farm and tenancy 
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arrangement regressions are excluded from the multivariate tobit estimation. A suitable 
identification strategy here is to employ variables in the first-stage regressions that strongly 
influence non-farm work and tenancy arrangement but not investment in soil conservation and 
productivity-enhancing measures. In the tenancy arrangement equation, we use the distance of 
the farm from the farmer’s residence and a dummy variable indicating whether cultivator 
resides in the village where the farm is located or not as instruments. In the non-farm 
equation, we employ migration status of the farmer as an instrument. As pointed out by 
Pfeiffer et al. (2009) and Kilic et al. (2009), migrant network is correlated with national and 
international migration and thus with participation in non-farm work, but not directly with 
agricultural investment decisions.  
To examine the impacts of non-farm work and tenancy arrangements on farm output, 
we use an instrumental variable approach to estimate specification (11). This accounts for the 
potential endogeneity of intensity of investment with the non-farm work and tenancy 
arrangement variables. To avoid confounding a potential increase in productivity from 
increased output with returns to storage, we value output at producer prices at the time of 
harvest. 
5.4 Data Description 
We examine the impacts of non-farm work and tenancy arrangements on investment in soil-
conservation and productivity-enhancing measures by using farm-level data from a survey 
conducted between September 2010 and January 2011 in Punjab province of Pakistan. Punjab 
is the second largest and most populous province of Pakistan, and contributes about 68 
percent to annual food grain production in the country. A stratified random sampling 
approach was employed in collecting information from a total of 341 households from six 
districts in the province. First, the total number of districts was considered, and a sample of 
six districts drawn for the survey. Within each district, random samples were drawn to ensure 
proportional representation of farmers. The six districts considered include Sahiwal, Layyah, 
Sialkot, Khushab, Muzaffargarh, and Lahore.   
The survey asked farmers whether they used any soil conservation and productivity-
enhancing inputs such as organic manure, green manure, terraces, strip cropping, and 
chemical fertilizer in the past few years. The land investments considered in the present study 
are organic manure and green manure, while the productivity-enhancing input is chemical 
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fertilizer.
10
 As noted by Jacoby and Mansuri (2008), organic manure supply nutrients to soil 
which remain available over a longer period of time than the nutrients supplied by mineral 
fertilizer. Thus, intensive use of fertilizer, considered as a static input, may cause soil 
degradation and hence lead to low crop productivity.
11
 Farmers were also asked to indicate the 
applicable acreage in each case, and the costs of inputs such as organic manure and chemical 
fertilizer. The data from the survey also contain information about the farm topography, farm 
operation, non-farm activities, farm finance, and human capital of the household head; such as 
age at the time of the survey; education, measured in number of years of schooling and 
experience. Non-farm work includes wage (on and off-farm) and self-employment. 
In addition, farmers were requested to provide information on the type of tenancy 
arrangement under which they operated their farms. The sample of interviewed households 
consisted of 200 owner-cultivated households, 91 sharecropping and 50 fixed-rental 
households, without any recorded cases of households with multiple tenancy arrangements. 
Information was also collected on other farm and non-farm activities, socio-demographic and 
location characteristics.
12 
The households were asked about their perceptions of soil fertility. 
The variable is captured as a dummy, where one represents good soil fertility and zero poor 
soil fertility. Farm size is captured by the number of acres under cultivation by the household.  
The distance of the farm from the home of the cultivator and from the home of the landlord in 
case it is a rented land was also included in the questionnaire. Information on output and input 
prices was also collected.  
The definitions of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 5.1. As 
indicated previously, the dependent variable in the study is investment in soil-improving and 
productivity-enhancing measures. The three tenancy arrangement variables used are owner-
cultivated, fixed-rent contract, and sharecropping contract. Non-farm employment was 
represented with a dummy variable taking the value of one if the household participated in the 
non-farm labor market, and zero otherwise. Other socio-demographic variables include 
                                                          
10
 In our sample, very few farmers engaged in terraces and strip cropping. We therefore did not 
consider them in the empirical analysis. 
11 
Increased application of mineral fertilizer leads to boost the productivity of crops in the short run but 
with time crop yield decrease if there is no usage of organic or green manure. Manures are long-term 
soil investments which increase the fertility of the soil by adding organic matter and nutrients. 
12
 Non-farm activities include non-farm self-employment, wage-labor, migration, non-labor work, 
renting of household and farm assets and all other activities other than agriculture. 
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household size, household assets (cultivated land, livestock, tube well) to indicate wealth, 
unearned income and access to credit to capture liquidity constraints.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression models.  
 
Variable Definition of variables Mean S.d 
Investment variables  
Organic Manure  Organic manure used per acre (kgs)  280.86  373.67  
Green Manure  Leguminous crops grown per acre  0.73  2.37  
Fertilizers  Chemical fertilizer applied per acre (Kgs)  324.87  256.09  
Non-farm Participation variable  
Parti in Nfarm  1 if HH members participate in non-farm work  0.63  0.48  
MigNet  1 if HH member migrated, 0 otherwise  0.29  0.45  
DisMarkt  Distance of market from house (km)  14.02  20.01  
Tenancy variables  
Owner  1 if land is under owner-cultivated, 0 otherwise  0.59  0.50  
Fix-renter  1 if land is under fixed-rent contract, 0 otherwise  0.26  0.44  
Sharecropper  1 if land is under sharecropping contract, 0 otherwise  0.15  0.23  
Household-level characteristics  
AgeHead  Age of HH head (years)  45.87  13.30  
Head  1 if female is the head of HH, 0 otherwise  0.74  0.43  
HeadEdu  Years of education of HH head   6.04  5.43  
HHSizOvr14  No.of HH members < 14 years  4.32    3.02  
Livstk  1 if HH has livestock, 0 otherwise  0.83   0.38  
TTwell  Number of tube well  0.66  0.97  
NONLAB  Unearned income (Rs)  5.55  15.74  
Credit  1 if HH has access to credit, 0 otherwise  0.36  0.48  
Exte0ff  1 if HH has contact to extension agent, 0 otherwise 0.21  0.41 
Farm-level characteristics  
CultiLand Total cultivated land in acres   22.83 38.71 
SoiFert 1 if land is fertile, 0 otherwise 0.13 0.36 
ADisField Distance of farm from owner’s residence (km)  1.99  4.12  
Residence  1 if landlord reside in village where farm is located,0 otherwise  0.54    0.43  
Family labor  Total hrs of family labor worked on farm last year  140.61  184.37  
Hired labor  Total hrs of hired labor worked on farm last year  221.26  270.71  
Location dummies 
Location1  1 if HH resides in Lahore district, 0 otherwise  0.15  0.36  
Location2  1 if Hh resides in Sahiwal district, 0 otherwise  0.20  0.39  
Location3  1 if HH resides in M.Garh district, 0 otherwise  0.30  0.46  
Location4  1 if HH resides in Layyah district, 0 otherwise  0.02  0.13  
Location5  1 if HH resides in Sialkot district, 0 otherwise  0.25  0.43  
Location6  1 if HH resides in Khushab district,0 otherwise  0.08  0.27  
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To explore the differences in output and input use between the three tenancy 
arrangements, we present descriptive statistics that point toward differences in the key 
characteristics for owner-cultivators, fixed-rent and sharecropping tenants in Tables 5.A.1-
5.A.3 in the appendix. Also presented in the Tables are differences in the means of the 
variables, alongside their significance levels. Tables 5.A.1 to 5.A.3 reveal significant 
differences in application of all the three inputs. Specifically, the mean value of output per 
acre for owner-cultivators (391135.2) is higher than those of fix-rent tenants (289372) and 
sharecroppers (153266.54).  Higher output points to Marshallian inefficiency. In addition, 
owner-cultivators are found to apply more organic manure than both tenants. However, fixed-
rent tenants appear to invest more in chemical fertilizer than both owner-cultivators and 
sharecroppers. The average quantity of organic manure used by owner-cultivators was about 
338 kg per acre, as compared to 257 kg per acre used by sharecroppers, and this difference is 
significant at 10% level. Although sharecroppers applied on average 286 kg per acre of 
organic manure, this is still lower than that of owner-cultivators, but higher than that of fixed-
renters.  The land used for green manure crops is higher on owner-cultivated plots (0.72) than 
those under fixed-rent contract (0.44) and sharecropping contract (0.25). The comparisons 
also reveal that fix-renters use about 387 kg per acre of chemical fertilizer, compared to 343 
kg per acre by owner-cultivators and 311 kg per acre by sharecroppers. This support the 
notion that fixed-rent tenants are more likely to use more productivity-enhancing inputs to 
obtain short-term yield gains than investing in soil conservation measures with longer term 
benefits. There are also significant differences in variables such as access to credit, education, 
and extension services between the three tenancy arrangements.  
5.5 Regression Results 
The empirical results of the impact of non-farm work and tenancy arrangements on 
investments in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing inputs, as well as agricultural 
productivity are presented in this section. The analysis was conducted by using the STATA 
statistical package. The investment specification was estimated by using a multivariate tobit 
model, controlling for endogeneity of the non-farm work and tenancy arrangement variables, 
while the productivity analysis was conducted with an instrumental variable approach. The 
first-stage estimates of the determinants of non-farm work and tenancy arrangements are first 
presented, followed by the second-stage investment estimates. 
Table 5.2 reports the first-stage estimates of the determinants of participation in non-
farm work. The signs of the estimated parameters are consistent with previous studies. A 
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household head with more schooling had a significantly higher probability of engaging in 
non-farm activities, suggesting that additional schooling raises an individual’s non-farm wage 
by more than it raises his or her reservation wage for farm or home activities. Age increases 
the probability of participation in non-farm work which represents general experience that 
increases the marginal value of time in each activity. Non-labor income tends to increase the 
probability of participating in non-farm work. Migrant household heads are more likely to 
participate in non-farm work, compared to non-migrants. Lack of credit access serves as a 
constraint to non-farm participation.  
Table 5.2: Linear probability estimates of determinants of non-farm participation 
Variable Variable non-farm work Standard errors 
AgeHead  0.026***    0.01 
Head  0.299    0.23 
HeadEdu  0.088***    0.02 
HHSizOvr14  0.051    0.03 
Livstk  -0.652**   0.31 
TCultiLand  0.012***    0.00 
Credit 0.444**    0.18 
TTwell  0.295**    0.13 
NONLAB  0.019***    0.01 
SoiFert  0.011***    0.00 
DisMarkt  0.009*    0.00 
Location1  0.142    0.39 
Location2  1.20***    0.37 
Location3  0.684**    0.33 
Location4  0.930    0.92 
Location5  0.644**  0.30  
MigNet  0.627**  0.26 
Intercept  -1.384**  0.49 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. 
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The first-stage estimates of the determinants of tenancy arrangement are presented in 
Table 5.3. The omitted category used as a reference group is the sharecropping variable in the 
case of tenancy arrangement. The estimates reveal that farm and household characteristics are 
related to tenancy arrangements. Owner-cultivators are more likely to be males, while fixed-
rent tenants are more likely to be females. Landlords living in the same village where plots are 
located are more likely to be owner-cultivated. Similarly, plots located at further distances 
from the cultivator’s residence are more likely to be on fixed-rent contracts, but less likely to 
be owner-cultivated. This is probably because landlords prefer to cultivate plots closer to their 
homes, and to rent out those that are far away because of transportation and monitoring cost. 
The estimations generally provide robust first-stage results that can be employed in the 
second-stage multivariate tobit analysis. The variables employed as identifying instruments in 
the analysis are all statistically significant in the first-stage regressions. The value of the F-
statistics on the joint significance of instruments (distance, residence) in the tenancy 
arrangement regression given in Table 5.3 suggests that the instruments can be considered 
exogenous in the estimation. 
Table 5.3: Linear probability estimates of determinants of land tenure arrangements 
Variable Own-cultivated Standard errors Fix-rented Standard errors 
AgeHead 0.024*** 0.01 -0.031*** 0.01 
Head -0.707** 0.26 0.793*** 0.30 
HeadEdu 0.343*** 0.08 -0.399*** 0.09 
HHSizOvr14 0.009 0.03 0.008 0.04 
Livstk 0.026* 0.01 -0.018* (0.01 
TCultiLand 0.009** 0.01 -0.008** 0.00 
Credit 0.492** 0.19 0.437** 0.20 
TTwell 0.645*** 0.16 0.685*** 0.16 
Exte0ff 0.250* 0.14 0.563** 0.27 
SoiFert 0.031*** 0.00 0.007* 0.00 
Location1 -0.284 0.43 -0.330 0.54 
Location2 -0.485 0.41 0.020 0.45 
Location3 -0.335 0.37 0.396 0.40 
Location4 -0.875 0.69 0.039 0.81 
Location5                                                       -0.123 0.36 -0.057 0.41 
ADisField -0.187** 0.08 0.078*** 0.02 
Residence 0.077*** 0.02 -0.839*** 0.23 
 Intercept  -0.257 0.54 -0.015 0.60 
F-Statistics 
(P-values) 
18.13[0.00]  
 10.79[0.00]  
Note: p-values in squared brackets. Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. 
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Table 5.4 presents the results of the second-stage regression on investment in soil-
improving and productivity-enhancing measures. The estimated coefficients and their 
associated t-statistics are presented in the first panel of the Table, while a number of test 
statistics are reported in the second panel. Considering the test statistics, the estimated 
correlation coefficients are all positive and significantly different from zero at the 5% level of 
significance, suggesting that unobserved variables involved in each investment option are 
significantly positively related. The likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of the 
correlation coefficients ( i ) rejects the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between 
the investment specifications, indicating that it is more efficient to use the multivariate tobit 
model than the separate tobit models. The estimates of residuals ResNF, ResOwn, and 
ResFix, derived from the first stage regressions of non-farm work and tenancy arrangement 
are not significantly different from zero, indicating that there is no simultaneity bias and that 
the coefficients are consistently estimated (Wooldridge, 2002). The value of 2 statistics for 
the joint significance of these residuals for each equation could not reject the null hypothesis 
that the residuals are jointly equal to zero, confirming the value of the individual t-statistics. 
These findings confirm the exogeneity of non-farm participation and tenancy arrangement 
variables.     
On the estimated coefficients and their t-statistics, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficients for the non-farm work variable in the organic manure and green 
manure specifications show that participation in non-farm work increases the intensity in the 
application of these inputs. This result is in line with the findings reported by Savadogo et al. 
(2004) for Burkina Faso and by Oseni and Winters (2009) for Nigeria. As argued by Marenya 
and Barrett (2007), non-farm income helps in easing liquidity constraints needed to invest in 
soil-improving inputs. In contrasts, the negative and significant coefficient in the chemical 
fertilizer specification suggests that fertility intensity declines with participation in non-farm 
work, a finding that is consistent with the results reported by Phimister and Roberts (2006) for 
England and Wales and by Kilic et al. (2009) for Albania.  
The results for the tenancy arrangement variables reveal positive and significant 
coefficients for the owner-cultivators variable in the organic manure and green manure 
specifications, suggesting that the intensity of investments in these farm inputs are higher for 
owner-cultivators, compared to sharecroppers. This finding is consistent with the results 
reported by Deininger and Ali (2008) for Uganda, but contrasts with the findings by 
Quisumbing et al. (2001), who found in their study that investment in sustainable 
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management practices are unaffected by land tenure regimes in Ghana. The results also show 
that sharecroppers tend to apply higher levels of chemical fertilizers, relative to owner-
cultivators. The intensity of investment in organic manure and green manure is lower for 
fixed-rent tenants, compared to sharecroppers. Consistent with expectations, fixed-rent 
tenants tend to apply higher levels of chemical fertilizers than sharecroppers.  
A few interesting results also emerge for the farm and household-level variables used in 
the regressions. Age exerts a negative effect on soil conservation measures but positive effect 
on the application of mineral fertilizers, indicating that younger farmers are more likely to 
invest in soil conservation measures than older ones. This may be attributed to the fact that 
younger farmers cultivate land for longer periods of time, and as such expect to reap the long-
term benefits from soil-improving investments. In particular, the coefficient of education is 
positive for all three types of investments, a finding that is in line with the human capital 
theory. 
The coefficient representing the effect of farm size is positive and statistically 
significant in the case of organic and green manure but negative and significant for chemical 
fertilizer. This is probably due to the fact that with increasing plot size, farmers are more 
likely to adopt soil investment measures because of the higher establishment cost in these 
types of longer term measures, as compared to investment in fertilizer. This finding is 
consistent with the results reported by of Shively (1997), who found a positive relationship 
between farm size and investment in soil conservation in Philippines. Livestock ownership is 
found to have positive and significant effect on investment in organic and green manure, but 
negative and significant effect on the application of chemical fertilizer. Livestock ownership 
may be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for investment in organic manure. This is 
because the manure market functions quite well in the study area, with farmers buying and 
selling manure in the market. With regard to plot characteristics, we found that investments in 
all three types of measures are higher on fertile soils, where the marginal returns to such 
investments are likely to be much higher. Access to extension services and education also 
appear to increase the intensity of investments in soil conservation and productivity-
enhancing investments. Non-labor income, which also relaxes household liquidity constraints, 
also tends to increase the intensity of investment. 
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Table 5.4: Multivariate tobit estimates of extent of investment in soil conservation and 
productivity-enhancing measures 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in squared brackets. Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at 
the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. District fixed effects included in the estimation, but not reported here. 
 
 
Variable Organic Manure Green Manure Fertilizer 
Participation in non-farm work 
762.609*  
(451.52) 
356.986* 
(202.59) 
-444.531** 
(198.39) 
Own-cultivated   
658.964*** 
(233.66) 
417.658*** 
(125.41) 
-307.909* 
(168.03) 
Fix-rented  
-8.942*** 
(2.96) 
-4.360*** 
(1.58) 
1.772* 
(1.04) 
AgeHead 
-2.442 
(3.99) 
-0.028 
(0.02) 
0.277 
(1.73) 
Head  
5.184 
(91.68) 
0.201 
(0.46) 
37.112 
(39.21) 
HeadEdu 
9.801*** 
(3.36) 
1.007** 
(0.50) 
16.752*** 
(5.72) 
HHSizOvr14  
1.334 
(13.87) 
0.126* 
(0.07) 
6.029 
(47.13) 
livstk  
7.291*** 
(1.56) 
1.496** 
(0.63) 
-0.452* 
(0.26) 
TCultiLand  
1.885* 
(1.13) 
0.019* 
(0.01) 
-3.927** 
(1.82) 
Credit 
-57.149 
(71.39) 
-0.573 
(0.36) 
40.429 
(32.16) 
TTwell  
8.435 
(5.38) 
0.496* 
(0.28) 
1.709 
(24.74) 
NONLAB  
0.993* 
(0.571) 
0.031* 
(0.02) 
1.971* 
(1.13) 
SoiFert  
4.588* 
(2.61) 
0.037* 
(0.01) 
0.929 
(1.059) 
Exte0ff  
217.135*** 
(83.66) 
0.251 
(0.41) 
52.480 
(36.80) 
ResNF  
-0.155 
(0.19) 
-0.345 
(0.970) 
0.117 
(0.84) 
ResOwn  
-0.273 
(0.33) 
-0.779 
(0.66) 
-0.104 
(0.16) 
ResFix  
-0.338 
(0.43) 
-0.237 
(0.66) 
-0.709 
(0.56) 
Intercept 
1633.371*** 
(319.60) 
-0.9160 
(1.51) 
426.146*** 
(120.74) 
Number of observations 341 341 341 
Cross-equation correlations    
12   
0.218*** 
(0.06)  
 
13   
0.137** 
(0.07)  
 
23
  
0.724*** 
(0.06)  
 
Likelihood ratio test of     
12.70 
(0.00) 
 
2 -statistics for joint significance of residues 0.68  34.0  1.29  68.0  0.83 58.0  
2 - statistics for over identification 0.57  39.0  0.62  42.0   0.91 63.0   
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The coefficients presented in Table 5.4 indicate the impact of explanatory variables on 
the intensity of each investment measure, but do not indicate the differences in intensity levels 
of the investments. We therefore compute marginal effects to show the marginal contribution 
of each explanatory variable on the intensity of investment in soil-improving and 
productivity-enhancing practices. The computed marginal effects and their standard errors are 
presented in Table 5.5. Marginal effects of the regressors are evaluated at their sample means. 
All the values of marginal effects have the expected signs. The estimates show that 
participation in non-farm work increases the intensity of investment in organic manure and 
green manure by 60% and 42%, respectively, while it decreases the investment in chemical 
fertilizer by 36%. Looking at the tenancy arrangement variables, the results show that being 
an owner-cultivator increases the probability of investment in organic manure and green 
manure by 56% and 57%, respectively but, decreases the investment in chemical fertilizer by 
39%. On the other hand, being a fixed-renter increases the intensity of investment in chemical 
fertilizer by almost 54%. These findings are consistent with the notion that secured rights 
matters for investment in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures. Households 
endowed with valuable physical capital like farm land or livestock are more likely to invest in 
organic and green manure, as they capitalize their assets to finance longer term investment 
measures. Non-labor income tends to increase the likelihood of all three types of investment 
between 10% and 50%. 
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Table 5.5: Marginal effects on the marginal probability of investment (in %) 
Note: Standard errors of the estimated marginal effects are presented in parentheses. 
The results of the instrumental variable analysis that capture the impact of non-farm 
work and tenancy arrangement on farm productivity are presented in Table 5.6. We employed 
value of crop output per acre as dependent variable, given the significant diversity of crops on 
the farms. Given the potential endogeneity of the non-farm work and tenancy arrangement 
variables, they were instrumented by first estimating probit regression and then using the 
predicted values of these variables in the farm productivity estimation. The estimates in Table 
5.6 show a positive and significant effect of non-farm work on farm productivity, suggesting 
that income from non-farm work provides much needed capital for investment in soil- 
improving measures that eventually increases productivity.  
The coefficients for the both own-cultivated and fixed-rent variables are positive and 
significant, suggesting that productivity is higher on farm under these tenancy arrangements,  
compared to sharecropping contracts, even after adjusting for other factors. These results 
further support the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis which states that sharecroppers are 
Variable  Organic Manure Green Manure Fertilizers 
Participation in non-
farm work 
0.603(0.082) 0.418(0.193) -0.359(0.195) 
Own-cultivated 0.559(0.100) 0.568(0.218) -0.387(0.152) 
Fix-rented -0.694(0.173) -0.421(0.004) 0.541(0.226) 
AgeHead -0.912(0.653) -0.168(0.212) 0.856(0.326) 
Head 0.295(0.782) 0.164(0.193) 0.109(0.148) 
HeadEdu 0.621(0.127) 0.606(0.210) 0.638(0.379) 
HHSizOvr14 0.158(0.070) 0.129(0.072) 0.256(0.021) 
Livstk 0.558(0.008) 0.479(0.032) 0.322(0.024) 
TCultiLand 0.062(0.031) 0.064(0.001) -0.085(0.031) 
Credit -0.382 (0.377) -0.336(0.141) 0.351(0.087) 
TTwell 0.146(0.091) 0.212(0.043) 0.312 (0.591) 
NONLAB 0.103(0.01) 0.194(0.112) 0.504(0.122) 
SoiFert -0.024(0.002) -0.087(0.011) -0.044(0.021) 
Exte0ff 0.423(0.024) 0.291(0.122) 0.563(0.089) 
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less efficient than owners and fix-renters, due to the fact that they get only a share of the 
marginal output at a given level of input use. These results are consistent with the findings by 
Banerjee et al. (2002) for India and Abdulai et al. (2011) for Ghana, who found positive and 
significant impacts of tenure security on productivity in their studies. The results also show 
that physical assets like land, labor, farm equipments and human capital like education tend to 
increase farm productivity. 
Table 5.6: Instrumental variable estimates of determinants of land productivity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels.  
Predicted values of non-farm participation and tenancy arrangement variables are used. 
Wald test for the joint significance of the non-intercept exogenous variables against a critical value of 14.30
2
)05.0,19(   
The instrument used in the non-farm equation is migration status. In tenancy arrangement equations, distance and location are 
used as instruments.  
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Participation in non-farm work 0.135** 2.24 
Own-cultivated 1.309*** 7.61 
Fix-rented 1.067*** 5.32 
Organic Manure 0.050*** 4.16 
Fertilizers 0.011* 1.72 
TCultiLand 0.329* 1.68 
Equipments 0.688** 2.30 
Family labor 0.164* 1.85 
Hired labor 0.422*** 3.50 
Head 0.840* 1.76 
HeadEdu 0.275* 1.70 
AgeHead -0.016 -1.06 
HHsizOvr14 0.164  1.49 
livstk 3.593*** 7.47 
location1 -0.0112 -0.02 
location2 -1.274* -1.86 
location3 -0.602 -0.96 
location4 -1.29 -1.82 
location5 0.649 1.10 
Constant 6.656*** 6.18 
R
2
 0.2984  
Adjusted  R
2
 0.2637  
Wald-statistics  )19(2  36.61  
F-value 121.29  
Prob>F 0.00  
Number of obsevations 341  
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Although our results show that tenure security have positive impacts on investment in 
soil-improving measures and agricultural productivity, it is also significant to examine the 
direct relationship between investment and productivity. We therefore, employed a propensity 
score matching approach to examine the direct effects of investment in organic manure, green 
manure, and chemical fertilizer on farm productivity. Table 5.7 presents the average treatment 
effects (ATT) estimated by nearest neighbor (NNM) and kernel-based methods (KBM). The 
matching results from both approaches generally indicate that investment in organic manure, 
green manure, and mineral fertilizer exert a positive impact on farm productivity, indicating 
that may partly account for the productivity impacts of tenure security. 
Table 5.7: Average treatment effect for organic manure, green manure and fertilizer 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels. 
ATT is the Average Treatment effect for the Treated.  
NNM stands for Nearest Neighbor Matching and KBM stands for Kernel Based Matching. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matching Outcome ATT No. of 
treated 
No. of 
controls 
Common
support 
imposed 
Balancing 
property 
satisfied 
Organic 
Manure 
NNM Output 
value per 
acre 
254002.08**(2.31) 192 147 Yes Yes 
KBM 230887.26*(1.97) 192 147 Yes Yes 
Green 
Manure 
NNM Output 
value per 
acre 
34130.03**(2.03) 271 68 Yes Yes 
KBM 27542.06***(2.96) 271 68 Yes Yes 
Fertilizer NNM Output 
value per 
acre 
266991.271**(2.33) 306 29 Yes Yes 
KBM 234394.563**(2.21) 306 29 Yes Yes 
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Land tenure arrangements in developing countries tend to have significant implications for 
allocative and farm productivity. The imperfect financial markets in these countries also make 
non-farm work a source of liquidity to overcome credit and insurance market constraints, and 
increase investment in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures in farming, which 
is the main source of income and food security for poor households. This study utilized cross-
sectional rural household level data collected in 2010 from a randomly selected sample of 341 
households in Punjab province of Pakistan to examine the effects of non-farm work and 
tenancy arrangements on the intensity of investment in soil-improving and productivity-
enhancing measures, as well as farm productivity. The empirical results show the significance 
of controlling for potential endogeneity of investment intensity and variables such as tenancy 
arrangement and participation in non-farm work when examining the effects of these 
variables. Our findings add to existing evidence that non-farm work and tenancy 
arrangements influence investment in longer term soil-improving measures and agricultural 
productivity. 
The evidence from our analysis suggests that participation in non-farm work increases 
the intensity of investment in soil-improving measures such as organic manure and green 
manure, but decreases the use of chemical fertilizer. Thus, household participation in non-
farm work induces a shift toward investment in soil-improving measures with long-term 
benefits, and away from static inputs such as chemical fertilizer with short-term benefits. The 
findings are consistent with the evidence that non-farm income can be used to finance long-
term farm investment (Savagado et al., 1994; Oseni and Winters, 2009). We also find 
evidence that participation in non-farm work exerts positive and significant impact on farm 
productivity, suggesting that access to non-farm work opportunities can contribute to higher 
farm household incomes and poverty reduction in rural areas.  
The analysis also reveals that land tenancy arrangements influence investment intensity 
in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures. In particular, owner-cultivators 
invested more in soil-improving measures, but less in chemical fertilizer. On the other hand, 
fixed-rent tenants invested less in soil-improving measures, but more in chemical fertilizer. 
These findings confirm the notion that farmers on short-term fixed-rent contracts normally 
aim for short-term benefits and therefore tend to invest more in static inputs such as chemical 
fertilizer. However, owner-cultivators, with secured property rights, mostly target longer term 
benefits from their agricultural investments. 
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Overall, our findings suggest that the strengthening of tenure security, either through 
land reforms to improve ownership or improving tenancy contracts through longer tenure 
durations can have positive impacts on investment in soil-improving measures and 
agricultural productivity. Moreover, improving the access of rural farm households to non-
farm opportunities can have significant investment and productivity effects. In particular, in 
rural areas with imperfect credit markets, where farm households find it difficult to obtain 
credit, improving non-farm work opportunities could provide a substitute for credit as a 
mechanism to facilitate investment in longer term soil-improving measures and increasing 
agricultural productivity. 
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Appendix 
Table 5.A.1: Difference in investment and other key characteristics by owners and fix-renters 
status                                       
     
Variable Description Owner       Fix-
renter   
Diff. t-values 
Organic Organic manure used per acre(kgs) 338.05 257.69 80.35* 1.77 
Green Leguminous crops grown per acre 0.72 0.44 0.27 0.77 
Fertilizer Chemical fertilizer applied per 
acre(kgs) 
343.24 387.76 -44.52* 1.71 
OutValue Output value per acre in rupees 391135.2 289372 101763.2** 2.03 
Head  1 if female is the head of HH,0 
otherwise 
0.77 0.92 -0.15*** 3.06 
HeadEdu   Years of education of HH head 2.32 1.96 0.37** 2.43 
AgeHead Age of HH head (years) 49.09 40.00 9.09*** 5.47 
HHSizOvr14 No.of HH members <14 years 4.03 4.07 -0.05 0.15 
Livstk(%) 1 if HH has livestock,0 otherwise 0.89 0.97 -0.08** 2.15 
TCultiLand  Total cultivated land in acres 21.46 33.43 -11.98** 2.28 
Credit(%) 1 if HH has access to credit, 0 
otherwise 
0.86 0.45 0.41* 1.73 
NONLAB  Unearned income in rupees 5.49 0.95 4.54*** 3.16 
TTwell  Number of tube well 1.21 0.60 0.61*** 4.81 
SoiFert(%)  1 if land is fertile, 0 otherwise 0.95 0.65 0.3* 1.81 
Exte0ff(%) 1 if HH has contact to extension 
agent, 0 otherwise 
0.25 0.16 0.08* 1.68 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels.  
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Table 5.A.2: Difference in investment and other key characteristics by owners and 
sharecroppers status                                         
              
Variable Description Owner Share-
cropper 
Diff. t-values 
Organic    Organic Organic manure used per 
acre(kgs) 
338.05 286.48 52.00** 2.15 
Green Leguminous crops grown per 
acre 
0.72 0.25 0.47 0.70 
Fertilizer Chemical fertilizer applied per 
acre(kgs) 
343.24 311.60 31.64 0.56 
OutValue Output value per acre in rupees 391135.2 153266.54 237868.66** 2.12 
Head  1 if female is the head of HH,0 
otherwise 
0.77 0.90 -0.12 1.29 
HeadEdu   Years of education of  HH head 2.32 1.80 0.52* 1.86 
AgeHead Age of household head (years) 49.09 45.00 4.09* 1.87 
HHSizOvr14 No.of HH members< 14 years 4.03 3.9 0.13 0.21 
livstk(%) 1 if HH has livestock,0 otherwise 0.89 0.8 0.09** 2.01 
TCultiLand  Total cultivated land in acres 21.46 14.71 6.74* 1.78 
Credit(%) 1 if HH has access to credit, 0 
otherwise 
0.86 0.25 0.61*** 2.73 
NONLAB  Unearned income in rupees 5.49 1.78 3.71* 1.96 
TTwell  Number of tube well 1.21 0.35 0.86*** 2.81 
SoiFert(%)  1 if land is fertile, 0 otherwise 0.95 0.76 0.19* 1.69 
Exte0ff(%) 1 if HH has contact to extension 
agent, 0 otherwise 
0.25 0.05 0.20** 2.04 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels.  
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Table 5.A.3: Difference in investment and other key characteristics by fix-renter and 
sharecroppers status                                          
              
Variable Description Fix-
renter        
Share-
cropper 
Diff. t-values 
Organic    Organic Organic manure used per 
acre(kgs) 
257.69 286.48 -28.79* 1.68 
Green Leguminous crops grown per 
acre 
0.44 0.25 0.19 0.42 
Fertilizer Chemical fertilizer applied per 
acre(kgs) 
387.76 311.60 76.16* 1.72 
OutValue Output value per acre in rupees 289372 153266.54 136105.46* 1.96 
Head  1 if female is the head of HH,0 
otherwise 
0.92 0.90 0.02 0.34 
HeadEdu   Years of education of HH head 1.96 1.80 0.16* 1.76 
AgeHead Age of HH head (years) 40.00 45.00 -5.0** 2.36 
HHSizOvr14 No.of HHmembers < 14 years 4.07 3.9 0.17 0.27 
livstk(%) 1 if HH has livestock,0 
otherwise 
0.97 0.8 0.17*** 2.86 
TCultiLand  Total cultivated land in acres 33.43 14.71 18.72* 1.91 
Credit(%) 1 if HH has access to credit, 0 
otherwise 
0.45 0.25 0.25* 1.69 
NONLAB  Unearned income in rupees 0.95 1.78 -0.83 0.69 
TTwell  Number of tube well 0.60 0.35 0.25*** 3.53 
SoiFert(%)  1 if land is fertile, 0 otherwise 0.65 0.76 -0.11* 1.83 
Exte0ff(%) 1 if HH has contact to extension 
agent, 0 otherwise 
0.16 0.05 0.11 1.32 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The analysis conducted in this study aimed at examining the labor supply responses of male 
and female members of rural household to changes in economic opportunities under the 
assumption of non-separability; second the factors that influence the household’s decision to 
participate in non-farm work and impact of participation on household welfare; third impact 
of non-farm work and land rights on the intensity of investment in soil-improving and yield-
enhancing measures and farm productivity. The major objective of this study is to examine 
the welfare activities of households living in rural areas.  In the present study effort has been 
made to investigate three diverse aspects of rural household development and welfare 
activities. This chapter first gives an overview of the study by summarizing major findings 
and review of methods applied. The conclusions and policy implications based on the findings 
are given at the end. 
6.1 Study Focus and Review of Methods 
Several studies in Pakistan have examined the role of gender in crop activities, fulfilling food 
demand of household, and inequality in resource access etc. Some studies investigated the 
linkages between agrarian change and gender relation. A very few studies examined the labor 
supply of household and tested presence of imperfect labor and factor markets as a by-product 
but no study has estimated the labor allocation of male and female on different activities 
(own-farm, non-farm, agri-wage) in Pakistan under the assumption of non-separability.  
 In this study hypothesis of separability in agricultural household models was tested by 
applying three tests; first test is based on the Benjamin (1992) test which focused on the 
relationship between production decision and preferences of the household; second test is 
based on the Jacoby (1993) test which tested the equality of market wage and shadow wage; 
and third test is the Le (2010) generalized test which combined both the Benjamin and the 
Jacoby tests into one relationship. 
In the past, few studies have explicitly analyzed household welfare effect of non-farm 
work participation but these studies did not account the selectivity bias due to unobservable 
factors. The present study acknowledges the differences in welfare outcome variables 
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between those farm-households that did and did not participate in non-farm work due to 
observed and unobserved factors by applying endogenous switching regression approach. The 
study also employed the propensity matching approach to further examine the impact of 
participation on household welfare, and to also check the robustness of findings from the 
endogenous switching regression model. 
The study also focused on the impact of non-farm and tenancy arrangements on the 
intensity of investment in agriculture. Very few studies that have analyzed the link between 
tenancy arrangements and farm investment through increased income possibilities from non-
farm work, considered non-farm work as exogenous. This study considered participation in 
non-farm work and land tenure arrangement as endogenous to investment decisions. 
6.2 Summary of Results and Implications for Policy 
 
 6.2.1 Gender based Labor Activity of Farm Households 
 
In developing countries markets are imperfect and wage data is not available so shadow 
wages and shadow income are important variables for estimating the labor supply of rural 
household. The study shows that labor supply of both male and female is sensitive to changes 
in shadow wages and income. 
The cross male wage effect on the non-farm and agri-wage labor supply of female is 
negative, indicating the sensitiveness to change in male wage. This is probably due to 
reallocation of time by female from income generating to non income generating personal 
matters. The cross female wage effect on the male labor supply is positive, showing that 
males are not much sensitive to reduce their labor supply even when females earn more from 
income generating activities. Education significantly increases the non-farm labor supply of 
both male and female, while decreases the labor supply of own-farm and agri-wage work, 
suggesting the potential role of education in shifting labor from agriculture to high return non-
farm sector. Thus education improves the ability of individuals to assign resources in response 
to changing economic conditions. Social caste system plays an important role in allocating the 
labor in different activities. In upper caste, female labor supply decreases in non-farm and 
agri-wage work due to cultural and social barriers for mobility. The results reveal that socially 
backward castes have higher constraints to enter in non-farm sector in the sense they face 
higher transaction costs. Well developed village infrastructure increases the possibilities to 
participate in non-farm work.  
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The functioning of labor market in Pakistan is tested by applying three tests of 
separability. All these tests strongly reject the separability assumption showing the 
dependence of production and consumption decisions of rural households in Pakistan. This 
finding is in line with much of development literature showing the existence of imperfect 
markets in developing economies. The study emphasizes the importance of labor allocation 
decisions under different factors for designing policy for the welfare of rural households. 
6.2.2 Determinants and Welfare Impacts of Non-farm Work 
The study shows that education level of household head, adult household size, and physical 
infrastructure tend to increase the probability of participation of both male and female in non-
farm work. Alternatively, lack of access to land, livestock, and credit tends to decrease the 
likelihood of participation in non-farm work, for both male and female.  
The welfare equation reveals that education increases welfare and reduces poverty of 
both participant and non-participant by increasing the efficiencies of individual activities. 
Farm size increases the per head expenditures and reduces the poverty level for both 
participants and non-participants. Adult household size tends to positively and significantly 
increase the welfare of participants, but has negative impact on the welfare of non-
participants. The findings of this study generally confirm the potential positive role of the 
non-farm work in improving rural household welfare and alleviating poverty in rural areas of 
developing countries. The study shows that although the participation rate of female in non-
farm work is low but its contribution towards increased welfare is more as compared to male. 
It highlights strategies for policy makers to reduce barriers for entering into non-farm sector 
especially for female. 
 6.2.3 Influence of Non-farm Work and Land Rights on the Intensity of Investment  
Non-farm work and secured property rights do matter in household’s decision to invest in 
agriculture. The results show that participation in non-farm work increases the intensity of 
investment in soil-improving measures such as organic manure and green manure, but 
decreases the use of chemical fertilizer. This reveals that non-farm income can be used to 
finance long-term farm investment by overcoming liquidity constraint. 
The analysis also shows that land tenancy arrangements influence investment intensity 
in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures. Specifically, owner-cultivators invest 
more in soil-improving measures, but less in chemical fertilizer. On the other hand, fixed-rent 
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tenants invest less in soil-improving measures, but more in chemical fertilizer. Our findings 
also reveal that secured property rights and non-farm work have positive impact on farm 
productivity. Overall, our findings suggest that strengthening of tenure security and access of 
rural farm households to non-farm opportunities can have significant investment and 
productivity effects. 
6.3 Policy Implications 
The findings summarized above indicate a number of important policy implications. Although 
it is difficult to derive general policy recommendation due to heterogeneity of non-farm sector 
in developing countries but as non-farm work has proved to increase welfare and reduce 
poverty level of household, as well as it provides finance to make investments in the 
agriculture sector so the policy makers should target to reduce entry barriers of non-farm 
work, especially for females.  
It is the need of time that policymakers and government agencies should introduce 
projects with the core issue to develop rural areas. Proper attention should be given to expand 
infrastructure, investment in human capital and small scale industries. Besides these, skill 
development and resource management programs should be introduced. Government poverty 
reduction strategies should address the poor people, especially females to encourage them to 
engage in non-farm work in order to reduce poverty. Strengthening the formal credit and 
insurance markets can be used to protect rural poor people from income shortfall due to 
agricultural risk. 
As the study shows that secured land rights influence the decision of household to 
invest in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures and farm productivity, so there 
is a need of revisiting the issue of land tenure security by formulating and implementing land 
reforms in Pakistan. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Questionnaire 
 
Gender based Labor Supply, Income Diversification and Household Welfare: 
Evidence from Pakistan 
 
Instructions 
 The questionnaire contains 6 sections and 17 pages. Please check that the blank 
questionnaires have no missing pages or sections.  
 Please prefer to interview household head, if it not possible then most important 
member of household. 
 First introduce yourself and explain thoroughly the purpose of the survey.  
 Please stick to the units in which figures and values are asked. 
 Please use codes where provided.  
 Please fill out the all details as correctly as possible. 
 Please note that the information will be kept secret and will not be disclosed to 
anyone. 
  
Time interview commenced: -------------------- Time interview concluded: ------------------ 
Case No.: ------------------------------------------- Date:  ------------------------------------------- 
District: --------------------------------------------- Tehsil:   ---------------------------------------- 
Village: ----------------------------------------------       Name of Respondent:   ----------------------- 
Distance of village from the city: ------------------ (km) 
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1/General information of the respondent 
Please write down the basic information about the respondent. 
Gender 
1=Male   
2=Female 
Age 
(Years) 
Marital status 
1= Unmarried  
2= Married  
3= Widow/ Widower  
4=Divorced  
5=Separated (living 
separately) 
 
Head of 
household 
1=Male  
2=Female 
How he/she become head 
1= Inherited 
2= Marriage 
3= Widow 
4= Divorced / Separated  
5= Migration 
6= Sickness 
7= Death 
8= Ability 
Relation with 
Head 
1= Head(self) 
2= Spouse 
3= Child 
4= Parent 
5= Other kin 
6= Other(specify) 
      --------------- 
      
 
2/ Village level information 
2.1: Village Infrastructure 
Please mark (X) in the yes column if facility is available in the village otherwise in column of 
No. If facility is not available then write distance at which facility is available. 
Items Yes No Distance 
(Km) 
Items Yes No Distance 
(Km) 
Mettle road    Electricity    
Brick road(soling)    Commercial bank    
Boy’s school    Agri. bank    
Girl’s school    Agri -extension office    
Hospital    Agri- research centre    
Veterinary centre    Crop output market    
Dairy centre    Input dealer    
Drinking  water supply    Shop for handicrafts    
Sanitation    Factory/Mill    
Transport    Other 
(Specify)_______ 
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2.2: Prevailing wages in village 
Please write the no. of meal, cash pay and value of wages in kind per unit (day, acre, task, 
months etc) of male, female and children for different agricultural tasks. 
 
 
Task 
Unit 
1=Day 
2=Acre 
3=Task 
4=Month 
5=Other 
(specify) 
________ 
Male >14 years Female>14 years  Child (10-14 years) 
No. of 
meals 
Cash 
pay 
(Rs) 
In-kind 
(Value) 
(Rs) 
No. of 
meals 
Cash 
pay 
(Rs) 
In-kind 
(Value) 
(Rs) 
No. of 
meals 
Cash 
pay 
(Rs) 
In-kind 
(Value) 
(Rs) 
*Prevailing agri-
wages  
          
Land preparation           
Planting           
Weeding/Hoeing           
Spraying           
Paddy 
transplanting 
          
Irrigation           
Harvesting of 
wheat 
          
Threshing of wheat           
Picking of cotton           
Digging of 
potatoes 
          
Cutting of fodder             
Livestock caring           
Milk sale           
Other 
(specify)_______ 
          
*is the regular agri-wages prevailing in village and all others are seasonal wages. 
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3/Household Related information 
Please use given codes for the following household related information. 
3.1: Family type ------------------              1=Nuclear, 2=Joint 
3.2: Caste of family     ------------------    1= Top caste,  2=Middle caste,      3=Lower caste 
3.3: Inheritance of property ------------     1=Only son,           2=Only daughter,      3= 2:1 ration to son &daughter
            4= Wife,                 5=Other kin,  6= Other (specify) 
3.4: Household size and education profile 
Members *Level of 
education 
 Members *Level of 
education 
Members  *Level of 
education 
Respondent  Female         1  Male child         3  
Head  Female         2  Male child         4  
Male       1  Female         3  Female child     1  
Male       2  Female         4  Female child     2  
Male       3  Male child    1  Female child     3  
Male       4  Male child    2  Female child     4  
*1=Illiterate, 2=1-5 years of schooling, 3=6-10 years of schooling, 4=Above 10 years of schooling, 5=University level 
3.5: No. of children less than 5 years -----------3.6: No. of handicapped in the family ---------   
3.7: Socio-economic characteristics 
Please indicate code in front column of socio-economic characteristics. 
Soil Fertility 
1=Fertile,  2=Better than average,  3=Average 4=Poor than 
average                                                                                                                                 
 House 
1=Earthen,    2=Cemented 
 
 Land Type   
1=Clay,   2=Loam,   3=Clay loam,  4=Sandy loam, 5=Silt 
loam,  6=Other(___________________)                                               
 Rights on house 
1=Owned,   2=Rented,  3= Of landlord 
 
 Power Source 
1=Bullocks,  2=Own tractor,  3=Rented tractor, 4=Bullock+ 
Own tractor,   5=Bullocks+ Rented tractor 
 Dwelling for cattle 
1=Katcha,  2=Pakka,  3=Mix               
 
 Irrigation Source 
1=Only Rain,    2=Canal,    3=Tube well,  4=Canal+ Tube well,   
5=Small dam, 6=Dugwells,   7=Turbines,    8=Other(specify) 
 Location of Livestock shed 
1= Connected with house      2=Inside house,                              
3= Separated 
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3.8: Ownership of resources 
Please write the no. of things that are owned by male, female or both in the relevant column. 
Items Male 
(No.) 
Female 
(No.) 
Combined 
(No.) 
Items Male 
(No.) 
Female 
(No.) 
Combined 
(No.) 
Land(acre)    Hen    
Fixed deposit 
(Specify__________ 
   Tractor    
TV    Trolley    
Radio    Tube well    
Mobile    Leveler    
Car    Thresher    
Refrigerator    Cultivator    
Madani    Rotavator    
Washing machine    Plough    
Sewing machine    Ridger    
Motorbike    Drill (rabi, kharif)    
Cows/Buffaloes    Tractor driven drill    
Goats/Sheep    Fodder cutter    
Horses/Donkey    Sprayer    
Oxen    Other(specify_____    
3.9: Farming unit 
Tenancy Status__________                      1=Owner,      2=Tenant,     3=Owner-cum-Tenant 
Kind of Tenancy_________                            1=Fixed rent,     2=Sharecropping 
Total owned land 
(Acres) 
Area leased/rented 
(Acres) 
Area  shared  
(Acres) 
Total cultivated land 
(Acres) 
Averaged
istance to 
field  
(km) 
Cultivated Uncultivated In Out In Out Irrigated Un irrigated 
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Land rent per year if land was rented in or out------------------- (Rs) 
Owner share percentage if land shared in or shared out/6 months -------------------- 
Is landlord residing in the same village? ------------   1=Yes,    2=No 
No. of years under the contract ---------------  
 No. of times contract renewed------------- 
 
3.10: Farm Employment record of household 
Please write down the record of all household members who spent their time in cropping.  
Member 
 
Working 
 
*1=Fulltime 
*2=Partime  
No. of years 
spent in 
farming 
(Years) 
Daily hours 
worked 
(Hours) 
Member 
 
Working 
 
*1=Fulltime 
*2=Partime  
No. of years 
spent in 
farming 
(Years) 
Daily hours 
worked 
 
(Hours) 
Respondent    2    
Head  
 
  3    
*Male 1    4    
2    *Child 1    
3    2    
4    3    
*Female1    4    
*Male/Female=15-60 years, *Child =10-14 years.  
*Fulltime= only doing farming, * Partime= in additional to farming, doing other job. 
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3.11: Non-farm employment record 
Please fill in the following information regarding non-farm activities. 
Person Activity 
name 
No. of 
years 
spent  
(Years) 
Location 
1=Village 
2=Other  
village 
3=City 
4-Other 
district 
5=Other 
province 
6=Other 
country 
Distance 
Of work 
place 
(Km) 
Mode of 
Transporta
tion 
1=Foot 
2=Bullock cart 
3=Cycle/bike 
4=Motorized 
5=Mixed 
(foot+vehicle) 
6=Other 
(specify)--------
- 
Work 
hours 
/day 
 
 
 
Entry 
constrains 
1=Family 
2=Religious 
3=Travelling 
4=Pardha 
5=Attitude of 
people 
6=Discrimination 
7=No one 
Attitude 
of people 
at work 
place 
 
1=Good 
2=Bad 
3=Neutral 
Pay/month 
 
 
 
(Rs) 
Respond
ent 
1 
2 
        
Head 1 
2 
        
Male 1 
 
1 
2 
        
2 
 
1 
2 
        
3 
 
1 
2 
        
4 
 
1 
2 
        
Female1  
 
     
1 
2 
        
2 
 
1 
2 
        
3 
 
1 
2 
        
4 1 
2 
        
Child 1 
 
1 
2 
        
2 
 
1 
2 
        
3 
 
1 
2 
        
4 
 
1 
2 
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3.12: Participation in domestic activities 
 Please write down the daily working hours spent on domestic activities of household 
members 
 
Activities 
No. of hours/day  
Activities 
No. of hours/day 
Male Female Male Female 
Cooking   Poultry activity   
Childcare   Animal byproducts   
Elder care   FYM collection   
Cleaning   Education/Training   
Washing   Visiting friends   
Fetching water   Watching movie/TV   
Collecting firewood   Listening radio   
Embroidery/Sewing   Sleep/Rest   
Livestock caring   Other(specify)_________   
3.13: Participation in cropping activities  
Please write down the number of hours worked by family and hired labor for different 
cropping activities of three major crops, vegetables and fruits. 
 
Activity 
Crop____Wheat 
Family labor Hired labor 
Male 
(No. of hours) 
Female 
(No. of hours) 
Child 
(No. of hours) 
Male 
(No. of hours) 
Female 
(No. of hours) 
Child 
(No. of hours) 
Land preparation       
Sowing       
Irrigation       
Weeding/Hoeing       
Spraying       
Fertilizer application       
Harvesting       
Threshing       
Transport        
Sale       
Processing/storage       
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Activity 
Crop____Cotton 
Family labor Hired labor 
Male 
(No. of hours) 
Female 
(No. of hours) 
Child 
(No. of hours) 
Male 
(No. of hours) 
Female 
(No. of hours) 
Child 
(No. of hours) 
Land preparation       
Sowing       
Irrigation       
Weeding/Hoeing       
Spraying       
Fertilizer application       
Picking       
Cutting of sticks       
Transport        
Sale       
       
Activity Crop__ Sugarcane/Rice 
Land 
preparation/nursery 
      
Sowing/transplanting       
Irrigation       
Weeding/Hoeing       
Spraying       
Fertilizer application       
Harvesting       
Gur making/Husking       
Transport        
Sale       
Processing/storage       
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Activity 
Vegetables __________ 
Family labor Hired labor 
Male 
(No. of hours) 
Female 
(No. of hours) 
Child 
(No. of hours) 
Male 
(No. of hours) 
Female 
(No. of hours) 
Child 
(No. of hours) 
Land preparation       
Sowing       
Irrigation       
Weeding/Hoeing       
Spraying       
Fertilizer application       
Harvesting       
Sorting/Packing       
Transport        
Sale       
Processing/storage       
 
Activity 
Fruits __________ 
Caring/trimming       
Irrigation       
Weeding/spraying       
Fertilizer application       
Picking       
Sorting/Packing       
Transport /sale       
Processing/storage       
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4/Income record of household 
4.1: Income from crops 
Crops Area 
(Acre) 
Yield/ 
acre 
(Maund) 
 
Price/ 
unit 
(Rs) 
Total 
cost/ 
Acre 
(Rs) 
Total 
Quantity 
sold 
(Maund) 
Total 
Quantity 
lost 
(Maund) 
*Reasons 
of lost 
Use code 
Quantity 
Consumed 
(Maund) 
Hold on 
income 
1=Male      
2 =Female 
Wheat          
Cotton          
Rice          
Sugarcane          
Maize          
Fodder          
Beans          
Tobacco          
Vegetable
1 
         
2          
3          
Fruits 1          
2          
3          
Other  
(specify---
-------- 
         
*1=Weather, 2=Rainfall/drought, 3=Flood, 4=Pest/disease, 5=Animal damage, 6=Financial, 7=Price of output, 
8=Transportation, 9= Other (specify) 
 
4.2: Was the food production enough to meet the household requirement? -------  1=Yes, 2=No 
 
4.3: Were there seasonal food shortage? ------    1=Yes, 2=No      If yes then how many 
months/year--- 
 
4.4: Did you get same price of major crops which was fixed by Govt? ------     1=Yes, 2=No 
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4.5: If No then, reason----------------------------- 
4.6: Did you get inputs at same prices which were fixed by Govt? -------   1=Yes, 2=No  
 
4.7: If No then, reason------------------------------ 
 
4.8: Any insurance of crop failure or help by Govt --------            1=Yes, 2=No  
 
4.9: Any subsidy by Govt for input purchase ---------                          1=Yes, 2=No  
 
4.10: Income from agri-wage employment 
Please write down the record of wages (cash, in-kind) of work done on farm of another person 
during the last year. 
Persons Work type 
*1=skilled 
*2=unskilled 
Cash wage / 
month 
(Rs) 
Value of wage in-
kind/Month 
(Rs) 
How many months 
you worked in last 
year 
Hold on 
income 
1=Male 
2=Female 
Respondent      
Head      
Male 1      
2      
3      
4      
Female 1      
2      
3      
4      
Children 1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
*1=skilled, is the work in which person has got training of few weeks/ months or have some formal education 
 (8-10 years). *2=unskilled , is the work in which person has not got any training or formal education. 
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4.11: Income from livestock and Poultry 
Items Quantity sold last year Quantity consumed last year Price/Unit 
(Rs) 
Hold on 
income 
1=Male 
2=Female 
 Quantity 
 
Unit 
1=Unit 
2=Litre 
3=Dozen 
Frequency 
1=Daily 
2=Weekly 
3=Monthly 
4=Annual 
Quantity 
 
Unit 
1=Unit 
2=Litre 
3=Dozen 
Frequency 
1=Daily 
2=Weekly 
3=Monthly 
4=Annual 
Cattle  
 
        
Goats/Sheep 
 
        
Milk/Cream 
 
        
Butter/Ghee 
 
        
Meat         
Hides         
Wool         
Eggs 
 
        
Broilers 
 
        
Layers 
 
        
Manure 
 
        
Fish 
 
        
Honey 
 
        
Other(specify) 
---------------- 
        
Did you hire labor for livestock caring-------------     1=Yes, 2=No  ,    if yes then how many  ----- 
Cash wages/month of one labor (Rs)------------- Value of in-kind wages/month of one 
labor(Rs) -   
4.12: Income from other sources 
Items Income/ 
year (Rs) 
Hold on 
income 
1=Male           
2=Female 
Items Income/ 
year (Rs) 
Hold on 
income 
1=Male 
2=Female 
Rental income of property   Widow pension   
Rental income of agri- 
equipments 
  Social securities 
(accidental death benefit) 
  
Income from water sale   Zakat   
 Old age pension   Other(specify)__________   
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5/Expenditure and saving record of the household 
5.1: Household expenditure in the last year 
Items Expenditure/year (Rs) Items Expenditure/year (Rs) 
Housing (rent/repair)  Medical  
Food items  Education  
Clothing and footwear  Recreation  
Tobacco  Water charges  
Fuel, lighting  Durable goods  
Electricity  Social expenses 
(Marriages, gifts etc.) 
 
Transport  Miscellaneous  
Livestock  Personal  
Poultry  Other(specify)----------  
5.2: Is price of food items changed during the year--------1=Yes, 2=No       if yes, then next 
question 
5.3: Trend of change-----------------      1=1-3 months, 2=4-6 months, 3= 7-9 months, 4=10-12 month 
5.4: Saving per year (Rs) ------------- 
6/Access to resources and decision making 
6.1: Did you hire agri.equipments during cropping season-------    1=Yes, 2= No  
6.2: If No, then reason ----------       1=Shortage, 2=Costly, 3=No one willing to give, 4=other 
6.3: Have you ever borrowed money---------  1=Yes, 2= No 
If yes, then fill in the following table regarding credit information for the previous five years. 
Source 
*1=Formal 
*2=Informal 
Year Amount 
(Rs) 
Length of 
duration  
(No. of Years) 
Interest 
rate (%) 
Total no. of 
Installments 
Amount of 
Installment 
(Rs) 
Purpose Benefited? 
1=Yes 2=No 
         
         
         
*1=Formal (Commercial bank/Agri-bank/Govt institute/NGO). *2=Informal (Friends, Relatives, Farmer group, Money 
lender).  
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6.4: If the loan needed collateral?---------------- 1=Yes, 2= No , if yes then what type------------------ 
6.5: Time lapse between application and loan disbursement------------------months 
6.6: Whether you repaid loan in time----------------1=Yes, 2= No,     if No then reason of it---------- 
6.7: If you never applied for a loan, what is the main reason? -------------- 
1= Amount of loan offered is insufficient   2= Procedures are too complicated 
3= Interest rates are too high   4= Guarantee/collateral required is too much 
5= Maturity period is too short   6= I did not need 
7= I do not believe in paying interest   8= Other (specify) ---------------- 
 
6.8: What was the main reason your application was rejected? --------------- 
1= Incomplete documents   2= Complete but not convincing documents 
3= Insufficient guarantees/collateral   4= Insufficient initial capital 
5= Activity/enterprise was deemed not viable  6= Other (specify) ------------------------ 
 
6.9: Is there any discrimination between male and female for getting loan--------  1=Yes,2=No 
 
6.10: If you got the loan, did you need more?-----------   1=Yes,2=No 
 
6.11: Access to sources of information 
 
Please write in the relevant box of male and female if they are getting or not information from 
mentioned sources. If yes indicate the frequency of contact from codes. 
 
Source Male          
1=Yes  2= No 
*Frequency of contact 
(Use code) 
Female        
1=Yes   2= No 
*Frequency of contact                    
(Use code) 
Newspaper     
Radio     
TV     
NGO /Govt agent     
Extension services     
Fellow farmers     
Other(specify)     
*1=Daily, 2=Weekly, 3=Fortnightly, 4=Monthly, 5=Thrice a year, 6=Twice a year, 7=Yearly, 8=Other (specify). 
6.12: Are you member of any organization -------------         1=Yes, 2= No      if yes then proceed 
Name of organization No. of meetings/year *Services obtained Demerits 
    
    
    
*1= Loan, 2=Purchase of input, 3=Marketing, 4=Extension advice, 5=Training, 6=Other (specify) 
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6.13: Was there any development program in the village ---------  1=Yes, 2= No    if yes then 
proceed 
Name of project Sponsored by 
 
Target group? Completed 
1=Yes, 2= No 
Benefit? 
(Specify) 
     
     
 
6.14: Diseases 
Is there any household member suffered from chronic disease during the last year_____                
1=Yes, 2=No.   if yes go to next section 
Member 
1=Male   
2=Female   
3=Male child 
5=Female child 
4=Elder 
Disease 
name 
For how 
long was 
ill 
(No. of 
Months) 
Who took 
care  
1=Male 
2=Female 
Treated from  
1=Indigenous 
2=Religious person 
3=Govt hospital 
4=Private doctor 
5=Charitable(NGO) 
6=Other(specify) 
How much 
money Spent 
(Rs) 
Recovered 
 
1=Yes  2=No 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
 
6.15: Role in decision making 
Please write from the codes about person who makes decision in different tasks. 
Items *Who make decision 
(Use code) 
Items *Who make decision 
(Use code) 
Crop selection  Sale of product  
Credit  Schooling of children  
Seed   Non-farm work of male  
Fertilizer  Non-farm work of female   
Pesticide/Chemical  Income of male  
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Hiring of labor  Income of female  
Land purchase/ sale  Income spending  
Milk/Ghee sale  Investment   
Cattle purchase/sale  Other(_______________)  
*1=Male, 2=Female,3=Combined (Male+ Female), 4=Son, 5=Daughter, 6=Elder, 7=Other(Specify) 
6.16: Do you think that women’s participation in different activities is necessary for 
strengthening income level and general welfare of the household? -------------  1=Yes, 2=No 
 
6.17: Problem/constraints that you face for taking part in non-farm earning activities 
1---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
6.18: Suggestions to improve participation in non-farm activities 
 
1---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Please say many thanks to respondent for his time and information 
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Appendix B: Curriculum Vitae 
 
Personal Information 
 
Name  : Rakhshanda Kousar 
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Nationality : Pakistani 
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